Opinion
A-3152-20
01-18-2023
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. CSHETARA W. MCLAUGHLIN, a/k/a CATHERINE MCLAUGHLIN, TARA MCLAUGHLIN, BEAUTY MCLAUGHLIN, and SHERATA W. MCLAUGLIN, Defendant-Appellant.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Monique Moyse, Designated Counsel, on the brief). William A. Daniel, Union County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Milton S. Leibowitz, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
Submitted January 11, 2023
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Union County, Indictment No. 13-06-0573.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Monique Moyse, Designated Counsel, on the brief).
William A. Daniel, Union County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Milton S. Leibowitz, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
Before Judges Haas and Gooden Brown.
PER CURIAM
Defendant Cshetara McLaughlin appeals from the Law Division's April 26, 2021 order denying her petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an evidentiary hearing. We affirm.
The underlying facts concerning the offenses involved in this matter are set forth in our prior opinion on defendant's direct appeal from her convictions for second-degree aggravated assault and third-degree aggravated assault in State v. McLaughlin, Docket No. 2653-15 (App. Div. Oct. 10, 2017), certif. denied, 233 N.J. 6 (2018). Therefore, those facts will not be repeated here. In our decision, we affirmed defendant's convictions, but remanded the matter for resentencing. After the Supreme Court denied certification, the trial court merged the two counts and sentenced defendant on the second-degree aggravated assault charge to a six-year prison term, subject to the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, with three years of parole supervision upon her release.
Defendant filed a timely petition for PCR. Defendant asserted her attorney provided her with ineffective assistance because he failed to file a motion to dismiss the second-degree aggravated assault charge at the end of the State's case or for a judgment of acquittal on this charge after the defense rested.
Following oral argument, the PCR judge rendered a thorough oral decision concluding that defendant did not satisfy the two-prong test of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), which requires a showing that trial counsel's performance was deficient and that, but for the deficient performance, the result would have been different. The judge found that defendant presented no evidence that a motion to dismiss or for a judgment of acquittal would have succeeded. See State v. O'Neal, 190 N.J. 601, 619 (2007) (stating that "[i]t is not ineffective assistance of counsel for defense counsel not to file a meritless motion").
On appeal, defendant raises the same argument she unsuccessfully presented to the PCR judge. Defendant contends that she "is entitled to an evidentiary hearing or relief on her claim that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance for failing to move to dismiss" the second-degree aggravated assault charge.
When petitioning for PCR, the defendant must establish, by a preponderance of the credible evidence, that he is entitled to the requested relief. State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 541 (2013); State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 459 (1992). To sustain that burden, the defendant must allege and articulate specific facts that "provide the court with an adequate basis on which to rest its decision." State v. Mitchell, 126 N.J. 565, 579 (1992).
The mere raising of a claim for PCR does not entitle the defendant to an evidentiary hearing and the defendant "must do more than make bald assertions that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel." State v. Cummings, 321 N.J.Super. 154, 170 (App. Div. 1999). Rather, trial courts should grant evidentiary hearings and make a determination on the merits only if the defendant has presented a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance, material issues of disputed facts lie outside the record, and resolution of the issues necessitates a hearing. R. 3:22-10(b); State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 354 (2013). We review a judge's decision to deny a PCR petition without an evidentiary hearing for abuse of discretion. Preciose, 129 N.J. at 462.
To establish a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant is obliged to show not only the particular manner in which counsel's performance was deficient, but also that the deficiency prejudiced her right to a fair trial. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987). There is a strong presumption that counsel "rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. Further, because prejudice is not presumed, Fritz, 105 N.J. at 52, the defendant must demonstrate "how specific errors of counsel undermined the reliability" of the proceeding. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 n.26 (1984).
Having considered defendant's contentions in light of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the denial of defendant's PCR petition substantially for the reasons detailed at length in the PCR judge's oral opinion. We discern no abuse of discretion in the judge's consideration of the issues, or in her decision to deny the petition without an evidentiary hearing. We are satisfied that the trial attorney's performance was not deficient, and defendant failed to demonstrate that a motion to dismiss or for a judgment of acquittal would have been successful. O'Neal, 190 N.J. at 619.
Affirmed.