Opinion
SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2012-263
09-20-2012
State of Vermont v. David F. Merriam
ENTRY ORDER
APPEALED FROM:
Superior Court, Bennington Unit,
Criminal Division
DOCKET NO. 660-7-12 Bncr
Trial Judge: Karen R. Carroll
In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:
The State appeals an order assigning defendant David Merriam to the Department of Corrections' home-detention program pending trial. I affirm.
Defendant was charged July 2, 2012, with second-degree aggravated domestic assault, interfering with access to emergency services, a third instance of driving under the influence, and driving with a suspended license. The following day, during a weight-of-the-evidence hearing, the trial court ordered defendant held without bail under 13 V.S.A. § 7553a. On July 18, by agreement with the state's attorney defendant moved to strike the hold-without-bail order so he could attend an inpatient alcohol rehabilitation program. The trial court granted the motion.
Defendant successfully completed the rehab program in an unlocked facility. At the end of the program, defendant returned to the Marble Valley Regional Correctional Facility, as required by the court's original order. The jail refused to accept him without paperwork. Defendant contacted his attorney, who filed a motion Aug. 8, 2012, to amend the existing hold without bail order to impose conditions of release. The hearing took place the following day.
At the August 9 hearing, defendant sought assignment to the home-detention program under 13 V.S.A. § 7554b. Defendant's attorney noted that defendant completed the rehabilitation program and attempted to return to jail as instructed. Defendant's attorney argued that the pending charges, as well as an earlier misdemeanor road-rage charge, were fueled by alcohol and that so long as defendant was able to abstain, he would be able to abide by the court's conditions. The State urged that defendant be held without bail. Among other things, the deputy state's attorney argued that defendant had been unable to refrain from alcohol use in the past even while receiving treatment. The State also noted that defendant had failed in the past to appear in court on six occasions.
After the hearing, the trial court indicated that it would "not be comfortable releasing [defendant] on conditions of release alone." The court said it was, however, "more comfortable with the idea of home detention." The court ordered that defendant be placed under home detention at his mother's house. Also, the court ordered GPS monitoring and an alcohol-monitoring bracelet. Defendant was given permission to leave home detention for court appearances, treatment, attorney visits, and meetings with DOC, but the judge denied defendant permission for employment-related absences.
As a threshold matter, defendant challenges the State's standing to appeal, arguing that home detention is not an appealable order because defendant was not "released." See 13 V.S.A. § 7556(c) (permitting State to appeal a bail decision when a person is "released").
That home detention involves a defendant's being "released" is evident from the provision's placement within the overall bail and recognizance statutory framework and its legislative history. The home-detention provision is found in the "Release prior to trial" section in the "Bail and Recognizances" chapter. The statute was added in the context of the 2010 Challenges for Change government-overhaul legislation, which, among other things, called on the Department of Corrections to reduce the number of short-term detainees. 2009 No. 68 (Adj. Sess.). In response, the Department of Corrections proposed "[e]stablishing home confinement as an optional condition of release to 13 V.S.A. § 7554." Challenges For Change: Progress Report To The Joint Legislative Government Accountability Committee (March 30, 2010) (emphasis added). Because the home-detention provision was clearly intended as an alternate condition of release, it must be concluded that the assignment of a defendant to the program is reviewable in the same manner prescribed for other types of release subject to conditions prior to trial and that the State therefore has standing to bring this appeal.
The State argues on appeal that defendants held without bail are ineligible for the home-detention program, citing the provision's procedural language referring to defendants who have been "detained pretrial . . . for lack of bail." See 13 V.S.A. § 7554b(b) (emphasis added). "Lack of bail," the State contends, can mean only inability to muster bail. Defendant urges a less constricted view, arguing that "lack" can also mean an utter absence, as would be the case with a hold-without-bail determination.
At the outset, the record reflects that the trial court did not intend to order defendant held without bail pursuant to 13 V.S.A. § 7553a as the State contends. The court initially determined it would permit defendant to enter the rehabilitation program. After release and defendant's attempt to reenter incarceration, the court deferred any decision regarding the hold-without-bail, ordering home detention as a sufficiently protective condition of release.
On the record, the court said that, while it was "not comfortable with conditions of release alone," it was "more comfortable with the idea of home detention." The court also admonished defendant, "[I]f there are any violations, including an extremely minimal violation, the [c]ourt would think strongly about the hold without bail going back into place." The court's statements reflect the conclusion to order the home-detention program. If the court's statements leave any room for doubt as to its conclusion, those were dispelled when the court agreed with defense counsel that hold-without-bail in a correctional facility would be considered in the event of a violation of conditions while on home detention.
This does not entirely dispense with the State's argument. The state also argues that "lack of bail" language in the statute pertaining to home-detention means it is available only to those financially incapable of paying a set bail. I disagree.
