State ex rel. Berger v. Superior Court, 109 Ariz. 506, 513 P.2d 935 (1973), cert. denied sub nom. Pate v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 1145, 94 S.Ct. 899, 39 L.Ed.2d 101 (1974); State v. Knapp, 114 Ariz. 531, 562 P.2d 704 (1977), cert. denied sub nom. Knapp v. Arizona, [435] U.S. 908, 98 S.Ct. 1458, 55 L.Ed.2d 500 (1978); State v. Pineda, 110 Ariz. 342, 519 P.2d 41 (1974)." State v. McGinty, 120 Ariz. 162, 164, 584 P.2d 1153 (1978); see also State v. Grange, 25 Ariz. App. 290, 543 P.2d 128 (1975). The trial court's denial of the motion to suppress was correct.

This Court has held that questioning a suspect after he has asserted his Miranda rights is permissible, so long as the suspect's right to cut off the questioning is "scrupulously honored." State v. McGinty, 120 Ariz. 162, 584 P.2d 1153 (1978); State v. Hatton, 116 Ariz. 142, 568 P.2d 1040 (1977). Similarly, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in United States v. Rodriguez-Gastelum, 569 F.2d 482 (9th Cir. 1978) cert. denied, 436 U.S. 919, 98 S.Ct. 2266, 56 L.Ed.2d 760 (1978), held that although questioning must stop after a right to counsel is asserted, it can later resume if the suspect makes a waiver of the right. Such a waiver of a previously asserted right must meet the definition pronounced in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938).