Id. (quoting Navarette , 2013-NMSC-003, ¶ 8, 294 P.3d 435 ). The Court also cited, among others, Ohio v. Clark , 576 U.S. 237, 249, 135 S.Ct. 2173, 192 L.Ed.2d 306 (2015), and State v. Mendez , 2010-NMSC-044, ¶ 29, 148 N.M. 761, 242 P.3d 328. Tsosie , A-1-CA-37791, mem. op. ¶ 13

See id.;United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 84 (8th Cir.1980).State v. Mendez, 148 N.M. 761, ¶¶ 20–21, 242 P.3d 328, 334 (N.M.2010). [¶ 11] To ensure that the reason for the rule is satisfied, the existence of the proper foundation should be a primary consideration for the trial court when making its evidentiary ruling on such statements.

The proper standard for admission of the evidence is purely a question of law, to which we apply plenary review. See State v. Saucier , 283 Conn. 207, 218, 926 A.2d 633 (2007) (proper interpretation of rules of evidence is subject to plenary review); see also State v. Mendez , 148 N.M. 761, 766, 242 P.3d 328 (2010) (whether primary purpose of interview controls admissibility of all statements made during diagnostic interview under medical treatment hearsay exception is subject to de novo review). This court previously has held that it has the authority to modify the Connecticut Code of Evidence.

Often this will require examination of individual questions and responses. This concept was recognized by the New Mexico Supreme Court in State v. Mendez, 148 N.M. 761, 242 P.3d 328 (2010), where the court rejected the notion that a victim's statements made to a sexual assault nurse should be categorically excluded based on the nurse's status. Mendez, 148 N.M. at 774, 242 P.3d 328.

See In re Gabriel M., 2002–NMCA–047, ¶ 20, 132 N.M. 124, 45 P.3d 64 (noting the rule of lenity “requires us to narrowly construe a penal statute to give clear and unequivocal warning in language that people generally would understand concerning actions that would expose them to penalties”). {17} In support of its broad reading of the words “every person,” the State cites State v. Mendez, 2010–NMSC–044, 148 N.M. 761, 242 P.3d 328, and Wilcox v. New Mexico Board of Acupuncture & Oriental Medicine, 2012–NMCA–106, 288 P.3d 902. We are not persuaded by the application of either case here.

SeeDavison v. State, 282 P.3d 1262, 1269 (Alaska 2012); State v. Telford, 948 A.2d 350, 354 (Conn.App.Ct.2008); Webster v. State, 827 A.2d 910, 915 (Md.Ct.Spec.App.2003); State v. Vigil,283 Neb. 129, 810 N.W.2d 687, 696–97 (Neb.2012); State v. Mendez,148 N.M. 761, 242 P.3d 328, 340 (N.M.2010); State v. Payne,225 W.Va. 602, 694 S.E.2d 935, 942 (W.Va.2010). ¶ 14 For example, in rejecting a per se ban on statements made to a SANE during an examination, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that the mere fact that the examination has both medical and forensic purposes does not render inadmissible all statements made during the course of the examination.

¶13 Additionally, although Colorado appellate courts have not addressed statements made to SANEs, the majority of state courts that have directly confronted the issue follow the reasoning in King. See Davison v. State, 282 P.3d 1262, 1269 (Alaska 2012); State v. Telford, 948 A.2d 350, 354 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008); Webster v. State, 827 A.2d 910, 915 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2003); State v. Vigil, 810 N.W.2d 687, 696-97 (Neb. 2012); State v. Mendez, 242 P.3d 328, 340 (N.M. 2010); State v. Payne, 694 S.E.2d 935, 942 (W. Va. 2010). ¶14 For example, in rejecting a per se ban on statements made to a SANE during an examination, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that the mere fact that the examination has both medical and forensic purposes does not render inadmissible all statements made during the course of the examination.

Under Section 39-3-3(B)(2), the state may appeal a district court’s order excluding evidence if it "certifies to the district court that the appeal is not taken for purpose of delay and that the evidence is a substantial proof of a fact material in the proceeding." Defendant does not challenge the State’s appeal on the basis of timeliness, see State v. Mendez , 2009-NMCA-060, ¶ 11, 146 N.M. 409, 211 P.3d 206 (concluding that an appeal under Section 39-3-3(B)(2) is timely when initiated before the jury is sworn), rev’d on other grounds by 2010-NMSC-044, 148 N.M. 761, 242 P.3d 328 ; rather, Defendant argues that the State’s appeal is not proper because the district court’s "ruling did not make it impossible for the State to prove an element of its case" under Section 39-3-3(B)(2). {14} Substantively, the State’s appeal must concern a court’s suppression or exclusion of evidence that "could constitute substantial proof of a material fact[.]"

Under these authorities, in determining whether the superior court here erred in allowing the nurse to recount the victim's statement, we must evaluate objectively all the facts concerning the exchange that produced the statement to determine the “primary purpose” of the nurse's question to the victim and the victim's response. See id.; see also State v. Mendez, 148 N.M. 761, 242 P.3d 328, 339–40 (2010).

State v. Lopez, 2000–NMSC–003, ¶ 14, 128 N.M. 410, 993 P.2d 727. “The Confrontation Clause guarantees the accused in a criminal trial the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him, regardless of how trustworthy the out-of-court statement may appear to be.” State v. Mendez, 2010–NMSC–044, ¶ 28, 148 N.M. 761, 242 P.3d 328 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). {7} The State sought to introduce the testimony of Dr. Krinsky as an expert witness.