State v. Mendacino

47 Citing cases

  1. State v. Foster

    82 Or. App. 730 (Or. Ct. App. 1987)   Cited 1 times

    It must show that the statement was given "without inducement through fear or promises, direct or implied." State v. Mendacino, 288 Or. 231, 235, 603 P.2d 1376 (1980) (Citation omitted). In evaluating voluntariness, we must look at the totality of the circumstances.

  2. State v. Elstad

    61 Or. App. 673 (Or. Ct. App. 1983)   Cited 22 times
    In State v. Elstad, 61 Or. App. 673, 658 P.2d 552 (1983), the defendant was questioned in his living room by police officers Burke and McAllister about a robbery.

    Our inquiry here is whether there was a sufficient break in the stream of events between that inadmissible statement and the written confession to insulate the latter statement from the effect of what went before. Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707, 87 S Ct 1338, 18 L Ed 2d 423 (1967); State v. Mendacino, 288 Or. 231, 603 P.2d 1376 (1979). In State v. Hibdon, 57 Or. App. 509, 645 P.2d 580 (1982), police also were in possession of an arrest warrant when they went to the defendant's girlfriend's house to arrest him.

  3. State v. Delong

    357 Or. 365 (Or. 2015)   Cited 12 times
    Concluding that defendant’s invitation to search his car was not a product of his unwarned exculpatory response

    Robeson did not engage "in repeated efforts to wear down [defendant's] resistance." See State v. Foster, 288 Or 649, 655-56, 607 P2d 173 (1980) (considering that situation) (internal quotation marks omitted); State v. Mendacino, 288 Or 231, 238, 603 P2d 1376 (1980) (same). The trial court found that only two to three minutes elapsed between the time that Robeson stopped defendant and defendant's invitation to search his car.

  4. State v. Jarnagin

    351 Or. 703 (Or. 2012)   Cited 34 times
    Holding that a Miranda waiver was involuntary due to an earlier Miranda violation, in part because "[n]o advice of Miranda rights intervened to break the causal chain" between the violation and the waiver

    See State v. Moore/Coen, 349 Or. 371, 385, 245 P.3d 101 (2010) (testimonial evidence); Vondehn, 348 Or. at 476, 236 P.3d 691 (physical evidence). This court has looked to the totality of the circumstances in determining whether physical or testimonial evidence derives from or is the product of an earlier Miranda violation. State v. Foster, 288 Or. 649, 655, 607 P.2d 173 (1980); State v. Mendacino, 288 Or. 231, 238, 603 P.2d 1376 (1979); see Vondehn, 348 Or. at 482, 236 P.3d 691 (directing courts to consider “all relevant circumstances” in deciding whether belated Miranda warnings were effective in ensuring a knowing and voluntary waiver of rights). Among other things, the court has considered the nature of the violation, the amount of time between the violation and any later statements, whether the suspect remained in custody before making any later statements, subsequent events that may have dissipated the taint of the earlier violation, and the use that the state has made of the unwarned statements.

  5. State v. Isom

    306 Or. 587 (Or. 1988)   Cited 80 times
    Holding that Oregon Constitution barred impeachment of defendant with prior inconsistent statements obtained in violation of Miranda

    This admonition should not have come as any surprise to police officers in this state. In State v. Mendacino, 288 Or. 231, 603 P.2d 1376 (1979), "[d]espite the defendant's repeated statements that he did not want to talk and that he wanted an attorney, the detectives continued the interrogation and elicited a confession from the defendant." 288 Or at 233.

  6. State v. Smith

    301 Or. 681 (Or. 1986)   Cited 47 times
    Holding that “the key to the ‘free and voluntary’ character of the confession is the inducement made to the defendant—was there any promise or threat made to the defendant which would elicit a false confession”

    " In State v. Mendacino, 288 Or. 231, 235-36, 603 P.2d 1376 (1979), this court said: "In Oregon, a confession is initially deemed involuntary.

  7. State v. Foster

    288 Or. 649 (Or. 1980)   Cited 19 times
    Explaining that the violation "created the impression that the assertion of one's rights was meaningless"

    We must therefore ascertain whether the police actions that had occurred on April 11 affected defendant's waiver on April 12. In State v. Mendacino, 288 Or. 231, 603 P.2d 1376 (1979), we held that coercive police actions that had produced the defendant's first two inadmissible confessions were not effectively removed so that as a matter of law his third confession was involuntary. The defendant's first two confessions resulted when the police interrogated the defendant after he had asserted his rights to remain silent and to see an attorney.

  8. State v. Ward

    295 Or. App. 636 (Or. Ct. App. 2019)   Cited 6 times
    Concluding that the record contains "constitutionally sufficient evidence for the trial court to find that defendant had knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to remain silent"

    See id. at 717, 277 P.3d 535. The officers’ conduct did not, for example, involve "advis[ing the] defendant of his Miranda rights and then proceed[ing] to question him despite his repeated requests for counsel," id . (citing State v. Mendacino , 288 Or. 231, 238, 603 P.2d 1376 (1979) ), or entail erroneously telling the defendant that he was not yet entitled to an attorney and then subjecting him to "rigorously structured and ‘focused’ * * * interrogation" that "elicited patently inculpatory responses" despite an unequivocal invocation of Miranda rights, State v. Koch , 267 Or. App. 322, 332, 341 P.3d 112 (2014). Although the interrogation continued for several minutes after defendant invoked his right to remain silent, the officers did not use flagrantly coercive tactics in an effort to elicit an incriminating response.

  9. State ex rel Juv. Dept v. McCluskey

    652 P.2d 812 (Or. Ct. App. 1983)   Cited 4 times

    The state concedes that the court erred in denying suppression of the statements made to the police prior to and immediately after the child was advised of his rights. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S Ct 1602, 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1963); State v. Mendacino, 288 Or. 231, 603 P.2d 1376 (1979); State v. Paz, 31 Or. App. 851, 572 P.2d 1036 (1977), rev den 282 Or. 189 (1978). The remaining question is whether the confession to his father is evidence that should have been suppressed.

  10. State v. Ward

    367 Or. 188 (Or. 2020)   Cited 19 times
    Concluding that the trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion to suppress and that that error required a reversal of the defendant's convictions and a remand for a new trial

    Similarly, in State v. Mendacino , we explained that the 72-hour gap between an unlawful interrogation and a later interrogation—preceded by fresh Miranda warnings—was insufficient to dissipate harm of the earlier violation because the defendant remained in jail and did not consult with an attorney between the interrogations. 288 Or. 231, 238, 603 P.2d 1376 (1979). Here, the state has offered no reason to conclude that the days of incarceration did anything to minimize the harm from the earlier violation.