Id . § 14-202.1(a)(1). As defendant was convicted for indecent acts by delivery of a letter, our analysis, in this case, is controlled by State v. McClary , 198 N.C. App. 169, 173, 679 S.E.2d 414, 417 (2009). In McClary , the defendant delivered a sexually explicit letter to a fifteen-year-old requesting to have sex, and this Court considered whether the delivery of the letter with sexual language constituted a willful taking, or the attempt to take, indecent liberties with a child to withstand a motion to dismiss.

Neither a completed sex act nor an offensive touching of the victim are required to violate the statute.” State v. McClary, 198 N.C.App. 169, 173, 679 S.E.2d 414, 417–18 (2009) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Further:

There is no more probative evidence of this than a sample of cases involving North Carolina's indecent liberties statute, N.C. Gen.Stat. § 14–202.1(a). A defendant who secretly videotapes a minor undressing when they are not in the same room, State v. McClees, 108 N.C.App. 648, 654, 424 S.E.2d 687, 690–91 (1993), or who has a sexually explicit conversation with a minor over the phone, State v. Every, 157 N.C.App. 200, 578 S.E.2d 642, 648 (2003), or who hands a sexually explicit note to a minor soliciting her (unsuccessfully) to have sex with him for $10, State v. McClary, 198 N.C.App. 169, 679 S.E.2d 414, 418 (2009), is not guilty of a crime of violence, or indeed, even engaged in conduct in which violence against a victim is imminently likely. Hereafter, however, convictions for all of these acts will be treated categorically as sexual abuse of a minor and thus as a crime of violence under our application of Diaz–Ibarra to today's case.

The North Carolina statute is similarly broad, but no broader. North Carolina courts have found that the following persons violated § 14-202.1: (1) a high school basket-ball coach who covertly video-taped a student changing clothes, State v. McClees, 108 N.C.App. 648, 424 S.E.2d 687 (1993); (2) a karate instructor who had sexually explicit and graphic phone conversations with a pupil, State v. Every, 157 N.C.App. 200, 578 S.E.2d 642 (2003); (3) a man who gave a sexually graphic note to his minor neighbor, which included requests that she participate in sexual activity with him, State v. McClary, 198 N.C.App. 169, 679 S.E.2d 414 (2009); and (4) a man who masturbated in a bed next to a young girl, State v. Hammett, 182 N.C.App. 316, 642 S.E.2d 454 (2007). Although none of these offenses involved contact with a minor, and some even did not involve the perpetrator's presence in front of the minor, North Carolina state courts determined that all involved taking indecent liberties with a child.

Indeed, no physical touching is required to violate the statute. State v. Nesbitt, 133 N.C.App. 420, 515 S.E.2d 503, 506 (1999) ; see also State v. McClary, 198 N.C.App. 169, 679 S.E.2d 414, 418 (2009) (holding that giving a child a graphic letter for the purpose of soliciting sex violates the statute); State v. McClees, 108 N.C.App. 648, 424 S.E.2d 687, 689–90 (1993) (holding that secretly videotaping an undressing child violates the statute). The elements of Mr. White's state offense therefore include that he: (1) willfully, (2) took or attempted to take indecent liberties, (3) with a minor, (4) for the purpose of arousing and gratifying sexual desire.

Moreover, "the variety of acts included under the statute demonstrate that the scope of the statute's protection is to encompass more types of deviant behavior and provide children with broader protection than that available under statutes proscribing other sexual acts." State v. McClary, 198 N.C.App. 169, 173-74, 679 S.E.2d 414, 418 (2009) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). If the evidence is "sufficient only to raise a suspicion or conjecture" of the crime, the motion to dismiss must be granted.

"Neither a completed sex act nor an offensive touching of the victim [is] required to violate the statute." State v. McClary, 679 S.E.2d 414, 418 (N.C.App. 2009). The broader protections of children contemplated by the statute criminalize such acts as having sexually explicit telephone conversations with a child while masturbating, see Every, supra; "photographing an unclothed child in a sexually suggestive position, masturbating in front of a child, . . . secretly videotaping a child who was undressing," id. at 648 (citations omitted, collecting cases); sitting on a log twenty yards away from children on the opposite side of a creek engaging in the lewd act of masturbation and inviting the children to imitate him, see State v. Strickland, 335 S.E.2d 74, 76 ( N.C.App. 1985); and handing a child "a letter containing

"Neither a completed sex act nor an offensive touching of the victim [is] required to violate the statute." State v. McClary, 679 S.E.2d 414, 418 (N.C.App. 2009).

Furthermore, written materials sent to minor victims may be considered to show that an act taken by a defendant was for the purpose of arousing or gratifying his sexual desire. State v. McClary , 198 N.C. App. 169, 174, 679 S.E.2d 414, 418 (2009).In order to establish the elements of an attempted sex crime against a minor, the State must show: (1) the intent to commit the substantive offense, and (2) an overt act done for that purpose which goes beyond mere preparation, but (3) falls short of the completed offense.

In his second argument, Defendant contends that the trial court committed plain error by failing to instruct the jury that the 4 June 2012 verification form was not required to be submitted on that date based on the timetable set out in N.C. Gen.Stat. § 14–208.9A. Because Defendant did not request a jury instruction on this issue, we review this argument only for plain error. See State v. McClary, 198 N.C.App. 169, 175, 679 S.E.2d 414, 419 (2009) (“Plain error review is only available in criminal cases and is limited to errors in jury instructions or rulings on the admissibility of evidence.”). [T]he plain error rule ... is always to be applied cautiously and only in the exceptional case where, after reviewing the entire record, it can be said the claimed error is a fundamental error, something so basic, so prejudicial, so lacking in its elements that justice cannot have been done, or where [the error] is grave error which amounts to a denial of a fundamental right of the accused, or the error has resulted in a miscarriage of justice or in the denial to appellant of a fair trial or where the error is such as to seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings or where it can be fairly said the instructional mistake had a probable impact on the jury's finding that the defendant was guilty.