Summary
affirming first-degree murder conviction of Lawrence McCoy
Summary of this case from State v. McCoyOpinion
No. 3-827 / 02-1516.
Filed December 10, 2003.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, J. Hobart Darbyshire, Judge.
The defendant appeals his judgment and sentences for first-degree murder and willful injury. AFFIRMED.
Thomas Preacher, Bettendorf, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Linda Hines, Assistant Attorney General, William Davis, County Attorney, and Michael Walton and Jerald Feuerbach, Assistant County Attorneys, for appellee.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Hecht and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
Lawrence McCoy appeals his judgments and sentences for first-degree murder and willful injury. See Iowa Code §§ 707.1, 707.2, 708.4, and 708.4(1) (2001). He contends the district court 1) incorrectly denied his motion to suppress evidence, and 2) abused its discretion in admitting testimony concerning a bloody fingerprint. We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
The body of Jonathon Johnson, brother of Brandy Johnson, was found in Davenport wrapped in a blanket in the back seat of his car. Johnson had been stabbed and shot several times and had sustained a severe blunt trauma injury to his head.
Lawrence McCoy became a suspect in the murder. He shared an apartment with Brandy until her incarceration six months prior to Jonathon's death. Although the two initially entered into a written lease agreement, their arrangement had reverted to a month-to-month tenancy by the time of the investigation.
When Brandy heard about the death of her brother, she called her father and told him to give the police permission to search the apartment. Officers met Brandy's father, proceeded to the premises, and obtained written consent from the landlord to enter the apartment. Once inside, the police discovered what they believed to be bloodstains on the front door, wall, and ceiling. One of the detectives also found a bottle with a fingerprint and what he believed to be blood.
McCoy moved to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of this search. The district court denied the motion.
At trial, and over McCoy's objection, the Davenport detective testified concerning the print on the bottle. A jury found McCoy guilty as charged and the district court denied his motion for new trial and in arrest of judgment. McCoy appealed after imposition of his sentence.
II. Suppression Ruling.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Iowa Constitution art. I, section 8 protect the rights of people to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. State v. Reinier, 628 N.W.2d 460, 464 (Iowa 2001). "A search occurs under the Fourth Amendment any time the government intrudes upon a person's legitimate expectation of privacy." Id. at 466. Subject to certain well-defined exceptions, a governmental search is per se unreasonable absent a warrant. Id. at 464.
The State contends defense counsel did not raise a challenge under the Iowa Constitution. We disagree.
McCoy contends the district court should have suppressed the evidence discovered in his apartment as well as evidence subsequently discovered in storage. The State responds with two arguments in support of affirmance. First, the State maintains McCoy abandoned the premises. Second, the State argues Brandy Johnson had authority to consent to the search and in fact did so. The district court found the first argument dispositive. On our de novo review, we agree with the district court.
The State contends counsel did not preserve error on his request to suppress evidence that was "the fruit of the poisonous tree." We disagree.
A person who abandons property loses an expectation of privacy in that property. See Bumpus v. State, 459 N.W.2d 619, 625 (Iowa 1990); cf. United States v. Sledge, 650 F.2d 1075, 1079-80 (9th Cir. 1981) (stating"[a]nabandonment by the owner or possessor of property ends his reasonable expectation of privacy"). Abandonment may afford a third party such as a landlord authority to consent to a search. See Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 241, 80 S.Ct. 683, 698, 4 L.Ed.2d 668 (1960) (stating that where occupant vacated hotel room, hotel management had exclusive possession of room and authority to consent to search); Sledge, 650 F.2d at 1080 (stating "[a]bandonment, as in this case, may confer upon a third person with a continuing or residual interest an authority which is sufficient to authorize him to consent to a search."); cf. State v. Smith, 178 N.W.2d 329, 332 (Iowa 1970) (holding unlawful a warrantless search of an occupied hotel room with consent of landlord). See generally Admissibility of Evidence Discovered in Warrantless Search of Rental Property Authorized by Lessor of Such Property, 61 A.L.R. 5th 1 (1998).
At the time the police officers sought and obtained the landlord's consent to enter the apartment, McCoy was no longer in the apartment. The landlord testified that sometime during the week prior to the search, McCoy called him and advised "he was going to be leaving the area, moving, and wouldn't be in the apartment after February 1." The landlord went into the apartment in late January to follow-up on comments that the carpeting had been changed there. He testified:
There was not much furniture there. There were a few things that looked like they were bagged up or ready to be taken, and there was no furniture in the living room section of the apartment, and there was brand new carpet.
Although the landlord received no "official notification" that McCoy had moved, he stated, "[t]here was certainly no evidence of anybody there." The landlord was not aware whether McCoy returned to the property after February 1 and he never had discussions with him about paying February rent.
We recognize this testimony does not create an ironclad case for abandonment. The officers' search took place on the first day of February, and McCoy technically had until the 5th day of that month to pay his rent. However, other courts have held that the fact rent is not yet due does not necessarily negate a finding of abandonment. See Feguer v. United States, 302 F.2d 214, 249 (8th Cir. 1962), cert denied 371 U.S. 872 (1962) (stating "[a]bandonment is not to be foreclosed here until the paid rent period ran out. . . ."); Baggett v. State, 494 S.W.2d 717, 720 (Ark. 1973) (same). Given McCoy's conversation with the landlord concerning his intent to move as well as the emptiness of the apartment, we agree with the district court that McCoy "had vacated the apartment." Accordingly, the landlord's consent to police entry into the apartment was valid and the subsequent search was constitutional.
III. Admission of "Blood" Testimony.
McCoy contends the district court abused its discretion in admitting a detective's testimony that a fingerprint found on a bottle in the apartment was, in his view, "made in blood." He maintains this evidence "is about as prejudicial as evidence can get." The State responds that error was not preserved. We are inclined to agree. Although defense counsel argued in support of his motion in limine that the evidence was "unfairly prejudicial," the court did not rule on this point. The court also advised defense counsel he would need to object during trial to preserve error. Counsel objected only on foundational grounds and not on grounds of prejudice. We nevertheless bypass our error preservation concern and proceed to the merits. State v. Taylor, 596 N.W.2d 55, 55 (Iowa 1999).
Relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Iowa R. Evid. 5.403. Unfair prejudice is the "undue tendency to suggest decisions on an improper basis, commonly though not necessarily, an emotional one." State v. Castaneda, 621 N.W.2d 435, 440 (Iowa 2001).
We cannot conclude the detective's limited mention of a "fingerprint in blood" was unfairly prejudicial. Through compelling cross-examination of a criminologist who also examined the bottle, defense counsel dispelled the notion that McCoy left a "fingerprint in blood" on the bottle. Specifically, he established that the pigment on the part of the bottle containing McCoy's fingerprint may not have been blood. He also established that, if indeed the discoloration was blood, there was no way to tell whether the fingerprint was placed on the bottle before or after the blood. This testimony effectively negated any potential prejudice created by the detective's statement.
We also note that the detective's testimony was far less graphic than substantial portions of the remaining record. There was testimony of blood on the walls and in other locations in the apartment. There was also testimony concerning the state of the victim when he was discovered, including the manner in which he was tied up and the nature of his wounds. In short, the detective's statement would not have aroused the jury to "overmastering hostility." State v. Rodriquez, 636 N.W.2d 234, 243 (Iowa 2001). The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence.