Opinion
DA 22-0650
11-06-2024
STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. AARON EUGENE McLAUGHLIN, Defendant and Appellant.
For Appellant: James M. Siegman, Attorney at Law Jackson, Mississippi. For Appellee: Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Katie F. Schulz, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana. Daniel M. Guzynski, Special Deputy County Attorney, Helena, Montana. Megan E. Hansen, Sanders County Attorney, Thompson Falls, Montana.
Submitted on Briefs: August 21, 2024.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Twentieth Judicial District, In and For the County of Sanders, Cause No. DC-2020-43, Honorable John W. Larson, Presiding Judge.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant: James M. Siegman, Attorney at Law Jackson, Mississippi.
For Appellee: Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Katie F. Schulz, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana.
Daniel M. Guzynski, Special Deputy County Attorney, Helena, Montana.
Megan E. Hansen, Sanders County Attorney, Thompson Falls, Montana.
OPINION
INGRID GUSTAFSON, JUSTICE.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this Court's quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana Reports.
¶2 Aaron McLaughlin appeals the September 9, 2022 Judgment entered by the Twelfth Judicial District Court, Sanders County. The judgment sentenced McLaughlin to 80 years in Montana State Prison, with credit for 693 days already served, after a jury found him guilty of deliberate homicide by felony murder, a felony in violation of § 45-5-102(1)(b), MCA. We affirm.
¶3 On October 7, 2020, McLaughlin called police and told them he beat his roommate, Raymond Wachlin. Police Chief Pfleger arrived and ascertained Raymond was dead. Chief Pfleger contacted the Justice's Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI), and Agent Teniente applied for, and was granted, a search warrant to enter Raymond's home. The warrant included a detailed description of the evidence police hoped to find in relation to the crime of deliberate homicide. The basis for those items listed in the warrant was Chief Pfleger's report of what he observed at the scene. Chief Pfleger observed Raymond on the floor in the home with a pale color, bruises on his face and body, and he was cold to the touch. Chief Pfleger was also aware of McLaughlin's own admission over the 911 call that he severely beat Raymond, Raymond had a weak pulse and was cold, and he needed an ambulance. Additionally, Chief Pfleger talked to Raymond's friend, Jonah Whitsett, who stated McLaughlin and Raymond had been doing drugs which usually resulted in arguments and physical altercations. Whitsett also alleged McLaughlin was addicted to morphine. Chief Pfleger observed that McLaughlin smelled of alcohol when he arrested him. After securing the warrant, another agent took photos of the outside and inside of the home, including the placement of Raymond's body. Police also collected various other pieces of evidence from the scene, none of which they used at trial.
¶4 McLaughlin entered a not guilty plea to the charge of deliberate homicide. McLaughlin made a motion to suppress the evidence and claimed the search warrant was invalid and not executed properly. The District Court denied the motion and noted under the totality of the circumstances, there was a substantial basis for concluding probable cause existed to support the warrant and it was executed correctly.
¶5 Prior to trial during voir dire, McLaughlin attempted to question potential jurors about what they thought about self-defense as a defense. He also tried to question jurors about what kind of evidence they would need to see to convict for deliberate homicide. However, the District Court interjected each time and precluded both lines of questioning.
¶6 McLaughlin filed an objection to the pattern jury instruction defining "reasonable doubt" and proposed his own instruction. The District Court denied his proposed instruction and used the pattern jury instruction adopted by the Criminal Jury Instructions Commission. Based on the jury's guilty verdict, the District Court sentenced McLaughlin to 80 years in the MSP.
¶7 The issues McLaughlin challenges on appeal are: (1) whether the District Court abused its discretion when it denied McLaughlin's motion to suppress; (2) whether the District Court abused its discretion when it did not permit McLaughlin to ask prospective jurors' opinions about self-defense claims and evidentiary expectations; (3) whether the District Court abused its discretion when it rejected McLaughlin's proposed "reasonable doubt" jury instruction; and (4) whether the District Court imposed a legal sentence.
