The Thoreen court reasoned in part that the deception of the trial judge violated the Washington Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 1-102(A)(4) ("A lawyer shall not [e]ngage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation."). And see Miskovsky v. State, 586 P.2d 1104 (Okla. Crim. App. 1978); State v. Massad, 334 P.2d 787 (Okla. 1959); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 914 (1966). In the case before us Rohrback, knowingly and actively, participated in Asbury's fraud on Lambert. By assisting Rohrback in the fraudulent suppression of a fact material to the PSI, Rohrback had the duty under Rule 4.1 to disclose the material fact, and he failed to do so.
Similarly, warnings given an attorney during dismissal of a prior complaint have been held to be relevant upon investigation and adjudication of later complaints. State ex rel. Okla. Bar Assn. v. Massad, 334 P.2d 787 (Okla. 1959). Although the evidence in the record is contested and conflicting in part, we believe that it established the respondent had:
Similarly, warnings given an attorney during dismissal of a prior complaint have been held to be relevant upon investigation and adjudication of later complaints. State ex rel. Okla. Bar Assn. v. Massad, 334 P.2d 787 (Okla. 1959). Prior case law from this Court indicates this tribunal will not unnecessarily circumscribe disciplinary proceedings by procedural rulings.
In re Kunkle, 218 N.W.2d 521 (S.D. 1974); Matter of Logan, 70 N.J. 222, 358 A.2d 787 (1976); In re Campbell, 74 Wn.2d 276, 444 P.2d 784 (1968); In re Black, 228 Or. 9, 363 P.2d 206 (1962); In re Ankelis, 164 Or. 676, 103 P.2d 715 (1940). In re Biggers, 24 Okla. 842, 104 P. 1083 (1909); In re Connell 79 Okla. 212, 192 P. 564 (1920) and State v. Massad, 334 P.2d 787, 791 (Okla. 1959).In re Toft v. Ketchum, 18 N.J. 280, 113 A.2d 671, 52 A.L.R.2d 1208 opinion adhered to, 18 N.J. 611, 114 A.2d 863, 52 A.L.R.2d 1217, cert. denied 350 U.S. 887, 76 S.Ct. 141, 100 L.Ed. 782 (1955) that court held:
We also realize that it is our duty to review all disciplinary actions instituted by the Oklahoma Bar Association and to affirm, modify or reverse its findings and recommendation. In re Green, et al., 161 Okla. 1, 16 P.2d 582; State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Massad, Okla., 334 P.2d 787. We have carefully examined the record and are of the opinion that the findings of fact, conclusions of law, comments and recommendation of the Trial Authority is just, reasonable and in line with good conscience and should be adopted.
This proceeding is not criminal, but is special, civil in nature, and has been described as like an investigation by the court into the conduct of its officers. State v. Clarke, 46 Iowa 155, 159; In re Stice, 184 Kan. 589, 339 P.2d 29, 31; Prime v. State Bar of California, 18 Cal.2d 56, 112 P.2d 881, 884; State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Association v. Massad, 334 P.2d 787, 791, and citations; In re Morford (Del.), 80 A.2d 429, 432; In re Pennica, 36 N.J. 401, 177 A.2d 721, 730. [4] The extent of persuasion required of the prosecution in disbarment proceedings does not vary according to the type of conduct charged, regardless of whether it amounts to a crime or merely professional misconduct.
Finally, the oath administered when an attorney is admitted to the Bar states in part, "that you will do no falsehood or consent that any be done in court, and if you know of any you will give knowledge thereof to the judges of the court, or someone of them, that it may be reformed; . . ." State v. Massad, Okla., 334 P.2d 787 (1958), involved an appeal of disbarment proceedings to the Oklahoma Supreme Court. In that case, the defense counsel pled a substitute defendant guilty to a charge of being drunk in a public place.