Opinion
ID NO. 93002189DI
January 31, 2000.
ORDER
This the 31st day of January, 2000, upon consideration of the Defendant's Motion for New Trial, and the record in this case, it appears that:
1. In March of 1994, the Defendant was convicted in the Superior Court on one count of Unlawful Sexual Intercourse First Degree and Unlawful Sexual Contact Second Degree. Those convictions were remanded by the Supreme Court for retrial in March of 1996. McGriff v. State, Del. Supr, 672 A.2d 1027 (1996). The retrial of this matter commenced on September 30, 1997. The jury went back for deliberation on this case on October 8, 1997. A note was presented from the jury at approximately 11:00 am on October 9, 1997, which stated that the jury was deadlocked and requested more time for deliberation. The jury returned a verdict of guilty as to both counts of the indictment approximately four hours later. The jury was polled at the request of the defense. All jurors indicated that the verdicts of guilty were their individual verdicts.
Barbara Tomlinson (Hereinafter Juror No. 9) paused briefly before responding in the affirmative when polled.
2. On October 10, 1997, at approximately 9:00 am, Juror No. 9 contacted defense counsel at his home. She indicated during that conversation that she felt as though she had let defense counsel down and that the State had not proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt. She said that she found the Defendant guilty, not because he was in fact guilty, but, because the other jurors had convinced her to vote in favor of his guilt and she could no longer endure the deliberative process.
3. Juror No. 9 specifically complained that during their deliberations, the other jurors:
1) made personal attacks on her character and intelligence;
2) ridiculed her reasoning and the position she took on the defendants guilt or innocence;
3) drew negative inferences as to the character of the defendant based upon the fact that he was dressed in prison garb;
4) concluded that the defendant was guilty, at least in part, because he acted in conformity with the aforementioned negative character inferences; and
5) told her she should consider, in determining the appropriate verdict in the case, how she would feel if they failed to reach a verdict and the defendant did this to some other child.
Defendant's Motion for New Trial at 2. Defense Counsel advised her in response that she should contact the Court and relay her concerns to the judge that presided over the trial. On October 10, 1991, that contact was established and a review of the situation began.
4. On September 10, 1999, an office conference on the record was held with Juror No. 9 and counsel for the defense and the state. At that time, Juror No. 9 reiterated what was said during her initial conversation with defense counsel she also felt "debased, fearful, and frankly, a victim of mob mentality." See Office Conference Tr. at 3. Apparently, the day after the jury verdict was announced, she read a newspaper with an article regarding the instant case which prompted the phone call made to defense counsel. She learned from the article that:
Last year the State Supreme Court overturned McGriff's conviction and ordered a new trial. Why? Because the high court ruled that it had been a violation of Mr. McGriff s rights that the defense was not able to cross-examination [sic] the little girl, and that, in essence, was my problem, and I, of course, had no concept . . . this was the first time Delaware utilized the child hearsay exception hearing or ruling.Id. at 4.
5. It is apparent that this juror believes that her feelings were ridiculed and had been coerced by the other jurors acting as a group to vote in favor of the Defendant's guilt. It was only after she read the newspaper article on the case that her resolve returned and she called defense counsel.
6. When considering a motion for new trial, the jury's verdict is presumed to be correct. Lacey v. Beck, Del. Super., 161 A.2d 579, 580 (1960). The Court must determine whether it is against the great weight of the evidence. James v. Glazer, Del. Supr., 570 A.2d 1150, 1156 (1990). A jury's verdict should not be disturbed unless it is manifest that it was the result of passion, prejudice partiality or corruption, or that it was clearly in disregard of the evidence or applicable rules of law. Storey v. Castner, Del. Supr., 314 A.2d 187, 193 (1973).