¶8 We review a lower court's denial of a motion to suppress evidence in a criminal case for "whether the court's pertinent findings of fact are clearly erroneous and whether it correctly interpreted and applied the applicable law to those facts." State v. Noli, 2023 MT 84, ¶ 24, 412 Mont. 170, 529 P.3d 813. "To determine whether a finding of fact is clearly erroneous, this Court ascertains whether the finding is supported by substantial evidence, whether the district court misapprehended the effect of the evidence, and whether the Court is nevertheless left with a definite and firm conviction that the district court made a mistake." State v. Wetzel, 2005 MT 154, ¶ 10, 327 Mont. 413, 114 P.3d 269.
¶9 A district court may determine whether an affirmative defense exists as a matter of law. State v. Leprowse, 2009 MT 387, ¶ 11, 353 Mont. 312, 221 P.3d 648. We review a district court's denial of an affirmative defense for correctness. State v. Lynch, 2005 MT 337, ¶7, 330 Mont. 74, 125 P.3d 1148.
¶10 We review a district court's decisions regarding jury instructions for abuse of discretion. State v. Marquez, 2021 MT 263, ¶ 14, 406 Mont. 9, 496 P.3d 963. We review jury instructions in criminal cases for whether the instructions fully and fairly instruct the jury on the law applicable to the case. State v. Ilk, 2018 MT 186, ¶ 15, 392 Mont. 201, 422 P.3d 1219.
¶11 We review criminal sentences that include at least one year of actual incarceration for legality only. State v. Ariegwe, 2007 MT 204, ¶ 174, 338 Mont. 442, 167 P.3d 815. Our review is confined to determining whether the sentencing court had statutory authority to impose the sentence, whether the sentence falls within the parameters set by the applicable sentencing statutes, and whether the court adhered to the affirmative mandates of the applicable sentencing statutes. This determination is a question of law which we review de novo. Ariegwe, ¶ 174.
Motion to Suppress
¶12 McLaughlin argues the District Court should have granted his motion to suppress. He claims the State's warrant application lacked probable cause to support the list of items the State hoped to find. Without probable cause to support the warrant, items found as a result of the search are not admissible.
¶13 Under the Montana Constitution, no search warrant shall be issued without "describing the place to be searched or the thing to be seized, or without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation reduced to writing." Mont. Const. Art. II, § 11; see also U.S. Const. amend. XIV. Section 46-5-221, MCA, requires a search warrant: (1) states facts sufficient to support probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed; (2) states facts sufficient to support probable cause to believe that evidence, contraband, or persons connected with the offense may be found; (3) particularly describes the place, object, or persons to be searched; and (4) particularly describes who or what is to be seized.
¶14 The warrant must be specific enough to prevent general exploratory searches, and the description of items to be seized must be reasonably specific but not elaborately detailed. Muir v. Bilderback, 2015 MT 180, ¶9, 379 Mont. 459, 353 P.3d 473.
¶15 Here, the District Court found the warrant was based on sufficient probable cause to support a search. As detailed above, the probable cause included Chief Pfleger's observations and report of the crime scene and McLaughlin's own admission to severely beating Raymond. The warrant listed specific items that may have caused the death or were related to the circumstances surrounding the death-including instruments potentially used in Raymond's death, DNA evidence, drugs, documents, and computers. Furthermore, the District Court pointed out the evidence McLaughlin sought to suppress was not being presented by the State at all. We agree with the court that the warrant sufficiently described the place and things to be searched and contained sufficient probable cause facts to allow the officers to search for evidence relating to the death of Raymond within the home.
McLaughlin sought to suppress essential oils, a notebook with miscellaneous writing, a file box containing miscellaneous files, a credit card, a laptop, medical paperwork, tree branch, belt, blanket, tablet, pill bottle, and piece of bark.
Voir Dire Proceedings
¶16 McLaughlin argues the District Court abused its discretion by not allowing him to question the jurors about his affirmative defense-justifiable use of force or self-defense- and what kind of evidence they would need to convict under deliberate homicide. McLaughlin claims because he gave notice of his affirmative defense, and the court acknowledged it, he should have been able to question the potential jurors about it.
¶17 On appeal, the State asserts McLaughlin failed to preserve this issue for appeal, asserting he did not object when the District Court precluded him from asking questions about his defense or what evidence the jurors hoped to see. However, after reviewing the trial transcripts, it is clear McLaughlin preserved the issue for appeal. During a side bar in chambers immediately after the court precluded questioning the jurors about their thoughts on self-defense, McLaughlin's counsel objected.
