Opinion
I.D. No. 9703008409.
Submitted: March 6, 2007.
Decided: April 5, 2007.
Upon Consideration of Defendant's Pro Se Motion for Postconviction Relief.
Summarily Dismissed.
This 5th day of April, 2007, it appears to the Court that:
1. On February 4, 2000, a jury found Curtis McAllister ("McAllister") guilty of trafficking in heroin, possession with intent to deliver heroin, possession of drug paraphernalia, maintaining a dwelling for keeping controlled substances, and conspiracy in the second degree. The Court later declared McAllister a habitual offender and he was sentenced to life in prison.
Docket 42. See also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 4751, 4753, 4755, 4771; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 512.
Docket 48.
2. On appeal, the Supreme Court determined that the case should be remanded to this Court for a complete reconsideration of McAllister's pre-trial motion to suppress. The Court, on remand, renewed its denial of McAllister's motion to Suppress. The Supreme Court affirmed that decision and McAllister's conviction.
Docket 57, 65.
3. McAllister subsequently filed a motion for postconviction relief. The motion was denied by this Court and that denial was affirmed by the Supreme Court. McAllister has now filed, pro se, a second motion for postconviction relief.
Docket 69, 78, 82, 83.
4. McAllister asserts in his motion only one ground on which he claims his rights were violated. He contends he was denied the fundamental right to confront and cross examine the witnesses against him in violation of the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of the Delaware Constitution. McAllister raises this claim pursuant to the fundamental fairness exception under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i)(5) because the rights relied upon by him in his motion have been recognized for the first time after his direct appeal. McAllister specifically refers to Crawford v. Washington, wherein the United States Supreme Court abrogated its previous holding in Ohio v. Roberts and held that, under the Sixth Amendment, out-of-court testimonial statements by witnesses are inadmissible against the defendant if the witness is unavailable and there is no opportunity to cross-examine the witness.
124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004).
100 S. Ct. 2531 (1980).
Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1369.
5. Prior to addressing the substantive merits of any claim for postconviction relief, the Court must first determine whether the defendant has met the procedural requirements of Rule 61. If the procedural requirements of Rule 61 are not met, the Court should not consider the merits of a postconviction claim.
Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). See also Bailey v. State, 588 A.2d 1121, 1127 (Del.Super.Ct. 1991).
State v. Gattis, 1995 WL 790961, at *2 (Del.Super.Ct. Dec. 28, 1995) (citing Younger, 580 A.2d at 554).
6. Rule 61(i) imposes four procedural imperatives: (1) the motion must be filed withn three years of a final order of conviction; (2) any basis for relief must have been asserted previously in any prior postconviction proceeding; (3) any basis for relief must have been asserted at trial or on direct appeal as required by the court rules; and (4) any basis for relief must not have been formally adjudicated in any proceeding. However, under Rule 61(i)(5), the bars to relief under (1), (2) and (3) do not apply to a "claim that the court lacked jurisdiction or to a colorable claim that there was a miscarriage of justice because of a constitutional violation that undermined the fundamental legality, reliability, integrity or fairness of the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction."
The motion must be filed within three years if the final order of conviction occurred before July 1, 2005, and within one year if the final order of conviction occurred on or after July 1, 2005. See Rule 61, annot. Effect of amendments.
7. In applying the procedural imperatives to this case, McAllister's claim is barred. His motion was not filed within three years of the final order of his conviction and, because Crawford was not decided until 2004, his basis for relief under that case was obviously not asserted previously in his trial, appeal, or first postconviction motion. Further, Rule 61(i)(5) does not make inapplicable those procedural requirements because McAllister's claim under Crawford is not a colorable claim that there was a miscarriage of justice because of a constitutional violation that undermined the fundamental legality, reliability, integrity or fairness of the proceedings leading to his conviction. In Whorton v. Bockting, the United States Supreme Court held that the Crawford decision did not announce a "watershed rule" of criminal procedure that could be applied retroactively on collateral review. Therefore, because McAllister's case was not pending or on direct appeal when Crawford was decided, his claim must fail.
127 S. Ct. 1173.
Id. at 1182-1183. See also State v. McGriff, 2006 WL 1515831, at *8 (Del.Super.Ct. Jan. 9, 2006) ("[T]his Court has no option other than to find that Crawford cannot be retroactively applied.").
8. Based on the foregoing, McAllister's Motion for Postconviction Relief is SUMMARILY DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.