The hold-without-bail statute states, in relevant part, that:
The status of a defendant who is detained pretrial for more than seven days in a correctional facility for lack of bail may be reviewed by the court to determine whether the defendant is appropriate for home detention.13 V.S.A. § 7554b(b) (emphasis added).
While the State contends that "lack" can mean only financial inability, defendant points out that "lack" may also mean the absence of bail. To be sure, the provisions in the statute relating to holding a defendant without bail and those pertaining to home detention are not well married. As the trial court noted, the statutory language falls short of utter clarity. While not determinative, I observe that in the face of this inherent ambiguity, the Department of Corrections has interpreted the home detention provisions to cover defendants who remain in custody for more than a mere financial inability to assemble bail money. The Department, which first proposed the legislation, has interpreted the statute to include even those defendants whose right to release has been affirmatively revoked by being "held without bail." If the Department interprets program eligibility to include detainees who remain in jail because they have been denied release under 13 V.S.A. § 7553a, it stands to reason that it also includes those pre-trial defendants who might be entitled to release under certain conditions, including bail or home-detention, that they have as of yet not met.
The legislative intent that animated the home-detention statute's passage confirms the Department of Corrections' interpretation. The Legislature enacted the home-detention statute to expand, not limit, the use of alternative custody arrangements in a bid to reduce jail occupancy. Even before the 2010 enactment of the home-detention statute, trial courts enjoyed broad discretion to impose a host of pre-trial release conditions to ensure that a defendant appears in court and does not pose a risk to the community. See 13 V.S.A. § 7554(a)(1)(A)-(F); § 7554(a)(2)(A)-(D). A trial court, for example, may place a defendant "in the custody of a designated person or organization agreeing to supervise him or her." Id. § 7554(a)(1)(A); Id. § 7554(a)(2)(A). The pre-trial release statute also authorizes a judge to "impose any other condition found reasonably necessary" to ensure a defendant returns to court and does not pose a risk to the public. § 7554(a)(1)(F); § 7554(a)(2)(D). A trial court, in its discretion, may impose bail and conditions of release when a defendant does not have a right to bail. State v. Falzo, 2009 VT 22, ¶ 6, 185 Vt. 616 (mem.). Trial courts have long used this broad discretion to impose conditions including remaining in a particular residence. See, e.g., State v. Platt, 158 Vt. 423, 610 A.2d 139 (1992) (defendant required to remain at home between 11 p.m. and 6 a.m.); State v. Nelson, 2008 WL 4539255 (2008) (unpub. mem.) (defendant released pretrial on condition he remain in mother's home and only leave under mother's or stepfather's supervision). The trial court already had the broad discretion to impose piecemeal the same sort of conditions now available as a whole under the home-detention statute; it would be absurd to interpret legislation designed to expand the use of alternative custodial arrangements in a manner that would limit the availability of those release conditions.
Where it is conditions of release—not a potential financial penalty—that both ensure courtroom appearances and protect the public, a court would be well within its discretion to set bail at zero but impose conditions, such as placement in the custody of a person or organization or, in this case, home detention. It would be illogical to presume that the home-detention statute requires judges to ritualistically and needlessly fix a monetary bail amount merely to trigger eligibility. Furthermore, the State's interpretation of the statute ignores the possibility of a defendant who has the wherewithal to post bail but chooses not to. Under the statute, the Department of Corrections may also petition the court to assign a defendant to home detention. See 13 V.S.A. § 7554b(b) ("The request for review may be made by either the department of corrections or the defendant."). If the detainee's financial inability to muster bail were the touchstone for program eligibility, the Department would be in the untenable position of having to establish the particulars of a defendant's financial situation.
Finally, to the extent the State's "purely legal" challenge to defendant's home-detention designation represents a collateral attack on the trial court's findings, I conclude that the record adequately supports the judge's conclusion that 24-hour confinement coupled with electronic location and alcohol monitoring under the home-detention program would adequately protect the public. When the State appeals a defendant's release, the Court must affirm the trial court's order "if it is supported by the proceedings below." 13 V.S.A. § 7556(c); State v. Hoffman, 2007 VT 141, ¶ 5, 183 Vt. 547 (mem.). As evidence of defendant's amenability to compliance with court-imposed conditions of release, the trial court credited not only defendant's successful completion of the rehabilitation program but also his stymied attempt to comply with the court's order that he return to jail immediately upon release from treatment. The court also indicated its preference for defendant to continue to receive alcohol treatment rather than return to a correctional facility.
Finding adequate legal and factual support in the record to support the trial court's assignment of defendant to home detention under 13 V.S.A. § 7554b, I affirm.
Affirmed.
FOR THE COURT:
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Paul L. Reiber, Chief Justice