Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-0444-12T3
06-09-2014
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. EDWARD C. MATHEWS, Defendant-Appellant.
Archer & Greiner, attorneys for appellant (Mark J. Sever, Jr., on the brief). Robert D. Bernardi, Burlington County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Jennifer B. Paszkiewicz, of counsel and on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Before Judges Lihotz and Maven.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Burlington County, Municipal Appeal No. 19-12.
Archer & Greiner, attorneys for appellant (Mark J. Sever, Jr., on the brief).
Robert D. Bernardi, Burlington County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Jennifer B. Paszkiewicz, of counsel and on the brief). PER CURIAM
Defendant Edward C. Mathews was found guilty in municipal court of driving while intoxicated (DWI), N.J.S.A. 39:4-50; reckless driving, N.J.S.A. 39:4-96; failure to maintain a lane, N.J.S.A. 39:4-88(b); and simple assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(a). On appeal to the Law Division, R. 3:23-2, he was found guilty of the same offenses following a trial de novo. R. 3:23-8(a)(2). Defendant appeals and we affirm.
We discern the facts from the record of the municipal court suppression hearing held on the issue of operation, during which two Maple Shade Police officers testified. Responding to a call of a one-vehicle accident on Route 73, Patrolman Mark Woodland arrived at the scene within two minutes to find a small red vehicle wrapped around a telephone pole. The vehicle sustained heavy damage to the driver's side front end. The driver's side was wrapped around the pole so there was no way to open the driver's side door. When he looked through the driver's side window, Officer Woodland saw a very bloodied female in the backseat. She was awake and mumbling. He also saw a male, whom he identified as defendant, partially in the driver's seat but leaning backwards. Officer Woodland testified defendant appeared to be dead: he had blood on his face and clothing, his feet were down near the pedals on the driver's side floor, his hips and knees were in the driver's seat, and his backside was partially on the driver's seat, a little toward the center.
Patrolman Mark O'Brien testified he arrived at the scene after the rescue personnel, who were in the process of treating and removing defendant and the female from the vehicle. He saw a male in the driver's seat and a female in the back seat.
After hearing testimony, the municipal court judge determined that defendant was the driver of the vehicle. She found both officers credible and stated:
I find beyond a reasonable doubt that the State has proven that the defendant was the operator of the vehicle. . . . I firmly am [sic] convinced, through a totality of what has been produced here that in the time period that was allowed for there to be any response to the accident, it would be highly incredible and just highly unreasonable for a person to believe that either [defendant] or the passenger had some opportunity to, in some way, gymnastically move in different ways in the vehicle than what they were currently situated.
There is no credible evidence for this court to start considering that there was a phantom driver. I believe that the evidence firmly allows this [c]ourt to believe that the only two occupants of the car that day . . . were [defendant] and his passenger.
. . . .
And the condition of the occupants, the fact is . . . that the defendant . . . was not awake or responsive as best that Officer Woodland can recall, although the passenger was awake and mumbling. And, therefore, again, it allows me to firmly believe that [defendant] was in the driver's side, was the individual operating the vehicle at the time of the collision with the pole.
Additionally, I believe that Officer Woodland was able to describe in excellent detail . . . the location of the different body parts of [defendant]. And again, it would be absolutely . . . illogical for this court to conclude that [defendant] was not the . . . operator of that vehicle at the
time of the crash due to the fact, particularly, that your feet were in the well area that is between the edge of the driver's seat and the operational pedals . . . of the car.
Therefore, given all of that information that was presented today, . . . I am absolutely firmly convinced that [defendant] was the driver of the vehicle at the time of the accident, that he was the operator of the vehicle as set forth under New Jersey law. And, therefore, the motion to suppress is denied.
When defendant appeared for trial, both counsel stipulated to utilizing the officers' testimony from the suppression hearing, and to the admission into evidence of the laboratory report showing defendant had a blood alcohol content of .154. Defendant did not offer any witnesses.
Based on the stipulated evidence, the municipal court judge found defendant guilty of all charges. The reckless driving and failure to maintain a lane offenses were merged into the DWI offense for sentencing. Defendant was sentenced on the DWI to a $500 fine, $33 court costs, $50 VCCB penalty, $1000 DDEF surcharge, $75 SNSF, one-year suspension of driving privileges, twelve hours of IDRC, and eighteen months of ignition interlock. On the simple assault, defendant was sentenced to eighteen months probation and ten days community service, the other fines and penalties were imposed.
On appeal to the Law Division, following a trial de novo, defendant was again found guilty of the same offenses, for which the same sentence was imposed. With regard to the DWI offense, the judge deferred to the municipal judge's findings of credibility and concluded Officer Woodland's on-scene observations proved defendant was the operator of the vehicle at the time of the accident.
On appeal, defendant raises only one issue.
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT CREDIBLE EVIDENCE PRESENT IN THE RECORD TO FIND THAT DEFENDANT WAS THE OPERATOR OF THE VEHICLE.
Defendant argues reasonable doubt exists as to whether he was the operator of the vehicle, given multiple scenarios that could explain the movement of the passengers in the vehicle following the accident and prior to Officer Woodland's arrival on the scene. He posits that he and his female passenger could have moved themselves in an effort to exit the vehicle, or bystanders on the scene could have moved the passengers in an effort to render aid. We reject these contentions as without merit. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).
Our review of the Law Division's decision is "exceedingly narrow." State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 470 (1999). The "standard of review of a de novo verdict after a municipal court trial is to 'determine whether the findings made could reasonably have been reached on sufficient credible evidence present in the record,' considering the proofs as a whole." State v. Ebert, 377 N.J. Super. 1, 8 (App. Div. 2005) (quoting State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 162 (1964)). Unless there is an obvious and exceptional showing of error, we will not disturb the Law Division's findings when the municipal court and Law Division "have entered concurrent judgments on purely factual issues." Ibid. (citing Locurto, supra, 157 N.J. at 474). However, "a trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference." Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 40 N.J. 366, 378 (1995).
The term "operates," as used in N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a), has been broadly interpreted. State v. Tischio, 107 N.J. 504, 513 (1987), appeal dismissed, 484 U.S. 1038, 108 S. Ct. 768, 98 L. Ed. 2d 855 (1988). There are three ways to prove "operation": (1) "actual observation of the defendant driving while intoxicated," (2) "observation of the defendant in or out of the vehicle under circumstances indicating that the defendant had been driving while intoxicated," or (3) admission by the defendant. Ebert, supra, 377 N.J. Super. at 10-11. "Operation may be proved by any direct or circumstantial evidence -- as long as it is competent and meets the requisite standards of proof." State v. George, 257 N.J. Super. 493, 497 (App. Div. 1992). So measured, we are satisfied that the evidence in this case established defendant's "operation" of the vehicle "while intoxicated."
While no witnesses observed defendant operating the vehicle, there is substantial circumstantial evidence giving rise to the reasonable inference that defendant operated the vehicle shortly before Officer Woodland arrived. Indeed, Officer Woodland found defendant in the vehicle within minutes of the reported accident, positioned in such a way that his feet were in the pedal area and his backside was partially in the driver's seat. The heavily damaged vehicle was wrapped around a telephone pole crushing the driver's side door to the extent it could not be opened. Officer Woodland, who the court deemed credible, testified defendant appeared dead and the female passenger found in the backseat was badly injured and mumbling incoherently. Based on these facts, it is highly improbable that either defendant or his female passenger maneuvered themselves through the mangled vehicle.
Thus, we conclude the findings and conclusions of the Law Division judge are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record and establish that defendant operated the vehicle while under the influence of alcohol prior to the accident.
Affirmed.
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION