Opinion
No. 4-225 / 03-1549
May 14, 2004.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Larry J. Conmey, Judge.
The State seeks discretionary review of the district court's order suppressing evidence. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kevin Cmelik, Assistant Attorney General, Harold Denton, County Attorney, and Jerry Vander Sanden, Assistant County Attorney, for appellant.
Mark Brown, Cedar Rapids, for appellee.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Vaitheswaran and Eisenhauer, JJ.
The State seeks discretionary review of an order suppressing evidence. We reverse and remand
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
A Wal-Mart employee informed Cedar Rapids police that a customer who had previously purchased methamphetamine precursors was currently in the store. A plain clothes officer went to the store and was directed by the employee to a man who was getting into a vehicle. The officer parked his car, walked to the vehicle, and pulled out his police badge. The officer then asked the customer if he could talk to him. The customer said yes.
After identifying the customer as Jeremy McAtee, the officer conveyed what the store employee had told him and asked McAtee what he had bought. McAtee showed him a bag containing tubing and other aquarium components, as well as paper towels. The officer asked if he could search McAtee and the car. McAtee responded that the officer could search his person but the car was not his. The officer searched McAtee, finding only a pocket knife. He then engaged McAtee in a conversation about the car's registration which culminated in McAtee's acknowledgment that the car was his.
The officer asked if there was anything illegal in the car. McAtee said he had "some pot" and proceeded to retrieve it from a back pack. McAtee was arrested and the car was searched.
The State charged McAtee with possession with intent to deliver marijuana. Iowa Code § 124.401(1)(d). McAtee moved to suppress the evidence. Following a hearing, the district court granted the motion. The court reasoned that the officer "had no grounds to form a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the Defendant was going to or had done anything illegal." The court further stated, "[T]here is no probable cause to detain the Defendant, nor to ask him any questions." The State sought discretionary review.
II. Motion to Suppress
The State argues that the officer's questioning of McAtee was not a "seizure" and, accordingly, did not implicate the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of warrantless searches and seizures. On our review of the totality of the circumstances, we agree.
In United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 200, 122 S.Ct. 2105, 2110, 153 L.Ed.2d 242, 251 (2002), the United States Supreme Court reiterated the principle that "[l]aw enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable seizures merely by approaching individuals on the street or in other public places and putting questions to them if they are willing to listen." Id. The Court further reaffirmed that "[e]ven when law enforcement officers have no basis for suspecting a particular individual, they may pose questions, ask for identification, and request consent to search luggage — provided they do not induce cooperation by coercive means." Id.
The officer in this case did not exceed these parameters. He asked McAtee if he could talk to him and he did not proceed with questioning until McAtee agreed. He did not park his vehicle in such a manner as to prevent McAtee from leaving. Id. at 204, 122 S.Ct. at 2112, 153 L. Ed.2d at 253 (noting no evidence defendants were prevented from terminating encounter). He wore no uniform and had no uniformed officers with him. Id. at204, 122 S.Ct. at 2112, 153 L. Ed.2d at 254 (according "little weight" to this fact in any event). He did not draw his weapon. Id. at 205, 122 S.Ct. at 2112, 153 L. Ed.2d at 254. While he showed his badge, this fact has been deemed irrelevant to the "coercion" analysis. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1324, 75 L.Ed.2d 229, 236 (1983) ("Nor would the fact that the officer identifies himself as a police officer, without more, convert the encounter into a seizure requiring some level of objective justification."). In sum, the officer's conduct did not amount to a "seizure." Id. at 498, 103 S.Ct. at 1324, 75 L. Ed.2d at 236 ("If there is no detention — no seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment — then no constitutional rights have been infringed.").
We need not address the question of whether, assuming the facts establish a "seizure," the seizure was supported by a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, as this issue has not been raised as an alternate ground for reversal. See Royer, 460 U.S. at 498, 103 S.Ct. at 1324, 75 L. Ed.2d at 237 (noting "certain seizures are justifiable under the Fourth Amendment if there is articulable suspicion that a person has committed or is about to commit a crime"); see also State v. Heuser, 661 N.W.2d 157, 162 (Iowa 2003) (finding reasonable suspicion to stop vehicle based on defendant's conduct of driving from store to store to gather cold medications used in manufacture of methamphetamine); cf. State v. Maddox, 670 N.W.2d 168, 172-73 (Iowa 2003) (finding probable cause to search a vehicle based on purchase of items associated with manufacture of methamphetamine).
The officer also did not engage in an unreasonable search of McAtee. Drayton, 536 U.S. at 206, 122 S.Ct. at 2113, 153 L. Ed.2d at 254-55. The search of his person was with his consent and there is no indication the consent was coerced. Id. The backpack search was not performed by the police officer but by McAtee and again appears to have been done voluntarily. Id. Finally, the search of the car was incident to McAtee's arrest. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 2040, 23 L.Ed.2d 685, 694 (1969).
We reverse the district court's suppression ruling and remand for further proceedings.