Indeed, that is what the first prong of Golding was designed to avoid. State v. Medina, 227 Conn. 456, 474, 636 A.2d 351 (1993); State v. Stanley, 223 Conn. 674, 689-90, 613 A.2d 788 (1992). A contrary rule would promote ceaseless litigation by discouraging parties from raising claims in a timely manner, thereby seriously undermining the efficient administration of justice.
I must first address a preliminary matter that greatly concerns me. The court has arrived at this juncture by granting a motion to vacate our judgment of August 24, 1993, in State v. Medina, 227 Conn. 456, (1993) (Medina I), and reconsider the case with a reconstituted court (motion). In Medina I, a majority of this court affirmed the defendant's convictions for murder and two narcotics offenses.
Second, he argues that his confession was involuntary under the due process clause of the federal constitution. See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 170, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986); State v. Medina, 227 Conn. 456, 467, 636 A.2d 351 (1993). He claims that the affirmative misrepresentations of the police "critically impaired his capacity for self-determination" and overbore his will.
"Two conditions . . . give rise to the requirement of advice of rights under Miranda: (1) the suspect must be in the custody of law enforcement officials; and (2) the suspect must be subjected to interrogation." State v. Medina, 227 Conn. 456, 463, 636 A.2d 351 (1993). "The term interrogation under Miranda is not limited to questioning explicitly designed to elicit an incriminating
We have already stated the well established principle that, in addition to being in custody, a defendant is not entitled to Miranda warnings unless he is also interrogated. State v. Medina, 227 Conn. 456, 462, 636 A.2d 351 (1993); State v. Rosado, 218 Conn. 239, 252, 588 A.2d 1066 (1991). The defendant bears the initial burden of showing that he was subjected to interrogation.
" (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Medina, 228 Conn. 281, 293-94, 636 A.2d 351 (1993). "`This determination of voluntariness and admissibility, in the first instance, is a question of fact for the trial court to resolve in the exercise of a legal discretion in accordance with constitutional standards of due process.
The defendant bears the initial burden of showing that the defendant was subject to custodial interrogation. See State v. Medina, 227 Conn. 456, 462, 636 A.2d 351 (1993). In the instant matter, it is not disputed that the defendant was, at all relevant times, in police custody and subject to police interrogation.