Opinion
Cr.A. No. 1409022259
12-14-2015
STATE OF DELAWARE, v. RALPH MERLINI, Defendant.
Christopher S. Marques, Esquire Office of the Attorney General 820 North French Street, 7th Floor Wilmington, DE 19801 Attorney for the State of Delaware Allison S. Mielke, Esquire Eugene Maurer, Jr., P.A. 1201-A King Street Wilmington, DE 19801 Attorney for Defendants
Christopher S. Marques, Esquire
Office of the Attorney General
820 North French Street, 7th Floor
Wilmington, DE 19801
Attorney for the State of Delaware Allison S. Mielke, Esquire
Eugene Maurer, Jr., P.A.
1201-A King Street
Wilmington, DE 19801
Attorney for Defendants
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
Defendant Ralph A. Merlini ("Defendant") brings this motion to dismiss charges filed against him on the grounds that his right to a speedy trial, as guaranteed by the United States and Delaware Constitutions, was violated because of repeated delays attributable to the State. Defendant filed this motion on September 8, 2015. The Court ordered briefings on the matter. This is the Court's Decision on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On September 30, 2014, Defendant was arrested and charged with Driving Under the Influence (DUI), Improper U-Turn, Following too Closely, Speeding, Improper Lane Change, and Expired Tags.
On October 29, 2014, the State filed these charges in the Court of Common Pleas. On December 8, 2014, Defendant failed to appear at his arraignment and a capias was issued. Defendant was not returned on the capias until February 2, 2015. Thereafter, Defendant was scheduled for DUI Case Review on March 25, 2015.
At the March 25, 2015 Case Review, the State requested a continuance since it was having difficulty obtaining certified records of Defendant's prior DUI convictions for the purpose of determining in which court to file Defendant's charges. The Court granted the continuance request, and issued an order requiring the State to determine by April 8, 2015, whether it would prosecute these charges in Superior Court or the Court of Common Pleas. The case was moved to the April 8, 2015 case review calendar.
On April 8, 2015, the State decided to prosecute the case in Superior Court. The Defendant was scheduled for an April 21, 2015 Preliminary Hearing where this case was bound over to the Superior Court.
On June 29, 2015, the State filed a Rule 9 Summons and Information in this Court. On August 7, 2015, Defendant pled not guilty and was scheduled a second time for DUI Case Review on September 2, 2015. At that case review, Defendant demanded a jury trial, which was scheduled for December 15, 2015.
On September 8, 2015, Defendant filed the instant Motion to Dismiss. On November 5, 2015, the Court heard argument on the motion, reserved decision, and ordered supplemental briefing. On November 30, 2015, the State filed its response to Defendant's Motion and Defendant filed his reply on December 7, 2015.
PARTIES' CONTENTIONS
Defendant argues that the fifteen month delay from the date of his arrest to the date of trial violates his right to a speedy trial. Defendant concedes that he is responsible for two of the fifteen months of delay, but contends that the State is responsible for the remaining thirteen months since the State improperly based its decision to file the charges in Superior Court on inconclusive information or speculation. Defendant contends that he asserted his speedy trial right by filing this motion, and that he was prejudiced by the delay in that he was placed in legal limbo, suffered prolonged anxiety and loss of time, and had to endure the stress of facing significant jail time when the case was transferred to Superior Court.
The State argues that Defendant's right to a speedy trial has not been violated in light of Defendant's criminal history, which required "exhausting efforts" to resolve. The State concedes that the length of the delay triggers a Barker v. Wingo analysis; however, the State argues that the reason for the delay should weigh slightly against the State, since it partially benefitted Defendant. Last, the State avers that Defendant is not prejudiced by the delay because he was not incarcerated, has failed to establish the delay caused excessive concern or anxiety, and has not asserted that the delay has prejudiced his defense.
DISCUSSION
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent part, that "the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial" in all criminal prosecutions. This constitutional right applies to the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A similar protection is provided in Article I, Section VII of the Delaware Constitution.
Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 222-23 (1967).
DEL. CONST. art. I, § 7.