7. The Supreme Court in Tanner v. United States, 526 A.2d 886 (1987), recognized the sound policy reasons for insulating a jury's deliberative process from public scrutiny in order to ensure the finality in the verdict, as well as to maintain public confidence in the jury system. Id. at 896. A court's decision whether to interview jurors must rest primarily on the evidence submitted as to an outside influence on the jury's deliberations. "The decision to hold a hearing to determine juror misconduct is within the sound discretion of the trial judge . . . [when] juror misconduct involves influences from outside sources, the failure of the trial judge to hold a hearing constitutes an abuse of discretion." United States v. Chiantese, 582 F.2d 974, 978-979 (5th Cir. 1978). A trial judge has broad discretion in deciding whether a case must be retried or the juror summoned and investigated due to alleged exposure to prejudicial information or improper outside influence. Styler v. State, Del. Supr., 417 A.2d 948 (1980).
8. As a general rule, a juror may not impeach his own verdict once the jury has been discharged. Sheeran v. State of Delaware, Del. Supr., 526 A.2d 886, 894 (1987) (citing McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267 (1915)). However, our criminal justice system is based upon the notion that the conclusions which the jury reaches "in a case will be induced only by evidence and argument in open court and not by any outside influence." It has therefore been established that an absolute prohibition against receiving post-verdict testimony from jurors would disregard the important public policy of "redressing the injury of a private litigant where the verdict reached by a jury that was not impartial." Thompson v. Papstavros Associates Medical Imaging, L.L.C., Del. Super., 729 A.2d 874, 878, (1998). The exception to the general rule regarding the sanctity of jury verdicts is governed by Delaware Rule of Evidence 606(b) which reads:
This rule promotes certain public policies:
1) discouraging harassment of jurors by losing parties eager to have the verdict set aside;
2) encouraging free and open discussion among jurors;
3) reducing incentives for jury tampering;
4) promoting verdict finality; and maintaining the viability of the jury as a judicial decision-making body. Id.
Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon his or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning his mental processes in connection therewith, except that a juror may testify on the question whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror. Nor may his affidavit or evidence of any statement by him concerning a matter about which he precluded from testifying be received for these purposes.
9. The courts have distinguished between extrinsic and intrinsic influences in order to preserve the sanctity of the jury's deliberations while also ensuring the defendants right to a verdict based on competent evidence only. Id. Extrinsic influences would justify an inquiry into the validity of a verdict, whereas, intrinsic would not. Extrinsic, or extraneous, influences have been construed to include:
1) exposure of jurors to news items about matters pending before the jury;
2) consideration by the jury of extra-record facts about the case;
3) communications relevant to the case to be decided between third parties and jurors; and
4) pressures or partiality on the part of the court.
Id. (citing Sheeran, 526 A.2d at 894, 895). Discussions among jurors, intimidation or harassment of one juror by another have been construed as intrinsic influences and are areas in which a juror is not competent to testify. Id at 879.
10. During the course of jury deliberations there are numerous pressures which are brought to bear upon the jurors, particularly those who find themselves in a minority position. It is a natural part of jury deliberation that such pressures would exist, and multiply as the size of the minority diminishes. See Sheeran at 896. Those pressures the juror refers to are an inherent and intrinsic part of the deliberative process. One would expect that those in the majority would argue forcefully in an attempt to persuade those in the minority to accept the views of the majority. Id. However, it has been generally held that jurors may not impeach their verdict by testimony that resulted from coercion or majority vote. Id. at 897 (citing Jones, Evidence, Volume III, § 20:58, page 727 (Sixth Edition); 8 Wigmore, Evidence, §§ 2345— 2356 (1961).
11. Juror No. 9 does not suggest that anyone attempted to threaten or injure her. Nor does she complain that any extraneous or outside information, which would justify a further inquiry into the validity of the decision made on October 9, 1997 was presented. She basically states that she was the subject of ridicule and group pressure, factors which will not invalidate the jury's decision. Consequently, it does not appear that the jury deliberations did involved prejudice, partiality, corruption, or a disregard of the evidence or applicable rules of law. The verdict must stand as it was handed down.
Based on the foregoing the Defendant's Motion for New Trial must be and is hereby denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.