State v. Merdinger

13 Citing cases

  1. State v. Nanowski

    56 Conn. App. 649 (Conn. App. Ct. 2000)   Cited 4 times
    In State v. Nanowski, 56 Conn. App. 649, 746 A.2d 177, cert. denied, 252 Conn. 952, 749 A.2d 1203 (2000), and State v. Merdinger, 37 Conn. App. 379, 655 A.2d 1167, cert. denied, 233 Conn. 914, 659 A.2d 187 (1995), we rejected the argument that intent is an element of General Statutes § 31-71a et seq.

    each offense if the total amount of all unpaid wages owed to an employee is more than one thousand dollars but not more than two thousand dollars; (3) fined not less than five hundred nor more than one thousand dollars or imprisoned not more than six months or both for each offense if the total amount of all unpaid wages owed to an employee is more than five hundred but not more than one thousand dollars; or (4) fined not less than two hundred nor more than five hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than three months or both for each offense if the total amount of all unpaid wages owed to an employee is five hundred dollars or less." "Before we begin our analysis, we note that [a] party who challenges the constitutionality of a statute bears the heavy burden of proving its unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt and we indulge in every presumption in favor of the statute's constitutionality. . . . Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Voll, 38 Conn. App. 198, 203, 660 A.2d 358 (1995); State v. Merdinger, 37 Conn. App. 379, 382, 655 A.2d 1167 [cert. denied, 233 Conn. 914, 659 A.2d 187] (1995). In addition to showing that [the statute] is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant must show that its effect or impact on him adversely affects a constitutionally protected right which he has.

  2. State v. T.R.D

    286 Conn. 191 (Conn. 2008)   Cited 61 times
    Holding that crime of failing to comply with sex offender registry requirements is a strict liability offense

    "Neither the United States Supreme Court nor [this court] has held that the magnitude of the penalty determines the constitutionality of strict liability statutes." State v. Nanowski, 56 Conn. App. 649, 656-57, 746 A.2d 177 (rejecting defendant's argument that General Statutes § 31-71a et seq. regarding payment of wages was unconstitutional as strict liability offense where amendments to statute increased penalty for conviction from misdemeanor to felony), cert. denied, 252 Conn. 952, 749 A.2d 1203 (2000); see State v. Kirk R., 271 Conn. 499, 515 n. 20, 857 A.2d 908 (2004) (noting that crime of sexual assault in first degree, found in § 53a-70, is strict liability crime, which does not require state to prove actor's knowledge or intent as element of offense); State v. Merdinger, 37 Conn. App. 379, 382-86 and 386 n. 4, 655 A.2d 1167 (public welfare offense of nonpayment of wages did not require mens rea and imposed strict criminal liability where defendant was sentenced to 240 days in jail suspended after ninety days and fined $8000), cert. denied, 233 Conn. 914, 659 A.2d 187 (1995); see also State v. Wilson, 83 Conn. App. 67, 69-72, 848 A.2d 542 (refusing to depart from precedent established in Merdinger and Nanowski that failure to pay wages is strict liability crime), cert. denied, 270 Conn. 913, 853 A.2d 529 (2004).

  3. State v. Wilson

    83 Conn. App. 67 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004)   Cited 3 times

    Those claims also are based on the defendant's contention that criminal negligence is an essential element of the crime of failure to pay wages; we therefore consider those claims together. In State v. Nanowski, 56 Conn. App. 649, 746 A.2d 177, cert. denied, 252 Conn. 952, 749 A.2d 1203 (2000), and State v. Merdinger, 37 Conn. App. 379, 655 A.2d 1167, cert. denied, 233 Conn. 914, 659 A.2d 187 (1995), we rejected the argument that intent is an element of General Statutes § 31-71a et seq. In those cases, we held, rather, that the failure to pay wages is a strict liability crime.

  4. Pa. Prison Society v. Commonwealth

    565 Pa. 526 (Pa. 2001)   Cited 23 times
    Holding that "the voters should be given free opportunity to modify the fundamental law as may seem to them fit. . . ."

    As the issues raised by Appellants involve a question of law regarding the interpretation of our Constitution, our scope of review is plenary. Phillips v. A-Best Products Co., 655 A.2d 1167 (Pa. 1995). There are longstanding principles that serve as the framework for analyzing challenges to the amendment process.