In Barker v. Wingo, the United States Supreme Court established a balancing test for courts to apply when determining speedy trial claims. The Barker test requires speedy trial claims to be analyzed on a case-by-case basis in conjunction with the following factors: "(1) the length of delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant's assertion of the right to a speedy trial, and; (4) prejudice to the defendant." No single factor is dispositive, and all factors should be weighed together, keeping in mind the particular circumstances of the case. Therefore, I will evaluate each relevant factor as it applies to this case.
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972).
Id. at 407 U.S. at 530.
Middlebrook v. State, 802 A.2d 268, 273 (Del. 2002) (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 533).
A. Length of Delay
First, the Court must consider the length of delay. A defendant's right to a speedy trial attaches "either upon the defendant's arrest or indictment, depending on which occurs first." If the length of delay is not presumptively prejudicial, the Court does not have to consider the remaining Barker factors, however, the Delaware Supreme Court has held that "if the delay between arrest or indictment and trial exceeds one year, the Court generally should consider the other Barker factors."
State v. Sells, 2013 WL 1654317 at *2 (Del. Com. Pl. April 17, 2013).
Hicks v. State, 26 A.3d 214 at *2 (Del. 2011) (TABLE).
Cooper v. State, 32 A.3d 988 at *7 (Del. 2011) (TABLE).
In this case, Defendant was arrested on September 30, 2014. Trial is scheduled for December 15, 2015. This fifteen month delay is presumptively prejudicial. Therefore, I will analyze the remaining Barker factors.
B. Reason for Delay
The second factor, the reason for delay, is known as the 'flag all litigants seek to capture,'" as it often will reveal whether the defendant will succeed in the speedy trial argument. The specific circumstances of the case dictate how much weight the Court assigns to the reason for the delay. For example, the reason for delay should weigh heavily against the State if the State causes a delay with the intention of impeding the defense. On the other hand, delays caused by "negligence, overcrowded courts, or excessive caseloads on prosecutors," while attributable to the State, should be weighed less heavily against the State. Such reasons for delay are considered to be neutral. Finally, valid reasons, such as missing witnesses, justify the delay, and do not weigh against the State.
Bailey v. State, 521 A.2d 1069, 1081 (Del. 1987) (quoting United States v. Loud Hawk, 412 U.S. 302, 315 (1986)).
Id. at *3.
Middlebrook, 802 A.2d at 274 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 531).
Barker, 407 U.S. at 531. ("The defendant has no influence over the decisions necessary to reduce a backlog in the courts or the caseloads of individual prosecutors.").
Middlebrook, 802 A.2d at 274.
Sells, 2013 WL 1654317 at *3; Barker, 407 U.S. at 531.
In this matter there were three delays attributable to either the State or Defendant prior to the scheduling of Defendant's trial. The initial delay occurred because Defendant failed to appear for his December 8, 2014 arraignment and was not returned on the capias until February 2, 2015. This resulted in Defendant's being scheduled for the March 25, 2015 DUI Case Review, a full three months after Defendant's failure to appear. At the March Case Review, the State delayed the case a second time by making a continuance request to determine in which court to prosecute Defendant. At that Case Review, the State was admonished by this Court to gather the necessary information and decide by April 8, 2015 where to prosecute this case.
On April 8, 2015, the State, evidently without sufficient information, made the decision to prosecute this case in Superior Court. However, on July 29, 2015, the State filed a summons and information in the Court of Common Pleas, effectively transferring the case back to this Court and thereby causing a third delay.
The State is undoubtedly responsible for a bulk of the delay associated with this case. However, I find that the State's inexact approach to obtaining certified records of Defendant's prior DUI convictions comes, at worst, as a result of negligence or excessive caseload, and at best, as the result of a valid delay. Defendant's argument of unreasonable delay implicitly relies upon the assumption that while Defendant was out on capias, the State should have consumed its finite resources to determine which charges to bring against an absentee defendant. The State cannot be expected to blindly prosecute a case without regard for a defendant's whereabouts. Ultimately, I find that verifying Defendant's complex criminal history is a valid delay. Therefore, this factor does not weigh in favor of Defendant.
C. Defendant's Assertion of the Right to a Speedy Trial
Next, the Court considers the time in which the defendant asserted the right to a speedy trial. A defendant's timeliness in asserting this right plays a crucial role in analyzing a speedy trial claim because whether and how a defendant asserts this right suggests the seriousness of the deprivation. To that extent, a defendant is responsible to inform the court of "what he views as an unfair postponement."
