Opinion
2 CA-CR 2023-0259-PR
05-09-2024
The State of Arizona, Respondent, v. Tyson Terrell McDaniel, Petitioner.
Tyson Terrell McDaniel, Eloy In Propria Persona
Not for Publication - Rule 111(c), Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court
Petition for Review from the Superior Court in Maricopa County No. CR1994000671 The Honorable Aryeh D. Schwartz, Judge
Tyson Terrell McDaniel, Eloy In Propria Persona
Presiding Judge Brearcliffe authored the decision of the Court, in which Judge Eckerstrom and Judge Kelly concurred.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
BREARCLIFFE, PRESIDING JUDGE
¶1 Tyson McDaniel seeks review of the trial court's order summarily dismissing his successive petition for post-conviction relief filed pursuant to Rule 32, Ariz. R. Crim. P. We will not disturb that ruling unless the court abused its discretion. See State v. Roseberry, 237 Ariz. 507, ¶ 7 (2015). McDaniel has not established such abuse.
¶2 After a jury trial, McDaniel was convicted of first-degree murder, burglary, and attempted armed robbery. For murder, the trial court sentenced him to life without the possibility of release for twenty-five years, to be served consecutively to concurrent prison terms for burglary and attempted armed robbery, the longer of which is 7.5 years. We affirmed his convictions and sentences on appeal. State v. McDaniel, Nos. 1 CA-CR 95-0601, 1 CA-CR 96-0055 (Ariz. App. May 20, 1997) (consol. mem. decision). McDaniel has sought and been denied post-conviction relief numerous times.
¶3 In November 2023, McDaniel filed a petition for post-conviction relief, citing Rule 32.1(d) and asserting he was entitled to release from his sentence for murder after having served twenty-five years. He reasoned the trial court had imposed a twenty-five-year sentence, not a life sentence, by stating at sentencing that he would not be "entitled to release on any basis until you have served at least 25 years of this sentence," the state had not appealed from his illegally lenient sentence, and any ambiguity should be resolved in his favor. In support, McDaniel cited Chaparro v. Shinn, 248 Ariz. 138 (2020), a vacated memorandum decision by this court, a federal trial court decision, and a Maricopa County Superior Court decision.
Specifically, McDaniel cited Shinn v. Arizona Board of Executive Clemency, 1 CA-CV 20-0617 (Ariz. App. Oct. 19, 2021), vacated, 254 Ariz. 255 (2022), Viramontes v. Ryan, No. CV-16-00151-TUC-RM, 2019 WL 568944 (D.
¶4 The trial court summarily dismissed the petition. It noted, inter alia, that McDaniel had made and the court had rejected a largely identical claim in an earlier proceeding. The court reiterated that McDaniel's life sentence was not illegal and he was eligible to apply for commutation. This petition for review followed.
¶5 On review, McDaniel repeats his claim that he is entitled to release from his life sentence. Even were the claim not precluded because it has been raised and rejected in a previous proceeding, see Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(2), McDaniel is not entitled to relief. McDaniel committed first-degree murder in January 1994 and was subject to sentencing under the version of A.R.S. § 13-703 in effect at that time. See 1993 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 255, § 20 (former A.R.S. § 13-1105). Relevant here, former § 13-703 stated that a trial court had discretion to impose a life sentence for those convicted of first-degree murder and that life sentence would either be for natural life with no possibility of release or with the condition that "the defendant shall not be released on any basis until the completion of the service of twenty-five calendar years." See 1988 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 155, § 1. The court's advisement at sentencing that McDaniel was not "entitled to release on any basis until [he has] served at least 25 years of this sentence" is entirely consistent with the governing statute. The court's statement cannot reasonably be read to suggest that McDaniel was necessarily entitled to release after serving twenty-five years, only that he could be released if there was a basis for it. No portion of McDaniel's life sentence is illegal or ambiguous.
¶6 McDaniel further asserts the trial court erred by failing to consider the Maricopa County order in support of his argument. Even if a trial court's order in another case had precedential value, the order McDaniel identifies shows only that the court signed an order pursuant to a stipulation regarding the defendant's sentence. In other words, the order does not identify a substantive basis for relief. Ariz. Feb. 12, 2019), and what appears to be an order in State v. Heath, Maricopa County Superior Court case number CR1996-001467. None of these are precedential authority. See Stephenson v. Nastro, 192 Ariz. 475, ¶ 15 (App. 1998) (vacated decisions have no precedential value); Arpaio v. Figueroa, 229 Ariz. 444, ¶ 11 (App. 2012) (Arizona courts not bound by federal district court decision); see also Sell v. Gama, 231 Ariz. 323, ¶ 31 (2013) (trial courts not permitted to disregard "decisions of a higher court").
¶7 Last, we do not address McDaniel's assertion that the trial court improperly denied his requested relief because of his race. Our review is limited to the issues decided by the trial court; we have no authority to address McDaniel's baseless claim of bias in this context. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.16(c)(2)(B), (C); State v. Vera, 235 Ariz. 571, ¶ 8 (App. 2014).
¶8 We grant review but deny relief.