Opinion
AC 37380
08-23-2016
STATE of Connecticut v. Michael MCCLEAN
Heather Clark, assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant). Melissa Patterson, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Gail P. Hardy, state's attorney, and Michele C. Lukban and John F. Fahey, senior assistant state's attorneys, for the appellee (state).
Heather Clark, assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant).
Melissa Patterson, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Gail P. Hardy, state's attorney, and Michele C. Lukban and John F. Fahey, senior assistant state's attorneys, for the appellee (state).
Lavine, Beach and Alvord, Js.
LAVINE, J.The defendant, Michael McClean, appeals from the trial court's judgment of dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court erred by dismissing his motion to correct an illegal sentence after concluding that his sentence did not violate the eighth amendment to the United States constitution, as explicated by Miller v. Alabama , 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012). We conclude that the trial court improperly determined that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the defendant's motion, but correctly concluded that the defendant's federal and state constitutional rights have not been violated. As we explain, the defendant's sentence does not violate the constitutional sentencing parameters set forth in Miller . See State v. Logan , 160 Conn.App. 282, 287, 125 A.3d 581 (2015), cert. denied, 321 Conn. 906, 135 A.3d 279 (2016). The form of the judgment is improper, and we therefore reverse the judgment and remand the case with direction to render judgment denying the defendant's motion to correct an illegal sentence. See, e.g., State v. Gemmell , 155 Conn.App. 789, 790, 110 A.3d 1234, cert. denied, 316 Conn. 913, 111 A.3d 886 (2015).
In Miller, the United States Supreme Court held that sentencing juveniles to mandatory life in prison without parole violates the eighth amendment. Miller v. Alabama, supra, 132 S.Ct. at 2469. Our Supreme Court has held that sentencing juveniles to discretionary life imprisonment without parole, and to lengthy sentences that are the functional equivalent to life imprisonment without parole, also violates the eighth amendment as explicated by Miller. See Casiano v. Commissioner of Correction, 317 Conn. 52, 115 A.3d 1031 (2015), cert. denied sub nom. Semple v. Casiano, ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 1364, 194 L.Ed.2d 376 (2016) ; State v. Riley, 315 Conn. 637, 110 A.3d 1205 (2015), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 1361, 194 L.Ed.2d 376 (2016).
The following facts are relevant to this appeal. "[O]n December 23, 1994, the [defendant] was arrested and charged with murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a–54a (a). Pursuant to a plea agreement negotiated by his defense counsel ... the [defendant] pleaded guilty to the murder charge under the Alford doctrine on January 5, 1998.... In exchange for the petitioner's guilty plea, the state recommended a sentence of thirty years incarceration and dropped additional charges and withdrew its request for a sentence enhancement." (Footnote omitted.) McClean v. Commissioner of Correction , 103 Conn.App. 254, 255–56, 930 A.2d 693 (2007), cert. denied, 285 Conn. 913, 943 A.2d 473 (2008). The parties waived the presentence investigation report. "On March 20, 1998, the court [Clifford, J .] sentenced the [defendant] to thirty years incarceration in accordance with the plea agreement." Id., at 256, 930 A.2d 693.
See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970).
The defendant, who was initially self-represented, filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence on September 20, 2013. On March 26, 2014, the defendant's public defender filed a motion to correct illegal disposition and a memorandum of law on behalf of the defendant. The defendant claimed that his sentence was imposed in an illegal manner because (1) he was not given an individualized sentencing hearing during which the court considered the mitigating factors of the defendant's youth, as required by Miller v. Alabama , supra, 132 S.Ct. at 2455 ; and (2) he will not be provided with a meaningful opportunity to obtain release on the basis of his demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation, as required by Graham v. Florida , 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010).
In Graham, the United States Supreme Court held that a mandatory life sentence without parole imposed on a nonhomicide juvenile defendant violates the eighth amendment. A claim pursuant to Graham refers to a claim that a juvenile offender is entitled to "some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation." Graham v. Florida, supra, 560 U.S. at 75, 130 S.Ct. 2011. The defendant amended his appeal by withdrawing his claim under Graham in light of the legislature's enactment of General Statutes § 54–125a (f). This statute became effective on October 1, 2015, while this appeal was pending. See Public Acts 2015, No. 15–84, § 1. The defendant is eligible for parole under the statute.
The court, Alexander, J ., heard oral argument on the motion on April 4, 2014. The court issued its memorandum of decision on July 23, 2014, dismissing the motion. It determined that the defendant's sentence will expire when he is approximately forty-five years old. At that time in Connecticut, Graham and Miller applied only to mandatory life without parole sentences. The court thus determined that "the defendant is not entitled to the relief sought, as it exceeds the jurisdiction of the court."
As we noted, since the defendant filed his motion to correct an illegal sentence, our Supreme Court has concluded that Miller applies to discretionary life sentences and term of years sentences that operate as life sentences. See Casiano v. Commissioner of Correction, 317 Conn. 52, 115 A.3d 1031 (2015), cert. denied sub nom. Semple v. Casiano, –––U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 1364, 194 L.Ed.2d 376 (2016) ; State v. Riley, 315 Conn. 637, 110 A.3d 1205 (2015), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 1361, 194 L.Ed.2d 376 (2016). We analyze the recent developments in the law of juvenile sentencing more fully in a case argued on the same day as the present appeal and also issued today. See State v. Williams–Bey, 167 Conn.App. 744, 144 A.3d 467, A.3d (2016).
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In regard to the trial court's jurisdiction, the defendant's motion to correct contended that his sentence was imposed in an improper manner, namely, because it was imposed without following the procedures outlined in Miller . Thus, the defendant's claim was properly raised by a motion to correct pursuant to Practice Book § 43–22. See State v. Williams–Bey , 167 Conn.App. 744, 144 A.3d 467 (2016). As we explained in Williams–Bey , "[t]he court's conclusion that it could not provide the defendant a remedy did not implicate the court's authority to determine whether the sentence had been imposed in an illegal manner." Id., at 761, 144 A.3d 467. As in Williams–Bey , however, it is clear from the court's memorandum of decision that it considered the merits of the defendant's constitutional claims. We conclude that the court properly concluded that the defendant's sentence did not violate the eighth amendment or the constitution of Connecticut, albeit for a different reason. Accordingly, the proper disposition was for the court to deny, rather than to dismiss, the defendant's motion to correct.
The defendant's constitutional claims are controlled by this court's recent decision in State v. Logan , supra, 160 Conn.App. at 282, 125 A.3d 581. In Logan , this court concluded that a sentence of thirty-one years imprisonment without the possibility of parole imposed on a juvenile offender does not violate the eighth amendment, as interpreted by Miller v. Alabama , supra, 132 S.Ct. at 2455. State v. Logan , supra, at 293, 125 A.3d 581. The defendant in the present case was sentenced to thirty years imprisonment without the possibility of parole. His sentence does not violate the constitutional parameters established in Miller . Furthermore, as we have stated, the defendant is now eligible for parole pursuant to General Statutes § 54–125a (f). See footnote 3 of this opinion.The form of the judgment is improper, the judgment is reversed and the case is remanded with direction to render judgment denying the defendant's motion to correct an illegal sentence.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.