We examine the totality of the circumstances to determine if consent was the product of defendant's free will rather than the result of coercion, express or implied. State v. Kennedy, 290 Or. 493, 624 P.2d 99 (1981); State v. Mercado, 105 Or. App. 582, 805 P.2d 744, rev den 311 Or. 482 (1991). We conclude here that the state did prove by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant's consent was voluntary. The stop took place in the afternoon on a well-traveled highway.

Id. at 322-23. See United States v. Deases, 918 F.2d 118 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1233, 111 S.Ct. 2859, 115 L.Ed.2d 1026 (speeding stop, warning ticket issued and license returned, then consent to search sought and received); Rada v. State, 544 So.2d 1112 (Fla.App. 3 Dist. 1989) (roadblock stop, officer advised defendant he was free to leave, then consent to search sought and received); State v. Clowney, 87 Md. App. 48, 589 A.2d 86 (1991) (speeding stop, warning ticket issued and license returned, advised he was free to leave, then consent to search sought and received); State v. Mercado, 105 Or. App. 582, 805 P.2d 744 (1991) (twice advised defendant free to leave, license and registration returned, then consent to search sought and received). But see State v. Bunnell, 517 So.2d 439 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1987) (speeding stop, refused to consent to search, officer said search was routine and would look briefly into car then allow to leave, consent given after second officer arrived; evidence suppressed because defendant illegally detained when consent given).

Contrary to the dissent's concerns, it is easy to imagine a situation in which police misconduct does not focus attention on a defendant or prompt officers to seek consent. See also State v. Mercado, 105 Or. App. 582, 584, 586, 805 P.2d 744, rev den 311 Or. 482 (1991) (no exploitation of allegedly illegal "stop" in obtaining consent, where trooper suspected defendant of drug trafficking before stop ever occurred). We conclude from the record that Maloney's illegal frisk prompted him to ask defendant to produce and open the metal container.

Rather, the burden on the state to prove voluntariness focuses on whether the consent was an exploitation of the prior illegality. State v. Kennedy, [ 290 Or. 493, 624 P.2d 99 (1981)]; see State v. Mercado, [ 105 Or. App. 582, 805 P.2d 744, rev den 311 Or. 482 (1991)]. The fact that a request for consent to search takes place after a traffic stop is a factor that should be considered in evaluating whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the consent was voluntarily given or was the product of coercion.

Accordingly, the conversation that followed the traffic stop was a separate exchange, and there was nothing otherwise impermissible about the inquiry. See State v. Mercado, 105 Or. App. 582, 586, 805 P.2d 744, rev den 311 Or. 482 (1991). The dissent argues that "[r]egardless of what Officer Anderson told defendant that, as a matter of law defendant was not 'free to go,' until he was back in his car."