After the case was dismissed, the state immediately moved for permission to appeal pursuant to § 54-96. The trial court refused to grant the state permission to appeal, citing State v. McMillan, 51 Conn. App. 676, 725 A.2d 342, cert. denied, 248 Conn. 911, 732 A.2d 179 (1999), for the applicable abuse of discretion standard of review under 54-96. The trial court stated that, pursuant to McMillan, the only question it had to ask itself in denying the state permission to appeal was, "Did I abuse my discretion?
Decided March 30, 1999 The defendant's petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 51 Conn. App. 676 (AC 16731), is denied. Richard E. Condon, Jr., deputy assistant public defender, in support of the petition.
Finally, we note that if the evidence supports a finding of probable cause, then the motion to dismiss must be denied, even if such evidence might also support a contrary conclusion. See State v. Pelella , supra, 327 Conn. at 19, 170 A.3d 647 ; see also State v. Taupier , supra, 197 Conn. App. at 796, 234 A.3d 29 ; see generally State v. McMillan , 51 Conn. App. 676, 686, 725 A.2d 342 (dismissal of information is drastic action), cert. denied, 248 Conn. 911, 732 A.2d 179 (1999). The defendant focuses his challenge on whether the state established probable cause that he was a "[s]chool employee" as defined in § 53a-65 (13) at the time he engaged in sexual intercourse with the victim.
The motion itself is marked denied on October 9, 2007, the case detail sheet lists the motion as denied on that date and the transcript is clear that the motion was denied on that date. Furthermore, "our rules of practice establish a procedure for rectifying the trial court record to include necessary material for the proper presentation of the issues raised on appeal"; State v. McMillan, 51 Conn. App. 676, 682, 725 A.2d 342, cert. denied, 248 Conn. 911, 732 A.2d 179 (1999); and the defendants took no steps in this regard. See Practice Book §§ 66-5 (motion for rectification) and 66-7 (motion for review of motion for rectification).
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. McMillan, 51 Conn. App. 676, 679-80, 725 A.2d 342, cert. denied, 248 Conn. 911, 732 A.2d 179 (1999). Section 54-96 provides limited authority for appeal by the state.
The formality of a full evidentiary, adversary hearing to determine whether or not there is probable cause to believe a delinquent or criminal act has been committed is not required to satisfy constitutional requirements for custodial detention. Gersein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975); State v. McMillan, 51 Conn.App. 676, 682 (1999); State v. Middleton, 20 Conn.App. 321, 328-30 (1989). In Gerstein v. Pugh, the Supreme Court held that the fourth amendment requires a prompt judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to an extended pretrial detention following a warrantless arrest.
The formality of a full evidentiary, adversary hearing to determine whether or not there is probable cause to believe a delinquent or criminal act has been committed is not required to satisfy constitutional requirements for custodial detention. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975); State v. McMillan, 51 Conn.App. 676, 682 (1999); State v. Middleton, 20 Conn.App. 321, 328-30 (1989). In Gerstein v. Pugh, the Supreme Court held that the fourth amendment requires a prompt judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to an extended pretrial detention following a warrantless arrest.
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. SR Sanitation Services, Inc., 202 Conn. 300, 307, 521 A.2d 1017 (1987); see also State v. McMillan, 51 Conn. App. 676, 679-80, 725 A.2d 342, cert. denied, 248 Conn. 911, 732 A.2d 179 (1999). Section 54-96 authorizes the state to appeal questions of law in criminal cases only if the trial court grants permission to appeal. SeeState v. Anonymous, 55 Conn. App. 250, 252, 739 A.2d 298 (1999).
" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. McMillan, 51 Conn. App. 676, 686, 725 A.2d 342, cert. denied, 248 Conn. 911, 732 A.2d 179 (1999). The defendant has not been prejudiced by the imposition of the initial protective order without an attorney because he has had the order modified with the aid of counsel.