  5. Katruska v. Bethlehem Center School

    564 Pa. 276 (Pa. 2001)   Cited 15 times
    In Katruska, our Supreme Court acknowledged "an inherent potential for bias on the part of school boards" due to "the dual function they serve in acting as both prosecutor and as judge in proceedings involving professional employees," but concluded "that the Secretary['s] de novo review of the decision of a school board ensures that the requirements of due process are satisfied."

    As the issue involves a question of law, our scope of review is plenary. Phillips v. Best Products Co., 655 A.2d 1167 (Pa. 1995). Section 1151 of the Public School Code provides that:

  6. State v. Merdinger

    659 A.2d 187 (Conn. 1995)

    Decided May 24, 1995 The defendant's petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 37 Conn. App. 379 (AC 11082), is denied. George C. Springer, Jr., special public defender, in support of the petition.

  7. Giordano v. Giordano

    39 Conn. App. 183 (Conn. App. Ct. 1995)   Cited 90 times
    Upholding prejudgment attachment in amount of $75,000 and $125,000 respectively for the two plaintiffs who alleged that the defendant, their grandfather, had sexually abused them as children, where plaintiffs testified at the attachment hearing "to emotional injuries including anxiety, low self-esteem, and difficulty in their adult relationships"

    (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Federal Deposit Ins. Co. v. Voll, 38 Conn. App. 198, 203, ___ A.2d ___ (1995); State v. Merdinger, 37 Conn. App. 379, 382, 655 A.2d 1167 (1995). In addition to showing that § 52-577d is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant must show that "`its effect or impact on him adversely affects a constitutionally protected right which he has.'"

  8. Bower v. D'Onfro

    38 Conn. App. 685 (Conn. App. Ct. 1995)   Cited 27 times
    In Bower v. D'Onfro, 38 Conn. App. 685, 663 A.2d 1061 (1995), a defendant raised a due process challenge to the validity of § 14-100a(c)(3). As the Appellate Court outlined, "[d]espite the fact that the jury could reasonably have found that [one of the defendants] was speeding, was driving recklessly, did not apply his brakes quickly enough, followed [the plaintiff's] vehicle too closely and failed to maintain a proper lookout, the defendants' position appears to be that it is irrational for the legislature to have abolished the seat belt defense, especially where the plaintiff is thrown from the vehicle."

    We are bound by the principle that "[a] party who challenges the constitutionality of a statute `bears the heavy burden of proving its unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt and we indulge in every presumption in favor of the statute's constitutionality.'" State v. Merdinger, 37 Conn. App. 379, 382, 655 A.2d 1167 (1995). Also, the defendant must show that § 14-100a (c)(4) adversely affects a constitutionality protected right. Society for Savings v. Chestnut Estates, Inc., 176 Conn. 563, 569, 409 A.2d 1020 (1979). Courts exercise their power to declare a statute unconstitutional "`with caution and in no doubtful cases.'"

  9. Federal Deposit Insurance v. Voll

    38 Conn. App. 198 (Conn. App. Ct. 1995)   Cited 67 times
    Concluding that equitable defense of laches, based on delay between commencement of foreclosure action and motion for judgment of foreclosure, could have been asserted in responsive pleading or in objection to calculation of debt when plaintiff moved for judgment of foreclosure, and, therefore, laches argument could not be raised in proceeding for deficiency judgment

    Guttman attacks the constitutionality of § 49-14 on the ground that it deprives him of his right to a jury trial under article first, § 19, of the Connecticut constitution. Before we begin our analysis, we note that "[a] party who challenges the constitutionality of a statute `bears the heavy burden of proving its unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt and we indulge in every presumption in favor of the statute's constitutionality." State v. Merdinger, 37 Conn. App. 379, 382, 655 A.2d 1167 (1995). In addition to showing that § 49-14 is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt, Guttman must show that "its effect or impact on him adversely affects a constitutionally protected right which he has."

  10. State v. Strickland

    2002 Conn. Super. Ct. 14791 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2002)

    "A party who challenges the constitutionality of a statute `bears the heavy burden of proving its unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt and we indulge in every presumption in favor of the statute's constitutionality." State v. Merdinger, 37 Conn. App. 379, 382, 655 A.2d 1167 (1995). In addition to showing that [a statute] is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt, [a party] must show that "its effect or impact on him adversely affects a constitutionally protected right which he has."