State v. Mendoza

9 Citing cases

  1. State v. Wilson

    154 Haw. 8 (Haw. 2024)   Cited 3 times

    This court eyed article I, section 17 before. See State v. Mendoza, 82 Hawai‘i 143, 920 P.2d 357 (1996). But Mendoza dodged the key question: Does Hawai‘i’s Constitution afford a personal right or a collective right to keep and bear arms?

  2. State v. Wilson

    543 P.3d 440 (Haw. 2024)

    This court eyed article I, section 17 before. See State v. Mendoza, 82 Hawai‘i 143, 920 P.2d 357 (1996). But Mendoza dodged the key question: Does Hawai‘i’s Constitution afford a personal right or a collective right to keep and bear arms?

  3. State v. Birdsall

    88 Haw. 1 (Haw. 1998)   Cited 13 times

    We review constitutional questions under the "right/wrong" standard. State v. Mendoza, 82 Haw. 143, 145, 920 P.2d 357, 359 (1996) (quoting State v. Toyomura, 80 Haw. 8, 15, 904 P.2d 893, 900 (1995)). Additionally, we have held "that (1) legislative enactments are presumptively constitutional; (2) a party challenging [a statutory scheme] has the burden of showing unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt; and (3) the constitutional defect must be clear, manifest, and unmistakable."

  4. U.S. v. Lewis

    Criminal No. 2008-45 (D.V.I. Dec. 24, 2008)

    State courts have likewise found that state legislative action is not restricted by the Second Amendment. See, e.g., State v. Mendoza, 920 P.2d 357, 360 (Haw. 1996) ("[T]he Second Amendment does not apply to the States through the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution.") (citation omitted); People v. Swint, 572 N.W.2d 666, 669 (Mich.Ct.App. 1997) ("[T]he Second Amendment is not applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment."); State v. Friel, 508 A.2d 123, 125 (Me. 1986) (citations omitted); Demyan v. Monroe, 108 A.D.2d 1004, 1005 (N.Y.App.Div. 1985); Burton v. Sills, 240 A.2d 462, 468 (N.J.Super.Ct. Law Div. 1967) ("[T]he Second Amendment merely protects against unwarranted extensions of federal power and does not bar a state government from enacting regulations concerning the use and possession of arms."). In Heller, the Supreme Court noted its previous holdings that the Second Amendment has not been incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment and thus is inapplicable to the states.

  5. Young v. Hawaii

    548 F. Supp. 2d 1151 (D. Haw. 2008)   Cited 16 times
    Concluding that defendants HPD and the County of Hawaii should be treated as one party for purposes of municipal liability under § 1983

    We believe that requiring a person to obtain a permit under HRS § 134-2 prior to acquiring a firearm is rationally related to the legitimate government interest of ensuring that only those who are mature, law abiding, competent citizens possess firearms.State v. Mendoza, 82 Hawai'i 143, 154, 920 P.2d 357, 368 (1996).

  6. State v. Jones

    96 Haw. 161 (Haw. 2001)   Cited 69 times
    Holding "that unanimity is not required where alternative means of establishing an element of an offense are submitted to the jury provided that there is no reasonable possibility that the jury's verdict was based on an alternative unsupported by sufficient evidence" (first emphasis in original)

    Second, this court has repeatedly recognized that it may accord greater protection to criminal defendants under the Hawai'i Constitution than that conferred under the United States Constitution. See,e.g., State v. Mendoza, 82 Haw. 143, 146, 920 P.2d 357, 360 (1996) (citing State v. Wallace, 80 Haw. 382, 397 n. 14, 910 P.2d 695, 710 n. 14 (1996) (citingState v. Texeira, 50 Haw. 138, 142 n. 2, 433 P.2d 593, 597 n. 2 (1967))). Inasmuch as the analysis employed by the plurality inSchad concluded that the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution does not preclude a state from employing a statute by which premeditated murder and felony murder are but alternative means of proving a single offense, I submit that Article I, sections 5 and 14 of the Hawai'i State Constitution may mandate a different result.

  7. State v. Kotis

    91 Haw. 319 (Haw. 1999)   Cited 115 times
    Holding that the defendant "had the opportunity to raise the issue [(now challenged on appeal)] . . . in the circuit court, but he did not do so. Inasmuch as he is the party alleging error, it was his burden to raise the issue, and any ambiguity in the circuit court's d i n g may therefore be attributed to him"

    This court has repeatedly recognized that it may accord greater protection to criminal defendants under the Hawai'i Constitution than that conferred under the United States Constitution. See, e.g., State v. Mendoza, 82 Haw. 143, 146, 920 P.2d 357, 360 (1996) (citing State v. Wallace, 80 Haw. 382, 397 n. 14, 910 P.2d 695, 710 n. 14 (1996) (citing State v. Texeira, 50 Haw. 138, 142 n. 2, 433 P.2d 593, 597 n. 2 (1967))). Certainly, as Kotis suggests, his liberty interest in bodily integrity and his right to a fair trial are protected by article I, section 5 of the Hawai'i Constitution (1978) (providing in relevant part that "[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law . . .").

  8. STATE v. RYKS

    No. A08-1296 (Minn. Ct. App. Jun. 2, 2009)

    See, e.g., Bach v. Pataki, 408 F.3d 75, 84 (2d Cir. 2005) ("[W]e hold that the Second Amendment's "right to keep and bear arms' imposes a limitation on only federal, not state, legislative efforts."); Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 252 (4th Cir. 1999) ("[T]he law is settled in our circuit that the Second Amendment does not apply to the States."); State v. Mendoza, 920 P.2d 357, 360 (Haw. 1996) ("[T]he Second Amendment does not apply to the States through the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution."); People v. Swint, 572 N.W.2d 666, 669 (Mich.Ct.App. 1997) ("[T]he Second Amendment is not applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment."). Despite the foregoing, appellant asks this court to hold that the Second Amendment is incorporated to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.

  9. State v. Turnbull

    766 N.W.2d 78 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009)   Cited 10 times
    Providing that section 624.713, subdivision 1 "is not ambiguous, and its plain meaning includes those 'convicted,' those 'adjudicated delinquent,' and those 'convicted as an extended jurisdiction juvenile'

    See also, Bach v. Pataki, 408 F.3d 75, 84 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that the Second Amendment imposes a limitation on only federal, not state, legislative efforts.); State v. Mendoza, 82 Hawai'i 143, 920 P.2d 357, 360 (1996) (stating that the Second Amendment does not apply to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution). But see Nordyke v. King, No. 07-15763, 2009 WL 1036086 (9th Cir. Apr.20, 2009) (concluding that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause incorporates the Second Amendment and applies it against state and local governments).