(Emphasis added.) To the extent that Napolis, State v. St. John, 544 S.W.2d 5 (Mo. banc 1976); State v. Meek, 584 S.W.2d 168 (Mo.App. 1979), and State v. Gordon, 536 S.W.2d 811, 817 (Mo.App. 1976), relied on by respondent, are contrary to the holding herein, they can no longer be followed. In Point II, appellant contends that the trial court impermissibly increased his sentence under Count I because it was a Class A felony under § 557.021; and, the persistent offender statute, § 558.016, applies only to Class B, C and D felonies.
Id. The Missouri Supreme Court disagreed. State v. Green, 629 S.W.2d 326, 329 (Mo. 1982), overruling Gordon and State v. Meek, 584 S.W.2d 168 (Mo.App. 1979). ¶ 28. What is different about what Meek did and Gordon is that there is some implication from Gordon's stated facts that the children would later give the drugs back to Gordon when the police left. Therefore he may not have had the intent permanently to relinquish control.
Such inquiry is permissible even though the witness has not been convicted of the crime. State v. Meek, 584 S.W.2d 168, 170[5] (Mo.App. 1979); Neal, 669 S.W.2d at 262[11]. Under § 491.050, RSMo Cum. Supp. 1983, any prior criminal convictions may be proved to affect a witness' credibility in a civil or criminal case and, further, any prior pleas of guilty, pleas of nolo contendere, and findings of guilty may be proved to affect a witness' credibility in a criminal case.
" He contends that these questions were relevant concerning the credibility of the witness, relying on State v. Lynch, 528 S.W.2d 454 (Mo.App. 1975), and State v. Horton, 607 S.W.2d 764 (Mo.App. 1980). As those cases and others acknowledge, see Murphy v. State, 636 S.W.2d 699, 702 (Mo.App. 1982); State v. Meek, 584 S.W.2d 168, 170 (Mo.App. 1979), impeachment by showing such acts is a matter for the trial court's discretion. Without objection defendant's counsel asked the witness: "You've used drugs in the past?", and the answer was "Yes."
Such inquiry is permissible even though the witness has not been convicted of the crime. State v. Meek, 584 S.W.2d 168, 170[5] (Mo.App. 1979). When the answer sought is pertinent only to the issue of credibility, the inquiry is subject to the general rule that the extent of cross-examination on collateral matters for the purpose of impeachment lies within the discretion of the trial court.
The informant testified that "crank" is slang for methamphetamine. Citing State v. Meek, 584 S.W.2d 168 (Mo.App. 1979), defendant states in her brief that although evidence of the prior sale was admissible to show knowledge or intent regarding the sale charged in Count I of the information, she asserts, relying on State v. Gordon, 536 S.W.2d 811 (Mo.App. 1976), that evidence of the prior sale was not relevant to the charge in Count II of distribution and delivery. Both cases indicate that knowledge or intent are not elements of an offense under § 195.020, RSMo 1978.
State v. Taylor, 498 S.W.2d 614, 616 (Mo.App. 1973). In his brief movant contends that the witness could be impeached by showing that the witness committed specific criminal acts, apparently illegal sales of drugs, although he was not convicted of them. Impeachment by showing such acts is a matter for the trial court's discretion, State v. Meek, 584 S.W.2d 168, 170 (Mo.App. 1979); State v. Lynch, 528 S.W.2d 454, 457-458 (Mo.App. 1975); State v. Winters, 525 S.W.2d 417, 425 (Mo.App. 1975), and might have been allowed at trial. See also State v. Horton, 607 S.W.2d 764, 766 (Mo.App. 1980).
There was a common scheme or plan for defendant to burglarize, steal and sell to the fence in question. State v. Connor, 585 S.W.2d 294, 299-300 (Mo.App. 1979); and State v. Meek, 584 S.W.2d 168, 169 (Mo.App. 1979). In Connor, a pandering case, there was no error in showing that several weeks prior to the date of the pandering charged, defendant had solicited a male for the purpose of prostitution.