State v. McElveen

88 Citing cases

  1. State v. Jerzy G.

    326 Conn. 206 (Conn. 2017)   Cited 11 times
    In Jerzy G., however, the court found McElveen ’s principle inapplicable to cases in which a conviction, other than the one being challenged, results in a permanent ban of an individual's reentry into the United States because the alternative source of prejudice in such cases is "necessarily dispositive regarding the collateral injury...."

    Moraski v. Connecticut Board of Examiners of Embalmers & Funeral Directors , supra, 255.In State v. McElveen, 261 Conn. 198, 802 A.2d 74 (2002), this court engaged in a comprehensive examination of the contours of the collateral consequences doctrine, which provides an exception to the traditional direct injury requirement of mootness. The defendant, Derek McElveen, was found to have violated the conditions of his probation on charges of failure to appear in the second degree due to his arrest in connection with an alleged attempt to commit robbery.

  2. State v. Gomes

    337 Conn. 826 (Conn. 2021)   Cited 11 times
    Cautioning that model jury instructions are to be used as " ‘guide’ " and are for instructive purposes

    (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. McElveen , 261 Conn. 198, 204, 802 A.2d 74 (2002), quoting Ayala v. Smith , 236 Conn. 89, 93, 671 A.2d 345 (1996). It is well settled that "[a] case is considered moot if [the] court cannot grant the [litigant] any practical relief through its disposition of the merits .... Under such circumstances, the court would merely be rendering an advisory opinion, instead of adjudicating an actual, justiciable controversy."

  3. Stephenson v. Comm'r of Corr.

    197 Conn. App. 172 (Conn. App. Ct. 2020)   Cited 1 times

    (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. McElveen , 261 Conn. 198, 204–205, 802 A.2d 74 (2002). "[A] case does not necessarily become moot by virtue of the fact that ... due to a change in circumstances, relief from the actual injury is unavailable.

  4. State v. Fletcher

    183 Conn. App. 1 (Conn. App. Ct. 2018)   Cited 4 times

    ’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. McElveen , 261 Conn. 198, 205, 802 A.2d 74 (2002). ‘‘If there is no longer an actual controversy in which [this court] can afford practical relief to the parties, we must dismiss the appeal.... In determining mootness, the dispositive question is whether a successful appeal would benefit the plaintiff or defendant in any way.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

  5. CT Freedom All. v. Dep't of Educ.

    346 Conn. 1 (Conn. 2023)   Cited 10 times
    In CT Freedom Alliance, LLC v. Dept. of Education, supra, 346 Conn. 1, 287 A.3d 557, in adopting the rule that some deference should be afforded to government actors in these matters, we relied on the decisions of several federal courts, including a United States court of appeals decision.

    Rather, the jurisdictional boundaries of our courts, including "[o]ur mootness jurisprudence," have "evolved under our common law." State v. McElveen , 261 Conn. 198, 212, 802 A.2d 74 (2002). The constitution of Connecticut, article first, § 10, provides: "All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by course of law, and right and justice administered without sale, denial or delay."

  6. State v. Roszkowski

    329 Conn. 554 (Conn. 2018)   Cited 1 times
    Holding that, under State v. Polanco , 308 Conn. 242, 245, 61 A.3d 1084, trial court should have vacated defendant's three murder convictions, rather than merging them into corresponding capital felony convictions, as lesser included offenses of capital crimes

    -------- The state's position is founded on the well established principle that a case is justiciable only if the defendant's appeal raises a claim from which the court can grant practical relief. See, e.g., State v. McElveen , 261 Conn. 198, 205, 216, 802 A.2d 74 (2002). As we recently explained, "[t]he fundamental principles underpinning the mootness doctrine are well settled.... Because courts are established to resolve actual controversies, before a claimed controversy is entitled to a resolution on the merits it must be justiciable.

  7. St. Juste v. Comm'r of Corr.

    328 Conn. 198 (Conn. 2018)   Cited 11 times
    Holding that appeal from denial of petition for writ of habeas corpus was not moot, despite petitioner's subsequent deportation, because challenged conviction gave "rise to a reasonable possibility of prejudicial collateral consequences—namely, his deportation and a barrier to reentry"

    Specifically, "[w]e have determined that a controversy continues to exist ... if the actual injury suffered by the litigant potentially gives rise to a collateral injury from which the court can grant relief." State v. McElveen , 261 Conn. 198, 205, 802 A.2d 74 (2002) ; see also State v. Jerzy G. , supra, 326 Conn. at 213–14, 162 A.3d 692. "[F]or a litigant to invoke successfully the collateral consequences doctrine, the litigant must show that there is a reasonable possibility that prejudicial collateral consequences will occur." State v. McElveen , supra, at 208, 802 A.2d 74.

  8. State v. Ovechka

    292 Conn. 533 (Conn. 2009)   Cited 32 times
    Deeming temporary but grave condition, loss of sight, to be serious physical injury

    State v. Ovechka, supra, 99 Conn. App. 681 n. 4. The record reveals that the defendant no longer is incarcerated. Nevertheless, this appeal is not moot because practical relief remains available as a result of the collateral consequences attendant to a criminal conviction; see, e.g., State v. McElveen, 261 Conn. 198, 216 n. 14, 802 A.2d 74 (2002); as well as the fact that he remains subject to a period of probation. The defendant raised numerous claims on appeal to the Appellate Court, including that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of assault in the second degree in violation of § 53a-60 (a) (2) "because the state did not prove that he used a dangerous instrument" since it had "failed to prove that the substance, under the circumstances it was used, was capable of causing death or serious physical injury. . . ."

  9. State v. Singleton

    274 Conn. 426 (Conn. 2005)   Cited 52 times
    Holding that a guilty plea to the charges underlying a probation violation renders the issue of probation violation moot because there is no live controversy regarding whether the conduct occurred

    We first address the question of mootness because it implicates both the subject matter jurisdiction of the Appellate Court when it decided this case and of this court. State v. McElveen, 261 Conn. 198, 201, 802 A.2d 74 (2002). It is clear that, because the defendant pleaded guilty to and was convicted of criminal conduct "stemming from the same criminal conduct that gave rise to the violation of his probation," his appeal from the trial court's judgment revoking his probation was moot when the Appellate Court decided that appeal because there was no controversy left regarding whether he had engaged in the criminal conduct for which his probation had been revoked.

  10. Wallingford v. Dept. of Public Health

    262 Conn. 758 (Conn. 2003)   Cited 57 times

    We agree with the parties and the trial court that this matter is not moot. We base our conclusion, however, on the collateral consequences doctrine, as recently stated in State v. McElveen, 261 Conn. 198, 802 A.2d 74 (2002), and Williams v. Ragaglia, 261 Conn. 219, 802 A.2d 778 (2002). Mootness is a question of justiciability that must be determined as a threshold matter because it "implicates [this] court's subject matter jurisdiction . . . ."