¶18 Where notice of a defense is given, a refusal to allow the defendant to voir dire prospective jurors on the defense constitutes prejudicial error. State v. McKenzie, 186 Mont. 481, 501, 608 P.2d 428, 441 (1980). Voir dire can be prohibited when notice of an affirmative defense has not been given prior to voir dire proceedings. McKenzie, 186 Mont. at 501, 608 P.2d at 441. When notice of a defense is properly given, voir dire can still limit questioning that is not directly related to the defense. State v. Sattler, 1998 MT 57, ¶ 33, 288 Mont. 79, 956 P.2d 54 (noting the question asked "went beyond an attempt to determine whether potential jurors were biased against the justifiable use of force defense" and therefore the court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the question).
¶19 Additionally, under § 46-16-131, MCA, the defendant has the initial burden to offer evidence regarding justifiable use of force before the burden of proof is shifted to the State. If the defendant offers no evidence, then he fails to satisfy his initial burden and the defense fails. See § 26-1-401, MCA ("The initial burden of producing evidence as to a particular fact is on the party who would be defeated if no evidence were given on either side. Thereafter, the burden of producing evidence is on the party who would suffer a finding against [him] in the absence of further evidence."); State v. Daniels, 2011 MT 278, ¶ 15, 362 Mont. 426, 265 P.3d 623.
¶20 Here, McLaughlin filed a notice of affirmative defense on August 16, 2021, and put the District Court on notice that he would be asserting a justifiable use of force defense. The State filed a motion in limine to preclude McLaughlin's use of a justifiable use of force defense. The District Court preliminarily granted the State's motion on December 7, 2021, when it stated "Defendant must establish a factual basis for the defense at issue through properly admitted evidence. The Court further finds the issue of self-defense is not joined until and during the time of trial through evidence before a jury." The court reasoned that McLaughlin could still choose to not testify, and thereby not present any evidence of self-defense at all. Unless defense counsel could assure the District Court either the Defendant would testify and admit some aspect of the charged conduct or that other admissible evidence would support the Defendant's claim of self-defense, the court stated it "preliminarily excludes reference to the defense of justifiable use of force in voir dire, opening statements, direct or cross examination until admissible evidence supporting Defendant's claim of self-defense is presented through the course of trial or Defendant otherwise elects to testify at trial admitting some aspect of the charged conduct."
¶21 Although McLaughlin submitted his defense, the District Court explained he would not be able to voir dire the jury about self-defense until he established admissible supporting evidence for use of the defense. Because the court temporarily precluded the defense, the court was not bound to permit McLaughlin to voir dire the jurors on self-defense. Up until the point of voir dire, McLaughlin had only given notice of his intention to assert a justifiable use of force in self-defense. He did not offer any other evidence to establish a basis for the defense. Additionally, even if the jurors were not aware of the justifiable use of force defense at the voir dire proceedings, they still acknowledged that they would follow the law as given by the court and assume McLaughlin was innocent until proven guilty and the full case had been submitted. As such, the District Court did not err in temporarily precluding questioning about an affirmative defense that, so far, had no foundational evidence.
Jury Instructions
¶22 McLaughlin argues the pattern jury instruction that the District Court used was unconstitutional because jurors would confuse its definition of "reasonable doubt" with a lesser degree of certainty than required by Due Process. The State pointed out the pattern instruction has been used since 1984 and in subsequent cases addressing the issue since then.
The pattern instruction was first sanctioned by this Court in State v. Lucero, 214 Mont. 334, 344, 693 P.2d 511 (1984) ("Recently, this Court received from the Commission on District Courts a set of pattern jury instructions which the Commission recommended for use in criminal cases in this State. Its general instruction No. 1-004 contained a definition of reasonable doubt. We suggest for use in future criminal cases that instruction and no further elaboration of the definition would be needed.").
¶23 The district court is entitled to broad discretion when formulating and approving jury instructions. State v. Spotted Eagle, 2010 MT 222, ¶6, 358 Mont. 22, 243 P.3d 402. The pattern instruction for "reasonable doubt," as used by the District Court here, states:
3. The State of Montana has the burden of proving the guilt of the Defendant beyond a reasonable doubt.
4. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof of such a convincing character that a reasonable person would rely and act upon it in the most important of his or her own affairs. Beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean beyond any doubt or beyond a shadow of a doubt.
