Opinion
No. 3-603 / 02-0276
Filed October 15, 2003
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Warren County, Jerrold W. Jordan, Judge.
Crysthian Mayoral appeals from his conviction for aiding and abetting the delivery of methamphetamine, in violation of Iowa Code section 124.401(1)(b)(7) (2001). AFFIRMED.
Ryan Moorman, Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Karen Doland, Assistant Attorney General, Kevin Parker, County Attorney, and Ryan Ellis, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Miller and Hecht, JJ.
Crysthian Mayoral appeals from his conviction for aiding and abetting the delivery of methamphetamine, in violation of Iowa Code section 124.401(1)(b)(7) (2001). We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
After being arrested for the possession of methamphetamine, Trina Ford agreed to work undercover with Warren County Law Enforcement Officials as part of her obligation to help in stemming the drug trade. On September 10, 2001, she called the Sheriff's office to report she had made arrangements to buy methamphetamine from an individual at a Git-N-Go convenience store. Ford later went to the store, while officers conducted surveillance from across the street. A short time later, a van, driven by Mayoral and carrying a passenger known as Joker, drove into the parking lot and pulled up next to Ford's vehicle. Joker exited Mayoral's van and walked to Ford's car where he sold her an ounce of methamphetamine for $850. During this transaction, Mayoral drove to a nearby air pump and filled the van's tires with air. Following the sale, Joker reentered the van and Mayoral drove it away from the scene.
After establishing that Ford had purchased methamphetamine, officers stopped the van a short distance from the Git-N-Go. Mayoral was still driving the van, and after his arrest, immediately told officers "I know I fucked up" and "I just drove." He also informed officers he was told he could earn $50 for driving and that he could help officers obtain additional methamphetamine. Officers later discovered the $850 in the console between the driver and passenger seats of the van, and an additional $100 in cash in a pouch in the driver's side door of the van.
The State charged Mayoral with conspiracy to deliver or aiding and abetting in the delivery of more than five grams of methamphetamine and failure to affix a drug tax stamp. Prior to trial, Mayoral filed a written waiver of his right to a jury trial, and a bench trial was subsequently held. Following the close of the State's evidence, the court granted Mayoral's motion for judgment of acquittal with regard to the drug tax stamp and conspiracy to deliver methamphetamine charges. The court found Mayoral guilty of aiding and abetting in the delivery of more than five grams of methamphetamine and sentenced him to an indeterminate prison term not to exceed twenty-five years. Mayoral appeals.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence.
Mayoral contends the evidence is insufficient to establish he aided and abetted in the delivery of methamphetamine. We review this question for errors at law. State v. Lewis, 514 N.W.2d 63, 65 (Iowa 1994). A district court's finding of guilt is binding upon us unless we find there was not substantial evidence in the record to support such a finding. State v. Torres, 495 N.W.2d 678, 681 (Iowa 1993). In determining whether there was substantial evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. Id. Substantial evidence means such evidence as could convince a rational trier of fact the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
In order to support a conviction based on the theory of aiding and abetting, "the record must contain substantial evidence to show that the accused assented to or lent countenance and approval to the criminal act either by active participation in it or in some manner encouraging it prior to or at the time of its commission." State v. Miles, 346 N.W.2d 517, 520 (Iowa 1984). Although mere presence of an accused at the scene of the crime does not of itself prove that he or she aided and abetted its commission, aiding and abetting need not be shown by direct proof, but may be inferred from circumstantial evidence, including presence, companionship, and conduct before or after the offense is committed. Fryer v. State, 325 N.W.2d 400, 406 (Iowa 1982).
On our review of the record, we conclude substantial evidence exists supporting the conviction for aiding and abetting in the delivery of methamphetamine. Importantly, Mayoral supplied the van used in the sale between Joker and Trina Ford. Based on the actions of both Mayoral and his passenger, one could reasonably infer the two were in agreement regarding the transaction. Mayoral admitted he agreed to transport Joker to the scene of the drug delivery in consideration for payment of fifty dollars. After arrival at the Git-N-Go, Joker exited the van to talk to Ford and then returned to the van to retrieve the methamphetamine. The cash from the sale of the methamphetamine was found by law enforcement officers in a console commonly accessible to both Mayoral and his passenger. Moreover, Mayoral's incriminating statements following his arrest are indicative of his knowledge of the sale. His comments that he "just drove" indicate both that he knew the purpose of the trip was to deliver an illegal drug and the reason officers detained him. Mayoral's unprovoked comments to officers, to the effect that he had nothing to do with the drugs and or their sale, provides additional circumstantial evidence from which a reasonable juror could find Mayoral knew of and assented to the transaction. We believe the record supports a fair inference Mayoral approved of the criminal act and actively and knowingly participated in its commission by transporting Joker to and from the location where the methamphetamine was delivered.
III. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.
On the day of trial, defense counsel informed the court his client would waive his right to a jury trial. She presented the court with a document, signed by Mayoral, stating "he is aware he has the right to be tried by a jury but that he voluntarily waives that right." Prior to the start of the trial, counsel again affirmed that Mayoral wished to waive his right to a jury trial. The State did not resist the waiver. Although not entirely clear, it appears Mayoral contends on appeal that trial counsel's failure to demand a record colloquy establishing a knowing and voluntary jury waiver constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. He baldly asserts that, had counsel done so, "[t]he outcome would have changed."
The standards required for a defendant to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel are well established and need not be repeated here. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693 (1984); Ledezma v. State, 626 N.W.2d 134, 141-44 (Iowa 2001). When there is an alleged denial of constitutional rights, such as an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel, we review the totality of the circumstances in the record de novo. Osborn v. State, 573 N.W.2d 917, 920 (Iowa 1998).
We usually preserve such claims for postconviction relief proceedings where an evidentiary record may be developed and a hearing held on counsel's alleged errors. State v. McKettrick, 480 N.W.2d 52, 56 (Iowa 1992). However, such claims may be adjudicated on direct appeal if there is a sufficient record available for a reviewing court to make a determination. State v. Allen, 348 N.W.2d 243, 248 (Iowa 1984). Here, the record is not clear whether Mayoral's written waiver of jury trial was knowing and voluntary. We therefore find the record inadequate to address this issue and therefore preserve it for a possible postonviction relief application.