See Annotation IV, 152 A.L.R. p. 273. Many cases in various jurisdictions hold that a plea of nolo contendere to an indictment has the effect of a plea of guilty in that proceeding, In re Smith, 365 Ill. 11, 5 N.E.2d 227; Fox v. Scheidt, 241 N.C. 31, 84 S.E.2d 259; State v. Shepherd, 230 N.C. 605, 55 S.E.2d 79; State v. McKay, 202 N.C. 470, 163 S.E. 586; In re Club 17, Inc., 26 N.J. Super. 43, 97 A.2d 171; Kravis v. Hock, 136 N.J.L. 161, 54 A.2d 778; Schireson v. State Board of Medical Examiners of New Jersey, 129 N.J.L. 203, 28 A.2d 879; Commonwealth v. Ingersoll, 145 Mass. 381, 14 N.E. 449; State v. Siddall, 103 Me. 144, 68 A. 634; Neibling v. Terry, 352 Mo. 396, 177 S.W.2d 502, 152 A.L.R. 249; Commonwealth v. Rousch, 113 Pa. Super. 182, 172 A. 484; Teslovich v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Company of San Francisco, 110 Pa. Super. 245, 168 A. 354; State v. McElroy, 71 R.I. 379, 46 A.2d 397; Ellsworth v. State, 258 Wis. 636, 46 N.W.2d 746; United States v. Food and Grocery Bureau of Southern California, D.C. 43 F. Supp. 974; or that such plea is equivalent to a plea of guilty insofar as it gives the court power to punish, but only in the particular case. United States v. Norris, 281 U.S. 619, 50 S.Ct. 424, 74 L.Ed. 1076; Hudson v. United States, 272 U.S. 451, 47 S.Ct. 127, 71 L.Ed. 347; People ex rel. Attorney General v. Edison, 100 Co
The general principle governing the validity of such agreements, is thus expressed in Taylor v. Taylor, 197 N.C. 197, 148 S.E. 174: "It seems to be unquestioned that a separation agreement must be untainted by fraud, must be in all respects fair, reasonable and just, and must have been entered into without coercion or the exercise of undue influence, and with full knowledge of all the circumstances, conditions, and rights of the contracting parties." Moreover, the effect of the resumption of the conjugal relationship between the parties after an agreement has been duly executed, has been discussed in several decisions, notably: Smith v. King, 107 N.C. 273, 12 S.E. 57; Archbell v. Archbell, 158 N.C. 408, 74 S.E. 327; Moore v. Moore, 185 N.C. 332, 117 S.E. 12; S. v. McKay, 202 N.C. 470, 163 S.E. 586. In the Smith case, supra, it was said: "The law, if it recognizes, does not favor, articles of separation, and will not so construe them as to be valid after the parties have themselves canceled the agreement to separate by cohabiting together, unless it appear in the deed plainly that such separate support is to be continued, notwithstanding any future reconciliation and cohabitation.
Accordingly, we must affirm the trial court's order denying Bishop Wilkins’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff's seduction claim as our Supreme Court has never abolished this tort. SeeState v. McKay , 202 N.C. 470, 163 S.E. 586 (1932) (recognizing wrongful seduction as a tort). B. The Church's Appeal