Opinion
No. 2-015 / 01-0514.
Filed April 24, 2002.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, SCOTT D. ROSENBERG and ELIZA J. OVROM, Judges.
Defendant appeals his judgments and convictions entered following a jury trial, where prior to such trial the district court denied his motion to suppress. AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and David Arthur Adams, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Denise A. Timmins, Assistant Attorney General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, Dan Voogt, Jeffrey Noble, and Bob DiBlasi, Assistant County Attorneys, for appellee.
Considered by HUITINK, P.J., and VOGEL and EISENHAUER, JJ.
Jeffrey McFadden argues his judgments and convictions for delivery of methamphetamine in violation of Iowa Code section 124.401(1)(b)(7) (1999), failure to affix a drug tax stamp in violation of sections 453B.3 and 453B.12, and operating a motor vehicle while his license was revoked, in violation of section 321.218(1), must be vacated. He contends the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress certain evidence discovered when the police searched his truck following his arrest for operating a motor vehicle without a valid driver's license. We agree the search was unconstitutional and reverse his drug-related convictions.
Although McFadden posits a challenge to all three convictions, his appeal brief focuses on the illegality of the search only, and does not raise any issues regarding his conviction for operating while revoked.
Background Facts and Proceedings . After being advised of a suspicious chemical smell emanating from McFadden's hotel room and determining that his driving privileges had been suspended or revoked, police placed McFadden's truck under surveillance. When McFadden left the hotel and drove away in his vehicle, the police followed, with the intention of having a marked cruiser stop him for operating a motor vehicle without a valid driver's license. Before a stop could be initiated, however, McFadden pulled into a convenience store parking lot, parked his truck "just to the west" of the store doors, exited the vehicle, and entered the store.
The police did not approach McFadden until he left the store two or three minutes later. It appears McFadden was just outside of the store doors when he was stopped, questioned, and almost immediately handcuffed. Once the officers confirmed McFadden did not have a valid driver's license, he was arrested. When one of the officers searched McFadden's truck in preparation for impoundment, he discovered bags containing money, drugs, and drug paraphernalia. Based upon this evidence, McFadden was charged with the drug-related crimes.
Scope of Review . Since McFadden maintains the officers' actions violated the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, U.S. Const. amend. IV, our review is de novo. State v. Tolsdorf, 574 N.W.2d 290, 291 (Iowa 1998).
Search Incident to Arrest . Because the search of McFadden's truck was warrantless, it was per se unreasonable unless the State can prove the search was conducted pursuant to an exception to the warrant requirement. Id. at 292. In its appellate brief theState conceded two such exceptions, a valid inventory search for impoundment purposes and an automobile search supported by probable cause and exigent circumstances, are not present in this case. We therefore limit our analysis to the question of whether the search of McFadden's truck fell within the exception that allows an officer making "a lawful custodial arrest" of a vehicle "occupant" to conduct a search of the vehicle's passenger compartment "as a contemporaneous incident" of the arrest. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 2864, 69 L.Ed.2d 768, 775 (1981) (footnotes omitted).
No prior Iowa case has addressed whether the police may conduct a search incident to arrest if the suspect has left his vehicle, entered another structure, and is arrested before he can return to the vehicle. What has been established is police authority to search a vehicle as an incident to an arrest, even where the police have no knowledge regarding the suspect's occupancy of the vehicle prior to the arrest, if that suspect seeks and obtains permission to enter the vehicle after he has been detained. Tolsdorf, 574 N.W.2d at 292. The test seems to be whether the suspect's movements into or perhaps even toward the vehicle "open up new areas which come within his `immediate control' and thus are subject to search." Id. (quoting 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 7.1(b), at 442 (3d ed. 1996) (footnotes omitted)). Such an interpretation comports with the recognized qualification to the Belton rule — that searches incident to arrest must always conform with the fundamental principals established in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969). State v. Derifield, 467 N.W.2d 297, 299 (Iowa Ct.App. 1991).
Under Chimel, an officer is authorized to search not only the person of the individual arrested, but also the area within that individual's immediate control, defined as "the area from within which [a suspect] might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence." Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763, 89 S.Ct. at 2040, 23 L.Ed.2d at 694. The justification for such a search is "the need to seize weapons and other things which might be used to assault an officer or effect an escape, as well as by the need to prevent the destruction of evidence of the crime. . . . But these justifications are absent where a search is remote in time or place from the arrest." Id. at 764, 89 S.Ct. at 2040, 23 L.Ed.2d at 694 (quoting Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367, 84 S.Ct. 881, 883, 11 L.Ed.2d 777, 780). Here, McFadden had left his vehicle and entered the store, and was stopped and arrested for an operating violation before he could return to his vehicle. Under these circumstances the safety and evidentiary concerns outlined in Chimel are simply not present.
The State presents a number of cases from other jurisdictions in attempted support of its position, all of which found passenger compartment searches valid where a suspect had voluntarily left the vehicle before being detained by police. However, even the case primarily relied upon by the State requires the suspect be arrested in close proximity to the vehicle immediately after his or her exit from the vehicle. Glasco v. Commonwealth, 513 S.E.2d 137, 142 (Va. 1999). Assuming our willingness to adopt such a rule, the delay caused by McFadden's entry into the convenience store, if not his distance from the vehicle when arrested, would still render the search invalid. Nor are any of the other justifications relied upon in the persuasive authority, such as re-entry into the vehicle or a suspect's attempt to thwart the search by exiting the vehicle, present in this case. See, e.g., United States v. Riedesel, 987 F.2d 1383, 1389 (8th Cir. 1993); People v. Savedra, 907 P.2d 596, 600 (Colo. 1995).
We recognize the difficulties police face when attempting to balance the competing interests of public and officer safety, which is why Belton attempted to create a "single, familiar standard" for cases such as this. Belton, 453 U.S. at 458, 101 S.Ct. at 2863, 69 L.Ed.2d at 774 (citation omitted). We also agree the dicta of Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983), as well as that found in Tolsdorf, indicates police need not take the risk associated with arresting a suspect while he or she still occupies the vehicle. However, nothing in those cases, or any other Iowa case, suggests the specific facts surrounding the search of McFadden's vehicle are sufficient to satisfy the occupancy and/or proximity requirements as laid down in Belton and Chimel. The motion to suppress should have been granted. We therefore vacate McFadden's convictions and sentences for delivery of methamphetamine and failure to affix a drug tax stamp, and remand for further proceedings. Because the suppression issue does not impact the validity of McFadden's driving while revoked conviction, that conviction and sentence is affirmed.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.