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State v. Meili

Court of Appeals of Kansas.
Feb 1, 2013
293 P.3d 815 (Kan. Ct. App. 2013)

Opinion

No. 107,041.

2013-02-1

STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. John W. MEILI, Appellant.

Appeal from Saline District Court; Rene S. Young, Judge. Joanna Labastida, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant. Christina Trocheck, assistant county attorney, Ellen Mitchell, county attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.


Appeal from Saline District Court; Rene S. Young, Judge.
Joanna Labastida, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant. Christina Trocheck, assistant county attorney, Ellen Mitchell, county attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.
Before McANANY, P.J., BUSER and STANDRIDGE, JJ.

MEMORANDUM OPINION


PER CURIAM.

In this appeal John Meili contends that his sentence of life imprisonment with no chance for parole for 25 years under Jessica's Law, K.S.A. 21–4643, constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and § 9 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights. Because Meili pled guilty and admitted his crimes, the facts are undisputed.

In March 2008, the mother of the 11–year–old victim entered her daughter's bedroom and found her husband, Meili, in bed with the child, his stepdaughter. The mother pulled back the blankets and saw that the child's breasts were exposed and her pants were pulled down.

Meili admitted to fondling the child's breasts. The child told the police that Meili had been molesting her for several months. On this last occasion, she said that Meili kissed and sucked on her breasts and attempted to touch her vagina. On other occasions his touching her caused pain. When questioned, Meili admitted the sexual abuse started sometime after he moved into the residence in July 2007 and that he may have penetrated the child with his finger in the past.

Meili was charged with one count of rape and three counts of aggravated indecent liberties with a child. After plea negotiations, Meili pled guilty to two counts of aggravated indecent liberties with a child. In exchange for the plea, the State dismissed two of the charged counts and agreed not to file charges against Meili for alleged incidents involving another victim and for any additional acts with his stepdaughter occurring prior to his plea.

Meili moved for a downward departure and challenged the constitutionality of the life sentence under Jessica's Law, K.S.A. 21–4643, as disproportionate and cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and § 9 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights. At sentencing, the district court denied Meili's request for a downward departure and imposed concurrent hard 25 life sentences without ruling on the constitutional challenge.

Meili appealed his sentence and, in State v. Meili, No. 101,810, 2010 WL 5129022, at *1 (Kan.2010) (unpublished opinion), our Supreme Court remanded the case to the district court for additional findings of fact and conclusions of law on the constitutional claim.

On remand, the district court examined and applied the three factors for considering the constitutional challenge found in State v. Freeman, 223 Kan. 362, 574 P.2d 950 (1978), and rejected Meili's claim that his sentence was unconstitutional. Meili appeals, claiming the district court erred in not finding that his sentence violates the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and § 9 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights.

The Eighth Amendment prohibits inflicting cruel and unusual punishment. It states: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted.” The Eighth Amendment has been made applicable to the states under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667, 82 S.Ct. 1417, 8 L.Ed.2d 758(1962).

Similarly, § 9 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights states: “All persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties except for capital offenses, where proof is evident or the presumption is great. Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel or unusual punishment inflicted.” In State v. Scott, 265 Kan. 1, Syl. ¶ 1, 961 P.2d 667 (1998), the Supreme Court stated: “The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clauses of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and § 9 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights are nearly identical and are to be construed similarly.”

A statute is presumed to be constitutional, and all doubts must be resolved in favor of its validity. If there is any reasonable way to construe a statute as constitutionally valid, the court has the duty to do so. State v. Laturner, 289 Kan. 727, 735, 218 P.3d 23 (2009).

When determining whether a sentence is cruel or unusual punishment, a district court must make both legal and factual determinations. On appeal, we apply a bifurcated standard of review: All of the evidence is reviewed, but not reweighed, to determine whether it is sufficient to support the district court's factual findings. We review de novo the district court's legal conclusions drawn from those facts. State v. Mossman, 294 Kan. 901, Syl. ¶ 1, 281 P.3d 153 (2012).

In Freeman, our Supreme Court stated: “Punishment may be constitutionally impermissible, although not cruel or unusual in its method, if it is so disproportionate to the crime for which it is inflicted that it shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity.” 223 Kan. at 367. The court set out a three-part test governing an analysis of cruel or unusual punishment claims:

“(1) The nature of the offense and the character of the offender should be examined with particular regard to the degree of danger present to society; relevant to this inquiry are the facts of the crime, the violent or nonviolent nature of the offense, the extent of culpability for the injury resulting, and the penological purposes of the prescribed punishment;

“(2) A comparison of the punishment with punishments imposed in this jurisdiction for more serious offenses, and if among them are found more serious crimes punished less severely than the offense in question the challenged penalty is to that extent suspect; and

“(3) A comparison of the penalty with punishments in other jurisdictions for the same offense.” 223 Kan. at 367.
See State v. Woodward, 294 Kan. 717, 720–21, 280 P.3d 203 (2012).

