Never again would the appellate courts of this state invoke the construct of "inherent powers" in the context of the deferral of guilty and no contest pleas; rather, they would look to the controlling language of HRS ch. 853 to ascertain whether the trial courts possessed the discretion to allow DAG and DANC pleas in any given matter.See, e.g., State v. Tom, 69 Haw. 602, 603-04, 752 P.2d 597, 598 (1988);Oshiro, 69 Haw. at 440, 443-48, 746 P.2d at 569, 571-74; Dannenberg, 74 Haw. at 80, 837 P.2d at 778-79; State v. Adams, 76 Haw. 408, 415, 879 P.2d 513, 520 (1994); State v. Hamili, 87 Haw. 102, 952 P.2d 390 (1998); State v. Putnam, 93 Haw. 362, 368, 3 P.3d 1239, 1245 (2000);State v. Matyas, 10 Haw. App. 31, 38, 859 P.2d 1380, 1384 (1993); State v. Wong, 10 Haw. App. 148, 158, 861 P.2d 759, 765 (1993); State v. Kimsel, 101 Haw. 65, 67-68, 62 P.3d 628, 630-31 (App. 2002), cert. denied, 101 Haw. 95, 63 P.3d 403 (2003). IV. CONCLUSION

"Despite this broad authority, . . . motions for new trials are not favored and new trials are to be granted with caution." State v. Matyas, 10 Haw.App. 31, 37, 859 P.2d 1380, 1383 (1993) (cleaned up). We review a trial court's ruling on a motion for new trial for abuse of discretion.

” Haw. R. Penal P. 33. “HRPP Rule 33 is applied when the prior trial resulted in a miscarriage of justice.” State v. Matyas, 10 Haw.App. 31, 40, 859 P.2d 1380, 1385 (1993) (citing 3 C. Wright, Federal Practice & Procedure: Criminal § 551 at 237 (2d ed.1982) ). Motions for new trial are “typically used to correct errors that have occurred in the conduct of the trial or proceedings .” Id. at 40, 859 P.2d at 1385.

Sen. Stand. Comm. Rep. No, 855, in 1979 Senate Journal, at 1384-85.State v. Matyas, 10 Haw. App. 31, 38-39, 859 P.2d 1380, 1384,cert. denied, 75 Haw. 581, 863 P.2d 989 (1993) (emphasis added). Were we to consider an appeal from the conditional plea while the deferral period is pending, as it is here, we would undermine the objectives served by that plea and circumvent the intent of the DANC plea order.

Id. at 237. State v. Matyas, 10 Haw. App. 31, 37, 859 P.2d 1380, 1383 (1993). The District Court's reasoning for denying the Motion for New Trial was not that it relied upon or accepted the State's argument that the Receipt was fraudulent; rather, the court noted that the Receipt was not newly discovered evidence.

Edralin provides no authority for the proposition that pretending to shoot another with an object that appears to be a gun is too equivocal or ambiguous to communicate a true threat. Cf. State v. Matyas, 10 Haw.App. 31, 35, 859 P.2d 1380, 1383 (1993) (explaining that jury convicted defendant of terroristic threatening in the second degree where the evidence suggested that the defendant had a toy gun); State v. Gray, No. W2002–02259–CCA–R3–CD, 2004 WL 115185, at *3 (Tenn.Crim.App. Jan. 21, 2004) (holding that a defendant's use of a cellular telephone to simulate a gun and threatening to shoot victim justified reasonable belief that defendant possessed a deadly weapon); State v. Tillman, 511 N.W.2d 128, 134 (Neb.Ct.App.1993) (“Indeed, the pointing of a gun by itself might constitute a terroristic threat.”). It appears that Edralin patterns his three arguments after the two methods of proof discussed in State v. Valdivia, 95 Hawai‘i 465, 477, 24 P.3d 661, 673 (2001), either of which may be used to prove the imminency required for a true threat.

We conclude that, inasmuch as the alleged errors complained of in the motion for a new trial were not errors, the trial court properly exercised its discretion in denying his motion. State v. Matyas, 10 Haw. App. 31, 40, 859 P.2d 1380, 1385 (1993). (7) Defendant argues that the holding of State v. Auwae, 89 Haw. 59, 968 P.2d 1070 (App. 1998), applies in this case and requires reversal of the judgment insofar as it convicts him of the offense of possession of ammunition by a convicted felon under Count IV.