Opinion
No. COA12–116.
2012-07-3
STATE of North Carolina v. Tanya Renee McGILL.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Letitia C. Echols, for the State. J. Edward Yeager, Jr., for defendant-appellant.
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 6 October 2011 by Judge Richard L. Doughton in Catawba County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 18 June 2012. Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Letitia C. Echols, for the State. J. Edward Yeager, Jr., for defendant-appellant.
ELMORE, Judge.
Tanya Renee McGill (defendant) appeals from a judgment revoking her probation and activating her sentence, and contends that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking probation. We affirm.
On 18 July 2006, defendant pled guilty to assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury. The trial court imposed a suspended sentence of 25 to 39 months and placed defendant on probation for 60 months. On 1 November 2006, defendant's probation officer filed a violation report alleging multiple violations of the terms and conditions of defendant's probation. On 4 January 2007, the trial court modified defendant's probation by ordering her to comply with additional special conditions.
On 7 July 2009, defendant's probation officer filed a second violation report alleging numerous violations, including that defendant tested positive for marijuana on two occasions and that she had six pending criminal charges. On 15 July 2010, after finding that defendant violated probation, the trial court modified the monetary conditions and ordered defendant to obtain a Treatment Accountability for Safer Communities (TASC) assessment and comply with all recommendations. The court also ordered intensive probation for six months.
On 14 March 2011, another violation report was filed alleging defendant had tested positive for cocaine and marijuana, was in arrears on the monetary conditions of her probation, and failed to comply with her TASC recommendations. At the hearing held on 6 October 2011, defendant admitted to the positive drug tests and to being in arrears on her court-ordered indebtedness, but argued that her failure to comply with the TASC recommendations was not willful. The trial court found defendant willfully violated the terms and conditions of her probation based on the positive drug tests and the failure to comply with the TASC recommendations, but the court declined to find a violation of the monetary conditions. The court entered judgment revoking probation and activating the original sentence. Defendant timely appealed.
Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking probation because she presented evidence that her violations were not willful. She contends that her existing mental health problems and her lack of transportation to get to her TASC assessment are valid excuses for her failure to comply with the terms of her probation. We do not agree.
This Court has stated,
A hearing to revoke a defendant's probationary sentence only requires that the evidence be such as to reasonably satisfy the judge in the exercise of his sound discretion that the defendant has willfully violated a valid condition of probation or that the defendant has violated without lawful excuse a valid condition upon which the sentence was suspended. The judge's finding of such a violation, if supported by competent evidence, will not be overturned absent a showing of manifest abuse of discretion.
State v. Young, 190 N.C.App. 458, 459, 660 S.E.2d 574, 576 (2008) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Only one violation is necessary to support an order activating a sentence. State v. Braswell, 283 N.C. 332, 337, 196 S.E.2d 185, 188 (1973). The defendant has the burden of showing excuse or lack of willfulness. State v. Crouch, 74 N.C.App. 565, 567, 328 S.E.2d 833, 835 (1985).
Here, defendant admitted to the positive drug tests as alleged in the probation violation report, and provided no evidence of lawful excuse for this violation at the revocation hearing. Since only one violation is necessary to support revocation of probation, we need not address defendant's arguments regarding her other violation. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking probation and activating defendant's sentence, and the judgment is hereby affirmed.
Affirmed. Judges HUNTER, Robert C., and McCULLOUGH concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).