There is no need for an analysis of the second and third Freeman factors unless the analysis of the first factor “leads to an inference of gross disproportionality.” State v. Ross, 295 Kan. 424, 429, 284 P.3d 309 (2012). But even if it does, our Supreme Court recently addressed the second and third Freeman factors as they relate to Jessica's Law and held that a Jessica's Law sentence is not constitutionally disproportionate to the sentences imposed for other crimes in Kansas and is not disproportionate to the punishments imposed in other jurisdictions for similar offenses. See State v. Britt, 295 Kan. 1018, 287 P.3d 905, 918 (2012); Woodward, 294 Kan. at 723–34. Thus, there remains only the first Freeman factor for us to consider.

An analysis under the first Freeman is inherently case-specific and fact-driven. That factual determination must be made by the district court, not an appellate court. See Woodward, 294 Kan. at 720.

The first Freeman test requires the court to consider the nature of the offense and the character of the offender, with particular regard to the degree of danger present to society. In doing so, the court considers the violent or nonviolent nature of the offense, the extent of culpability for the injury resulting, and the penological purposes of the proscribed punishment. 223 Kan. at 367. In addition:

“This analysis may consider the offender's mental state and motive in committing the crime, the actual harm caused to the victim or to society by the offender's conduct, any prior criminal history of the offender, and the offender's propensity for violence.” Ross, 295 Kan. at 429.

Here, the district court found Meili was 34 years old at the time he molested his 11–year–old stepdaughter. The court pointed to the extent of the sexual abuse and the fact that it had occurred several times over a period of several months. The court noted that Meili had a lengthy criminal history, including his most recent conviction of soliciting a prostitute. Meili had previously served time in a juvenile correctional facility and served time in prison. The court noted that Dr. Hillyard's evaluation placed Meili into the medium to low risk of reoffending. The court stated the offenses were violent and resulted in injury to the victim. The court found Meili solely responsible for the injury to the child. Finally, the district court evaluated the penological purpose of the punishment and found a public safety interest in incapacitating known sex offenders who have been convicted of sex crimes against victims under the age of 14. These factual findings address requirements of the first Freeman factor, and we find them sufficient for appellate review and that they support a finding of no cruel and unusual punishment.

On appeal, Meili points to several factors that he perceives to be in his favor. He asserts that the State did not present evidence that he “used a weapon to commit the crimes or that he kidnapped [the child].” Meili notes that he did not put the child in a position where she could have lost her life, but his sentence does not take that into consideration. Meili complains that his punishment is not proportional to the injury or harm to the child. Finally, Meili points to the fact that this is his first sexual offense, other than a misdemeanor conviction for solicitation of a prostitute in 2002.

In response, the State contends that Meili presents a high degree of danger to society. The State points to Meili's position as the child's stepfather and the fact that the sexual abuse was ongoing over a period of time. Finally, the State claims that Meili “is culpable for the resulting physical and emotional injuries resulting to the victim.”

Meili's arguments focus on the fact that the crime could have been worse or committed in a more heinous manner. These arguments disregard the seriousness of the crime and the consequences of Meili's actions. The first Freeman factor does not weigh in Meili's favor. The facts relating to the first Freeman factor do not support a claim that Meili's sentence was unconstitutional.

As noted above, we only proceed to the second and third Freeman factors “[i]n the rare case in which this threshold comparison leads to an inference of gross disproportionality.” Ross, 295 Kan. at 429. Our Supreme Court has recently evaluated Jessica's Law under the second and third Freeman factors and rejected similar arguments that the imposition of a life sentence under Jessica's Law is grossly disproportionate. Britt, 295 Kan. at ––––, 287 P.3d at 918;Woodward, 294 Kan. at 723–24. We follow this precedent and reject Meili's challenge to the constitutionality of his sentence.

Affirmed.


Summaries of

State v. Meili

Court of Appeals of Kansas.
Feb 1, 2013
293 P.3d 815 (Kan. Ct. App. 2013)
Case details for

State v. Meili

Case Details

Full title:STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. John W. MEILI, Appellant.

Court:Court of Appeals of Kansas.

Date published: Feb 1, 2013

Citations

293 P.3d 815 (Kan. Ct. App. 2013)