State v. Merola

15 Citing cases

  1. State v. Vasquez

    265 N.J. Super. 528 (App. Div. 1993)   Cited 47 times
    Finding no reversible error where verdict sheet was erroneous but jury received proper oral instruction, because "[t]he jury is presumed to have understood instructions"

    The State contends any error did not constitute plain error as defense counsel did not request such a charge. In State v. Merola, 214 N.J. Super. 108, 518 A.2d 518 (App.Div. 1986), certif. denied, 107 N.J. 91, 526 A.2d 168 (1987), the State claimed that defendant shot two people during a drug deal. Defendant stated that the two victims shot each other.

  2. State v. Brown

    118 N.J. 595 (N.J. 1990)   Cited 280 times
    Holding that codefendants' defenses were not so antagonistic as to demand separate trials

    Compare People v.Conyers, 52 N.Y.2d 454, 459, 438 N.Y.S.2d 741, 744, 420 N.E.2d 933, 935-36 (1981) (probative value of "pretrial" silence is nearly always outweighed by the risk of undue prejudice: "the use of such evidence for impeachment purposes cannot be justified in the absence of unusual circumstances") with People v. Collier, 426 Mich. 23, 393 N.W.2d 346 (1986) (pre-arrest silence found admissible because it would have been natural for defendant to report to the police that he had been robbed by the person he was charged with assaulting). The lower courts in this case relied heavily on the Appellate Division decision in State v. Merola, 214 N.J. Super. 108, 518 A.2d 518 (1986), certif. denied, 107 N.J. 91, 526 A.2d 168 (1987). In Merola, the State alleged that the defendant had killed one person and wounded another during a drug deal; the defendant claimed that the two victims had shot each other during the drug deal.

  3. State v. Brown

    228 N.J. Super. 211 (App. Div. 1988)   Cited 7 times

    [ 447 U.S. at 239, 100 S.Ct. at 2129, 65 L.Ed.2d at 95]. In State v. Merola, 214 N.J. Super. 108 (App.Div. 1986), certif. den. 107 N.J. 91 (1987), Judge Baime reviewed the authorities on the subject of pre-arrest silence.

  4. State v. Marshall

    123 N.J. 1 (N.J. 1991)   Cited 507 times
    Holding that defense counsel does not have prerogative to decide whether to death-qualify a jury in capital cases because risk of unfair conviction of death poses too grave a constitutional offense

    At this point, the questioning about whether Marshall had ever approached the authorities concerning the investigation ceased. Defendant contends that the prosecution's cross-examination, emphasizing defendant's failure to communicate with the authorities about the progress of the investigation, infringed on defendant's exercise of his privilege against self-incrimination, citing State v. Deatore, 70 N.J. 100, 358 A.2d 163 (1976); State v. Merola, 214 N.J.Super. 108, 518 A.2d 518 (App.Div.1986); and other state and federal precedents. In Deatore, the defendant was on trial for armed robbery.

  5. People v. Sutton

    436 Mich. 575 (Mich. 1990)   Cited 20 times

    The jury in Sutton's trial was instructed on this offense. See Commonwealth v Nickerson, 386 Mass. 54, 60-61; 434 N.E.2d 992 (1982), State v Merola, 214 N.J. Super. 108, 116-121; 518 A.2d 518 (1986), Silvernail v State, 777 P.2d 1169, 1178 (Alas App, 1989), and People v McKinney, 193 Ill. App.3d 1012, ___; 550 N.E.2d 604, 608 (1990), lv den 132 Ill.2d 551 (1990). In McKinney, 550 N.E.2d 608, the Appellate Court of Illinois concluded that "[t]o adopt a rule that it is likely that everyone who acts accidentally or negligently will immediately acknowledge that action or negligence fails to meet the test of reason."

  6. People v. Cetlinski

    435 Mich. 742 (Mich. 1990)   Cited 32 times
    Addressing the evidentiary value of pre- and postarrest, preMiranda silence and stating that the use of a defendant's silence for impeachment purposes “cannot be justified in the absence of unusual circumstances” because “evidence of a defendant's ... silence may have a disproportionate impact upon the minds of the jurors and ... the potential for prejudice inherent in such evidence outweighs its marginal probative worth”

    While the use of this defendant's pre-arrest silence would apparently not violate due process principles of the Fourteenth Amendment . . ., his failure to come forward in these circumstances says little about the truth of his trial testimony. See also State v Merola, 214 N.J. Super. 108, 117-118; 518 A.2d 518 (1986), and Silvernail v State, 777 P.2d 1169, 1178 (Alas App, 1989). On this record, to suggest otherwise would be tantamount to holding that all persons — innocent and guilty — have a duty to volunteer self-incriminating information.

  7. State v. Muhammed

    366 N.J. Super. 185 (App. Div. 2004)   Cited 3 times

    For silence to be probative, "it must appear that the failure to speak was unnatural and that an ordinary person would have come forward with the exculpatory information under the circumstances." State v. Merola, 214 N.J. Super. 108, 118 (App.Div. 1986), certif. denied, 107 N.J. 91 (1987). Here, the defendant's failure to disclose the prostitution allegation at the earliest possible point has no real probative value on, or relevance to, the issue of his credibility or culpability.

  8. State v. Merola

    365 N.J. Super. 203 (App. Div. 2002)   Cited 62 times
    Denying a second PCR as untimely when filed fifteen years after entry of JOC

    The petitioner filed a notice of appeal which resulted in an affirmance by the Appellate Division in a reported opinion entered on December 1, 1986. Certification to the New Jersey Supreme Court was denied on February 2, 1987. State v. Merola, 214 N.J. Super. 108 (App.Div. 1986),certif. denied, 107 N.J. 91 (1987).

  9. State v. Aceta

    223 N.J. Super. 21 (App. Div. 1988)   Cited 8 times
    Holding that a prosecutor's use of a defendant's post-arrest silence, which included comments on the silence during the prosecutor's closing argument, violated the defendant's right to remain silent

    This conclusion was reached "as a matter of state law and policy," based upon the "privilege against self-incrimination which is enshrined in the common law." Id. at 112, 113 See also State v. Whitehead, 80 N.J. 343, 346-348 (1979); State v. Lyle, 73 N.J. 403 (1977); State v. Alston, 70 N.J. 95 (1976); State v. Micheliche, Jr., 220 N.J. Super. 532 (App.Div. 1987); State v. Merola, 214 N.J. Super. 108 (App.Div. 1986), certif den., 107 N.J. 91 (1987). In Deatore, the reversal of defendant's conviction was upheld because of the improper questioning of defendant concerning his failure to have disclosed his alibi defense at the time of his arrest or later when he learned of the charges against him.

  10. Merola v. Sherrer

    Civil No. 07-948 (SDW) (D.N.J. Apr. 19, 2007)

    See Merola v. Sherrer, 07-948 (SDW), Docket Entry No. 2-4, at 2 (reproducing Merola v. Beyer, 90-971 (JWB) (hereinafter "Merola, D.N.J.", at 2 (D.N.J. June 29, 1990) (J.W. Bissel, C.J.)). Petitioner's appeal of his conviction and sentence to New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, was denied on October 28, 1986, see State v. Merola, 214 N.J. Super. 108 (N.J.Super. App. Div. 1986), and the Supreme Court of New Jersey denied Petitioner certification on April 19, 1989. See State v. Merola, 117 N.J. 37 (1989).