Barker, 407 U.S. at 531. ("The strength of his efforts will be affected by the length of the delay, to some extent by the reason for the delay, and most particularly by the personal prejudice, which is not always readily identifiable, that he experiences. The more serious the deprivation, the more likely a defendant is to complain.")
Id.
In this case, Defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial on September 8, 2015, prior to trial, which is approximately twelve months following his arrest. Defendant argues that he waited to assert his right to a speedy trial until it was clear "that the State had delayed the prosecution against him beyond that normally associated with a busy court docket." Since March 25, 2015, Defendant was aware of the fact that the State was having difficulty in determining in which court to prosecute these charges. On that date, Defendant's former counsel expressed his concerns over the State's dilatory prosecution of this case, yet Defendant still waited for six months to assert this right. The Court therefore views this factor against Defendant.
Defendant's Motion ¶ 21.
D. Prejudice to the Defendant
The final factor, prejudice to the defendant, is "assessed in the light of the interests of defendants which the speedy trial right was designed to protect," which include: "(1) preventing oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) minimizing the anxiety and concern of the accused; and (3) limiting the possibility that the defense will be impaired.
Barker, 407 U.S. at 532.
First, the right to a speedy trial protects a defendant's interest in preventing oppressive pretrial incarceration. "'Time spent in jail awaiting trial by one presumed innocent until proven guilty [is a serious matter, as it] often means loss of a job, disrupts family life, and enforces idleness.'" Defendant here is not currently incarcerated on the charges before this Court. Therefore, this first interest does not weigh in Defendant's favor.
Middlebrook, 802 A.2d at 276.
Downs, 2014 WL 4929507 at *4 (citing Sells, 2013 WL 1654317 at *4).
The right to a speedy trial also protects a defendant's interest in minimizing anxiety and concern. When a trial is delayed, a defendant is presumed to be prejudiced to some degree "by living under a cloud of anxiety, suspicion, and often hostility" for the duration of that delay. This interest, however, will only weigh in a defendant's favor when the defendant has alleged "excessive concern or anxiety."
Barker, 407 U.S. at 532.
Dabney v. State, 953 A.2d 159, 168 (Del. 2008) (quoting Middlebrook, 802 A.2d at 277).
Downs, 2014 WL 4929507 at *4 (citing Cooper, 32 A.3d 988 at *8.
Defendant maintains that he has been left in "legal limbo" for a considerable period of time and has thus experienced prolonged anxiety and repeated inconvenience resulting from having to attend multiple court dates. Defendant proposes that the uncertainty of his potential sentence and the attendant stress, stem from the State's mishandling of this case. After reviewing Defendant's argument, I find that although the charges against Defendant may place him under a "cloud of anxiety," without specifically alleging how these delays have caused excessive concern or anxiety, I cannot find that this interest has been impaired. Therefore, I do not find that the delays attributable to the State have impaired Defendant's interest in minimizing anxiety and concern.
Finally, the right to a speedy trial protects a defendant's interest in limiting the possibility of impairing the defense. The right to a speedy trial protects this interest "because the inability of a defendant [to] adequately prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system." While this kind of prejudice is particularly difficult to prove as "time's erosion of exculpatory evidence and testimony can rarely be shown," it is nonetheless the "most serious" type of prejudice.
Downs, 2014 WL 4929507 at *4
Sells, 2013 WL 1654317 at *3 (citing Doggett v. U.S., 505 U.S. 647, 655 (1992)).
Barker, 407 U.S. at 532 --------
Here, Defendant has failed to allege any type of impairment to his defense. Therefore, I find that Defendant has not proven that his ability to prepare his defense has been impaired.
Ultimately, the trial delays in this matter have not impaired the three interests protected by the Sixth Amendment. Therefore, the fourth factor does not weigh in Defendant's favor.
E. Balancing of Factors
The balancing of the four Barker factors does not support Defendant's motion, as three of the four factors do not tip in favor of Defendant. Therefore, I find that there has not been a violation of Defendant's right to a speedy trial.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is DENIED, and the matter will proceed to trial as scheduled.
IT IS SO ORDERED
/s/_________
Honorable Alex J. Smalls
Chief Judge Merlini-OP Dec 2015