The pattern that emerges clearly from these cases is that, provided a person's vehicular flight creates no actual risk of injury to others, or, if it does, creates it only in relation to pursuing officers, the person can be guilty only of a Class E felony. See State v. Turner, 193 S.W.3d 522, 525 (Tenn.2006); e.g., State v. Winters, No. M2009–01164–CCA–R3–CD, 2011 WL 1085101, at *1 (Tenn.Crim.App. Mar. 24, 2011) (risk to officer); State v. Rogers, No. M2006–01339–CCA–R3–CD, 2007 WL 4245051, at *1 (Tenn.Crim.App. Dec. 4, 2007) (same); State v. Burnette, No. W2006–02092–CCA–R3–CD, 2007 WL 2822906, at *1–2 (Tenn.Crim.App. Sept. 28, 2007) (same); State v. Medford, No. W2002–00226–CCA–R3–CD, 2003 WL 22446575, at *1 (Tenn.Crim.App. Oct. 21, 2003) (same); State v. Marable, No. M1999–00576–CCA–R3–CD, 2001 WL 1028817, at *4 (Tenn.Crim.App. Sept. 7, 2001) (same); State v. Johnson, No. W2000–00386–CCA–R3–CD, 2001 WL 721082, at *1–4 (Tenn.Crim.App. June 26, 2001) (same); State v. Gann, No. 01 C01–9704–CC–00164, 1998 WL 265495, at *1–2 (Tenn.Crim.App. May 27, 1998) (same). The residual clause, of course, is not so restricted; it covers conduct that creates a serious potential risk of harm simply to “another,” a term that, to be sure, includes pursuing police officers. Rogers, 594 F.3d at 522.

This court has concluded that "[t]he statutory language is straightforward and unambiguous" that subsection (b) requires only a signal to stop, and not an arrest or attempted arrest. State v. Thaddaeus Medford, No. W2002-00226-CCA-R3-CD, 2003 WL 22446575, at *12 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 21, 2003). Finally, the fact that the officer may or may not have thought that they had probable cause to make the stop is irrelevant.

See State v. Timothy Murrell, No. W2001-02279-CCA-R3-CD, slip op. at 5-9, 2003 WL 21644591 (Tenn.Crim.App., Jackson, July 2, 2003) (collecting and discussing cases and articles upholding admissibility of police testimony about the habits of drug dealers if witness is qualified through experience or other means).State v. Thaddaeus Medford, No. W2002-00226-CCA-R3-CD, 2003 WL 22446575 at *10 (Tenn.Crim.App. Oct. 21, 2003) perm. app. denied (Tenn. Mar. 22, 2004). At trial, Defendant objected to the testimony by Agent Scott Jones concerning guns found during the search of Defendant's residence. Agent Jones testified that he had fourteen years of law enforcement experience, eight of which involved narcotics investigations.

The State argues that this court has previously concluded that possession for delivery of drugs may be inferred from the presence of large amounts of money in small denominations, loaded guns, and the packaging of drugs in separate plastic bags, which are all present in this case. See State v. Thaddaeus Medford, No. W2002-00226-CCA-R3-CD, 2003 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 914, *30 (Tenn.Crim.App. Oct 21, 2003, at Jackson), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Mar. 22, 2004). A jury in this state, by statute, may infer from "the amount of a controlled substance or substances possessed by an offender, along with other relevant facts surrounding the arrest, that the controlled substance or substances were possessed with the purpose of selling of otherwise dispensing."

]" Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-16-603(b)(1). This Court has previously highlighted a crucial distinction between the two modes, see, e.g., State v. Thaddaeus Medford, No. W2002-00226-CCA-R3-CD, 2003 WL 22446575 (Tenn.Crim.App., Jackson, Oct. 21, 2003), by pointing out that evading arrest pursuant to subsection (a)(1) requires a defendant flee after he or she "knows the officer is attempting to arrest" them, while evading arrest in a motor vehicle pursuant to subsection (b)(1) requires only the lesser burden of a flight "after having received any signal from such officer to bring the vehicle to a stop." Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-16-603 (emphasis added).

We have also concluded that subsection (a) of the same statute, which does require that the person "`[k]nows the officer is attempting to arrest the person,'" is distinct from subsection (b), the latter addressing a specific "mode of evading arrest," i.e., through the use of a motor vehicle. State v. Thaddaeus Medford, No. W2002-00226-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 22446575, at *12 (Tenn.Crim.App., Jackson, Oct. 21, 2003) (quoting Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-16-603(a)(1)(A)). Therefore, this Court concluded, "[t]he statutory language is straightforward and unambiguous" that subsection (b) requires only a signal to stop, and not an arrest or attempted arrest.