Opinion
2016 KW 1082
08-14-2016
STATE OF LOUISIANA v. YONNI MATTHEWS
IN RE: Yonni Matthews applying for supervisory writs, 17th Judicial District Court, Parish of Lafourche, No. 535,575 BEFORE: WHIPPLE, C.J., GUIDRY, HIGGINBOTHAM, J.J.
STAY DENIED. WRIT GRANTED. The trial court's rulings of August 12, 2016 are reversed. The federal constitution grants an accused the right of self-representation. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). An accused has the right to choose between his right to counsel and his right to self-representation. State v. Bridgewater, 2000-1529 (La. 1/15/02), 823 So.2d 877, 894, cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1227, 123 S.Ct. 1266, 154 L.Ed.2d 1089 (2003). Defense counsel stated on the record that relator is "refusing to cooperate and speak with us."
While, at first glance, the timing of relator's pro se motions and his request to discharge counsel and represent himself shortly before the scheduled trial date could be considered dilatory, and is somewhat troubling, the trial court's colloquy with relator and his counsel clearly indicated relator's desire to represent himself. Relator indicated he is 28 years old, a senior at Southern University, is employed offshore as a supervisor loading chemicals onto barges, and had the financial means to hire an attorney if he wished. When asked, relator knew both the charged offense (vehicular homicide) and the maximum penalty (thirty years). After thoroughly advising relator of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, and finding that relator "intellectually [was] not lacking," was not suffering "mental problems or things of that nature," and "seemed like a sharp guy," the court nevertheless concluded that relator would not be allowed to discharge counsel and conduct his own trial defense. The trial court seemed concerned that relator had "a gross misunderstanding of how these things go," while also stating relator might "have the ability to ask questions and muddle your way through the complicated portions of the trial."
When a defendant requests the right to represent himself, the defendant's technical legal knowledge is not relevant in determining if he is knowingly exercising the right to defend himself. "A trial judge confronted with an accused's unequivocal request to represent himself need determine only whether the accused is competent to waive counsel and is 'voluntarily exercising his informed free will.' In this context, 'the competence that is required of a defendant seeking to waive his right to counsel is the competence to waive the right, not the competence to represent himself.'" State v. Santos, 99-1897 (La. 9/15/00), 770 So.2d 319, 321 (per curiam). We further note that consideration also must be given to relator's pro se filings. See State v. Melon, 95-2209 (La. 9/22/95), 660 So.2d 466 (A trial court must accept and consider preverdict pro se motions, so long as doing so does not lead to confusion at trial).
Accordingly, the trial court is ordered to grant the motion to withdraw as counsel of record and to grant relator's Sixth Amendment right to self-representation. If necessary, the trial court may consider the appointment of stand-by counsel. See Santos, 770 So.2d at 322.
VGW
TMH Guidry, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. I agree with the denial of the stay. However, I would deny the writ. /s/_________
Clerk of Court, For the Court