Moraski v. Connecticut Board of Examiners of Embalmers & Funeral Directors , supra, 255.In State v. McElveen, 261 Conn. 198, 802 A.2d 74 (2002), this court engaged in a comprehensive examination of the contours of the collateral consequences doctrine, which provides an exception to the traditional direct injury requirement of mootness. The defendant, Derek McElveen, was found to have violated the conditions of his probation on charges of failure to appear in the second degree due to his arrest in connection with an alleged attempt to commit robbery.

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. McElveen , 261 Conn. 198, 204, 802 A.2d 74 (2002), quoting Ayala v. Smith , 236 Conn. 89, 93, 671 A.2d 345 (1996). It is well settled that "[a] case is considered moot if [the] court cannot grant the [litigant] any practical relief through its disposition of the merits .... Under such circumstances, the court would merely be rendering an advisory opinion, instead of adjudicating an actual, justiciable controversy."

(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. McElveen , 261 Conn. 198, 204–205, 802 A.2d 74 (2002). "[A] case does not necessarily become moot by virtue of the fact that ... due to a change in circumstances, relief from the actual injury is unavailable.

’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. McElveen , 261 Conn. 198, 205, 802 A.2d 74 (2002). ‘‘If there is no longer an actual controversy in which [this court] can afford practical relief to the parties, we must dismiss the appeal.... In determining mootness, the dispositive question is whether a successful appeal would benefit the plaintiff or defendant in any way.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

Rather, the jurisdictional boundaries of our courts, including "[o]ur mootness jurisprudence," have "evolved under our common law." State v. McElveen , 261 Conn. 198, 212, 802 A.2d 74 (2002). The constitution of Connecticut, article first, § 10, provides: "All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by course of law, and right and justice administered without sale, denial or delay."

-------- The state's position is founded on the well established principle that a case is justiciable only if the defendant's appeal raises a claim from which the court can grant practical relief. See, e.g., State v. McElveen , 261 Conn. 198, 205, 216, 802 A.2d 74 (2002). As we recently explained, "[t]he fundamental principles underpinning the mootness doctrine are well settled.... Because courts are established to resolve actual controversies, before a claimed controversy is entitled to a resolution on the merits it must be justiciable.

Specifically, "[w]e have determined that a controversy continues to exist ... if the actual injury suffered by the litigant potentially gives rise to a collateral injury from which the court can grant relief." State v. McElveen , 261 Conn. 198, 205, 802 A.2d 74 (2002) ; see also State v. Jerzy G. , supra, 326 Conn. at 213–14, 162 A.3d 692. "[F]or a litigant to invoke successfully the collateral consequences doctrine, the litigant must show that there is a reasonable possibility that prejudicial collateral consequences will occur." State v. McElveen , supra, at 208, 802 A.2d 74.

State v. Ovechka, supra, 99 Conn. App. 681 n. 4. The record reveals that the defendant no longer is incarcerated. Nevertheless, this appeal is not moot because practical relief remains available as a result of the collateral consequences attendant to a criminal conviction; see, e.g., State v. McElveen, 261 Conn. 198, 216 n. 14, 802 A.2d 74 (2002); as well as the fact that he remains subject to a period of probation. The defendant raised numerous claims on appeal to the Appellate Court, including that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of assault in the second degree in violation of § 53a-60 (a) (2) "because the state did not prove that he used a dangerous instrument" since it had "failed to prove that the substance, under the circumstances it was used, was capable of causing death or serious physical injury. . . ."

We first address the question of mootness because it implicates both the subject matter jurisdiction of the Appellate Court when it decided this case and of this court. State v. McElveen, 261 Conn. 198, 201, 802 A.2d 74 (2002). It is clear that, because the defendant pleaded guilty to and was convicted of criminal conduct "stemming from the same criminal conduct that gave rise to the violation of his probation," his appeal from the trial court's judgment revoking his probation was moot when the Appellate Court decided that appeal because there was no controversy left regarding whether he had engaged in the criminal conduct for which his probation had been revoked.

We agree with the parties and the trial court that this matter is not moot. We base our conclusion, however, on the collateral consequences doctrine, as recently stated in State v. McElveen, 261 Conn. 198, 802 A.2d 74 (2002), and Williams v. Ragaglia, 261 Conn. 219, 802 A.2d 778 (2002). Mootness is a question of justiciability that must be determined as a threshold matter because it "implicates [this] court's subject matter jurisdiction . . . ."