Opinion
2 CA-CR 2023-0018-PR
02-28-2023
The State of Arizona, Respondent, v. Jonathan Lewis Mattox, Petitioner.
Jonathan Mattox, Kingman In Propria Persona
Not for Publication - Rule 111(c), Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court
Petition for Review from the Superior Court in Maricopa County No. CR2000017329 The Honorable Margaret B. LaBianca, Judge
Jonathan Mattox, Kingman In Propria Persona
Judge O'Neil authored the decision of the Court, in which Vice Chief Judge Staring and Judge Sklar concurred.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
O'NEIL, Judge
¶1 Jonathan Mattox seeks review of the trial court's ruling summarily dismissing his successive petition for post-conviction relief, filed pursuant to Rule 33, Ariz. R. Crim. P. We will not disturb that ruling unless the court abused its discretion. See State v. Martinez, 226 Ariz. 464, ¶ 6 (App. 2011). Mattox has not met his burden of establishing such abuse here.
¶2 Pursuant to 2001 plea agreements, Mattox was convicted of manslaughter and aggravated assault. The convictions were based on an incident in which Mattox, who was driving impaired after smoking marijuana, lost control of and crashed his vehicle, killing one of his passengers and injuring three others. The trial court sentenced him to seven years in prison, followed by five years' probation. Mattox sought post-conviction relief three times, but the trial court dismissed each of the proceedings.
¶3 In November 2021, Mattox again sought post-conviction relief, simultaneously filing a notice of and petition for post-conviction relief, which cited Rule 33.1(a), (e), (f), (g), and (h). He challenged the classification of his manslaughter conviction as "dangerous," reasoning that the basis for the classification had been a "trace amount marijuana" in his blood at the time of the offense, but marijuana was no longer an illegal substance. He also asserted a claim of ineffective assistance because trial counsel had misinformed him about the "dangerous" allegation.
On his form petition, Mattox checked boxes indicating that he was seeking relief under Rule 32.1(a), (e), (f), (g), and (h), Ariz. R. Crim. P. However, because Mattox was convicted pursuant to plea agreements under this cause number, this proceeding arises under Rule 33.1.
¶4 In January 2022, the trial court summarily dismissed Mattox's petition. The court first determined that Mattox had failed "to provide adequate factual support" or "legal authority" supporting his claim that the failure to file a timely notice was not his fault under Rule 33.1(f). The court nevertheless addressed each of his claims, concluding that his Rule 33.1(a) and (g) claims were precluded. The court also explained that Mattox's Rule 33.1(e) claim failed because "[h]is discovery of a legal argument" does not constitute newly discovered material facts. Finally, the court determined that Mattox had failed to meet his burden of establishing actual innocence under Rule 33.1(h). Mattox filed a motion for rehearing, which the court denied. This petition for review followed.
¶5 On review, Mattox repeats his argument that his manslaughter conviction was designated a "dangerous" offense because of a "trace amount of marijuana in his blood stream," but "marijuana is no longer an illegal substance," and his conviction therefore needs to be "adjusted" accordingly. He maintains the trial court erred in determining he should have raised his claim in a prior proceeding because he had no reason to do so until marijuana had been legalized. Mattox also restates his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
¶6 To the extent Mattox's claim arises under Rule 33.1(a), which includes his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, it is precluded. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 33.2(a)(3); see also State v. Petty, 225 Ariz. 369, ¶ 11 (App. 2010). However, to the extent his claim arises under Rule 33.1(e) or (g), it is not subject to preclusion under Rule 33.2(a)(3). See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 33.2(b)(1). But Mattox was still required to "explain the reasons for not raising the claim in a previous notice or petition, or for not raising the claim in a timely manner." Id. The trial court determined that Mattox had failed to "assert substantive claims and adequately explain the reasons for [his] untimely assertion," but it nevertheless addressed his claims. We therefore do the same.
"A defendant is not precluded from filing a timely second notice requesting post-conviction relief claiming ineffective assistance of counsel in the first Rule 33 post-conviction proceeding." Ariz. R. Crim. P. 33.2(b)(2). Here, however, Mattox's claim of ineffective assistance relates to trial counsel, not original Rule 33 counsel.
Claims under Rule 33.1(f) and (h) are also not subject to preclusion under Rule 33.2(a)(3). See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 33.2(b)(1). However, on review, Mattox does not appear to reassert his argument with respect to those rules. We therefore do not separately address them. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 33.16(c)(4) ("A party's failure to raise any issue that could be raised in the petition for review or cross-petition for review constitutes a waiver of appellate review of that issue.").
¶7 The trial court properly rejected Mattox's claim of "newly discovered material facts." Ariz. R. Crim. P. 33.1(e). Mattox has identified no new facts warranting relief. Rule 33.1(e) does not encompass newly discovered legal arguments, like Mattox raises here, but is instead limited to "newly discovered material facts" that "probably would have changed the judgment or sentence." See State v. Amaral, 239 Ariz. 217, ¶ 9 (2016) (describing five requirements for cognizable claim of newly discovered material facts).
¶8 Mattox's claim under Rule 33.1(g) also fails. Even assuming the legalization of marijuana constitutes a significant change in the law, Mattox has failed to show that it is applicable to his case. Although possession and personal use of marijuana are now allowed under certain circumstances, see A.R.S. § 36-2852, causing the death of another while driving intoxicated remains an offense, see A.R.S. §§ 13-105(10)(c), (24), 13-1103(A)(1). Notably, Mattox's indictment alleged the manslaughter offense was "dangerous" because it involved "a motor vehicle," not marijuana. See A.R.S. §§ 13-105(12)-(13), 13-704; State v. Venegas, 137 Ariz. 171, 175 (App. 1983) (automobile driven by intoxicated person at high rate of speed in densely populated area qualifies as dangerous instrument and triggers use of enhanced punishment provisions).
¶9 Accordingly, we grant review but deny relief.