It is a regulatory action taken by the State for safety purposes and cannot be compared with a right-of-way agreement in which the property owner reserve access at a particular point. In State v. Mauney, 76 N.M. 36, 411 P.2d 1009, 1914 (1966), the Supreme Court of New Mexico held: Even if we were to assume that the permit was revoked, or revoked in part, the law affords no relief in favor of the landowners.
MOISE, Justice (dissenting). In State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Mauney, 76 N.M. 36, 411 P.2d 1009 (1966), I acquiesced in the result reached by the majority of the court for the announced reason that my objections, stated in three dissents (State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Silva, 71 N.M. 350, 378 P.2d 595 (1962); State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Danfelser, 72 N.M. 361, 384 P.2d 241 (1963), and State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Lavasek, 73 N.M. 33, 385 P.2d 361 (1963)) had proved fruitless, and I was accordingly forced to accept the contrary conclusion announced by the majority as the law of this state. Notwithstanding my recognition of the law as announced, I am once again moved to express my disagreement in the instant case because of the application of those rules.
The Highway Commission would like us to embrace and adopt for this state the rule of State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Danfelser, 72 N.M. 361, 384 P.2d 241, 246, cert den 375 U.S. 969, 84 S.Ct. 487, 11 L.Ed.2d 416, to the effect that an abutting property owner's right of access is only to the system of public highways, but not necessarily directly to the main traveled portion thereof; and that an abutter having access to a frontage road which provides "reasonable" access to the main traveled highway is afforded access to the public road system, and any circuity of travel, once that access is given, is noncompensable. See also State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Mauney, 76 N.M. 36, 411 P.2d 1009. Counsel for the property owners, on the other hand, argue access to a highway is a property right which cannot be taken away without compensation.
The terms are frequently used interchangeably. See State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Mauney, 76 N.M. 36, 43, 411 P.2d 1009, 1014 (1966); Black's Law Dictionary 829, 1026 (5th ed. 1979). We therefore believe that the ordinance does not fail solely because it uses the word "permit" instead of "license."
Neither party has briefed the nature of this "permit" interest. Compare: Lease — State v. District Court of Ninth Judicial Dist., Curry County, 44 N.M. 16, 96 P.2d 710 (1939), 126 A.L.R. 651 (1940); permit — State v. Mauney, 76 N.M. 36, 411 P.2d 1009 (1966); license — New Mexico Sheriffs Police Ass'n v. Bureau of Rev., 85 N.M. 565, 514 P.2d 616 (1973). Whatever the nature of plaintiff's "permit" interest, damage to that interest is protected by the courts.
. . ." Compare State v. Mauney, 76 N.M. 36, 411 P.2d 1009 (1966). The ordinary meaning of license being "permission to act," the contract in question was a license from taxpayer to Shaffer to publish the magazine.