5. The Defendant is presumed to be innocent of the charge against the Defendant. This presumption remains with the Defendant throughout every stage of the trial and during your deliberations on the verdict. It is not overcome unless from all the evidence in the case you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant is guilty. The Defendant is not required to prove his or her innocence or present any evidence.
The pattern instruction has a long history of use by Montana Courts, and it has been established that the pattern instruction fully and fairly instructs the jury on the applicable law. Here, the District Court provided the pattern jury instruction for "reasonable doubt" which was then supported by direct evidence presented at trial. When the court denied McLaughlin's proposed instruction, it noted it was not a correct or current statement of the law, and it "might be something for the [Criminal Jury Instructions] Commission to discuss at some point, but I'm not about to start a whole new set of criminal jury instructions." As such, we find no error in the jury instructions, and the District Court did not abuse its discretion in this regard.
See, e.g., State v. Milhoun, 224 Mont. 505, 73 P.2d 1170 (1986); State v. Goodwin, 249 Mont. 1, 14-15, 813 P.2d 953, 961 (1991), overruled on other grounds by State v. Turner, 262 Mont. 39, 50, 864 P.2d 235, 241 (1993); State v. Flesch, 254 Mont. 529, 535, 839 P.2d 1270, 1274 (1992); State v. Steffes, 269 Mont. 214, 235, 887 P.2d 1196, 1209 (1994).
Sentence
¶24 McLaughlin does not challenge the constitutionality of his sentence on appeal, rather, he claims the court abused its discretion when it failed to consider similar sentences in other cases, failed to take into account a possible mitigating factor under § 46-18-101(3)(d), MCA,-that he did not intend to kill Raymond, but was only trying to protect himself,-and commented on McLaughlin's unlikely receptiveness to rehabilitation.
¶25 Under § 45-5-102(2), MCA, "[a] person convicted of the offense of deliberate homicide shall be punished by death . . ., by life imprisonment, or by imprisonment in the state prison for a term of not less than 10 years or more than 100 years, except as provided in 46-18-219 and 46-18-222." "District courts have broad discretion in sentencing defendants convicted of criminal offenses. We generally review a criminal sentence only for legality-that is, to determine whether it is within the statutory parameters established by the legislature; where a sentence is within those parameters, we generally will affirm it." State v. Smith, 276 Mont. 434, 445, 916 P.2d 773, 780 (1996) (internal citations omitted).
¶26 Here, the District Court imposed an 80-year prison sentence for deliberate homicide. Because 80 years is within the statutory parameters for deliberate homicide enumerated in § 45-5-102(2), MCA, the sentence was legal. The court stated its reasons for the sentence included: the prospects of rehabilitation were not good, unless McLaughlin worked on his chemical dependency issues; the interest of public safety; the details of the crime; McLaughlin did not act under strong provocation, but more likely extreme emotional turmoil and drugs/alcohol; McLaughlin had an extensive criminal background; although there may be some grounds tending to excuse or justify the crime, there is not a defense- it can only be explained based on chemical dependence, which does not justify taking another's life; and imprisonment would not create a hardship on his family, rather it would protect them and society. Additionally, the court noted it fully reviewed McLaughlin's pre-sentence investigation report.
¶27 We find the exhaustive list of factors considered by the court sufficiently accounts for the 80-year prison sentence it imposed on McLaughlin. Although the court did not specifically reference similar cases with punishments for the same crime-as McLaughlin alleged the court failed to do-it does not mean the court's sentencing was illegal. Additionally, contrary to McLaughlin's argument that the court failed to consider any mitigating factors, the court did note that it considered certain factors that tended to excuse or justify McLaughlin's actions. But, based on the total evidence presented, those factors did not hold much weight. Accordingly, the District Court's sentence was not unlawful.
¶28 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. In the opinion of the Court, the case presents a question controlled by settled law or by the clear application of applicable standards of review.
¶29 Affirmed.
We concur: MIKE McGRATH, LAURIE McKINNON, JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA, JIM RICE, JUDGES.