Considering the types of statements deemed to be testimonial by the United States Supreme Court, this Court recently noted that “[w]hat these examples have in common is that they lend themselves to an analysis that focuses largely on surrounding circumstances to separate testimonial from non-testimonial statements.” State v. Mendez, 2010–NMSC–044, ¶ 29, 148 N.M. 761, 242 P.3d 328. We therefore look at the circumstances surrounding how pleas of guilty and no contest are entered in New Mexico to determine whether such pleas are testimonial or non-testimonial statements.

State v. Saiz, 2008–NMSC–048, ¶ 66, 144 N.M. 663, 191 P.3d 521,abrogated on other grounds by State v. Belanger, 2009–NMSC–025, ¶ 36 & n. 1, 146 N.M. 357, 210 P.3d 783. Although State v. Mendez, 2010–NMSC–044, ¶ 22, 148 N.M. 761, 242 P.3d 328, indicates that State v. Woodward was abrogated on other grounds as recognized by State v. Granillo–Macias, 2008–NMCA–021, 143 N.M. 455, 176 P.3d 1187, this characterization is inaccurate. Granillo–Macias incorrectly states that State v. Woodward was reversed in part on other grounds by Woodward v. Williams, 263 F.3d 1135 (10th Cir.2001).

Often this will require examination of individual questions and responses. This concept was recognized by the New Mexico Supreme Court in State v. Mendez, 148 N.M. 761, 242 P.3d 328 (2010), where the court rejected the notion that a victim's statements made to a sexual assault nurse should be categorically excluded based on the nurse's status. Mendez, 148 N.M. at 774, 242 P.3d 328.

According to Dr. Jenkins, the manner in which an injury occurs, including whether it was inflicted by a stranger or by a family member, impacts diagnosis and treatment. . . . In sum, Ms. Thacker's statements were made for diagnosis and treatment purposes and were not testimonial, or primarily given for criminal prosecution purposes."); cf. State v. Mendez, 148 N.M. 761, 242 P.3d 328, 340-41 (2010) ("[Sexual Assault Nurse Examiners] may be more adept at collecting and preserving evidence, but any medical provider who treats sexual abuse victims is engaged to some extent in the collection of evidence, and most understand that the evidence they collect — physical or otherwise — could be used in a subsequent prosecution.

Under these authorities, in determining whether the superior court here erred in allowing the nurse to recount the victim's statement, we must evaluate objectively all the facts concerning the exchange that produced the statement to determine the “primary purpose” of the nurse's question to the victim and the victim's response. See id.; see also State v. Mendez, 148 N.M. 761, 242 P.3d 328, 339–40 (2010).

State v. Lopez, 2000–NMSC–003, ¶ 14, 128 N.M. 410, 993 P.2d 727. “The Confrontation Clause guarantees the accused in a criminal trial the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him, regardless of how trustworthy the out-of-court statement may appear to be.” State v. Mendez, 2010–NMSC–044, ¶ 28, 148 N.M. 761, 242 P.3d 328 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). {7} The State sought to introduce the testimony of Dr. Krinsky as an expert witness.

{8} “The Confrontation Clause guarantees the accused in a criminal trial the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him, regardless of how trustworthy the out-of-court statement may appear to be.” State v. Mendez, 2010–NMSC–044, ¶ 28, 148 N.M. 761, 242 P.3d 328 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “As a rule, if an out-of-court statement is testimonial in nature, it may not be introduced against the accused at trial unless the witness who made the statement is unavailable and the accused has had a prior opportunity to confront that witness.”

The proper standard for admission of the evidence is purely a question of law, to which we apply plenary review. See State v. Saucier , 283 Conn. 207, 218, 926 A.2d 633 (2007) (proper interpretation of rules of evidence is subject to plenary review); see also State v. Mendez , 148 N.M. 761, 766, 242 P.3d 328 (2010) (whether primary purpose of interview controls admissibility of all statements made during diagnostic interview under medical treatment hearsay exception is subject to de novo review). This court previously has held that it has the authority to modify the Connecticut Code of Evidence.

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Manuel T. , supra, 337 Conn. 443, 254 A.3d 278, quoting State v. Mendez , 148 N.M. 761, 772, 242 P.3d 328 (2010) ; see also State v. Dollinger , 20 Conn. App. 530, 536, 568 A.2d 1058 (noting that "[t]he test focuses on the declarant's motives"), cert. denied, 215 Conn. 805, 574 A.2d 220 (1990). In Manuel T. , we noted that "the tender years exception considers the purpose of the interview, whereas the medical treatment exception focuses on the declarant's purpose in making individual statements."

See State v. Mendez , 2009-NMCA-060, ¶ 11, 146 N.M. 409, 211 P.3d 206 ("[W]e observe that the special concurrences of Judges Bustamante and Fry in Gomez constitute the opinion of this Court."), rev’d on other grounds , 2010-NMSC-044, ¶ 56, 148 N.M. 761, 242 P.3d 328 ; see also Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 640 Pa. 604, 164 A.3d 1133, 1139 (2017) (recognizing that a lead opinion written by one judge "lack[s] the force of precedent" where the two other panelists do not join in its reasoning). Notably, Chief Judge Bustamante specifically declined to address the merits of the district attorney’s certification, instead holding that " Section 39-3-3(B)(2) does not provide an automatic appeal from suppression or exclusionary orders entered after jeopardy has attached in a trial."