State v. Martin

15 Citing cases

  1. United States v. Edwards

    572 F. Supp. 1527 (D. Conn. 1983)   Cited 20 times
    Interpreting Conn.Gen.Stat. § 52-552

    Graves v. Atwood, 52 Conn. 512, 517 (1885) (quoting Bump, Fraudulent Conveyances 283). The proper procedure for determining solvency is to balance assets against liabilities. See State v. Martin, 77 Conn. 142, 144, 58 A. 745 (1904). As long as Clarence Edwards retained sufficient property to discharge his debts without recourse to the Clintonville Road property he would be solvent and the conveyance would not be fraudulent.

  2. State v. Jorgensen

    758 N.W.2d 830 (Iowa 2008)   Cited 94 times
    Finding substantial evidence for indecent exposure when store employees witnessed defendant masturbating in the store on a surveillance system

    As this court noted in discussing a predecessor indecent exposure statute: "The words `indecent exposure' clearly imply that the act is either in the actual presence and sight of others, or is in such a place or under such circumstances that the exhibition is liable to be seen by others, and is presumably made for that purpose, or with reckless and criminal disregard of the decencies of life. . . . The exposure becomes `indecent' only when [the actor] indulges in such practices at a time and place where, as a reasonable person, he knows, or ought to know, his act is open to the observation of others."State v. Martin, 125 Iowa 715, 718, 101 N.W. 637, 638 (1904). This definition presupposes a public exposure as opposed to a private one.

  3. Wisneski v. State

    398 Md. 578 (Md. 2007)   Cited 24 times
    Reviewing cases from other jurisdictions construing the common law and interpreting Maryland's common law crime of indecent exposure as requiring a public exposure that "was observed, or was likely to have been observed, by one or more persons"

    Therefore, probability of being seen, in addition to actual observation, was sufficient. In State v. Martin, 125 Iowa 715, 101 N.W. 637 (1904), the defendant also was convicted of indecent exposure under a state statute, which he challenged on the ground that his exposure was not actually seen by a victim, which the court did not find persuasive, explaining: It does not follow from this rule that one who uncovers his person in the privacy of his own apartment, or other place where there is no reason to suppose that his act may offend the sensibilities of others, is guilty of a crime.

  4. State v. Rocker

    52 Haw. 336 (Haw. 1970)   Cited 56 times
    Holding that individuals bathing in the nude on a public beach had committed the offense of indecent exposure

    Thus, the intent may be inferred from the conduct of the accused and the circumstances and environment of the occurrence. Messina v. State, 212 Md. 602, 606, 130 A.2d 578, 580 (1957); Peyton v. District of Columbia, 100 A.2d 36, 37 (D.C. Mun. App. 1953); State v. Martin, 125 Iowa 715, 101 N.W. 637 (1904). The criminal intent necessary for a conviction of indecent exposure is usually established by some action by which the defendant either (1) draws attention to his exposed condition or (2) by a display in a place so public that it must be presumed it was intended to be seen by others.

  5. State v. Queen

    73 Wn. 2d 706 (Wash. 1968)   Cited 16 times

    "[L]ascivious," and "indecent" are synonyms and connote wicked, lustful, unchaste, licentious, or sensual design on the part of the perpetrator. And, in State v. Martin, 125 Iowa 715, 718, 101 N.W. 637 (1904), it was said: The words "indecent exposure" clearly imply that the act is either in the actual presence and sight of others, or is in such a place or under such circumstances that the exhibition is liable to be seen by others, and is presumably made for that purpose, or with reckless and criminal disregard of the decencies of life.

  6. D'Addario v. Abbott

    128 Conn. 506 (Conn. 1941)   Cited 14 times

    The fact that he retained some other property in his own name is not enough. "It is the policy of our law `that all the property of a debtor not exempt by law from execution, should be subject to the demands of his creditors; and that every facility, consistent with the reasonable immunities of debtors, should be afforded to subject such property to legal process.' Gager v. Watson, 11 Conn. 168, 171." Sutherland v. Brown, 85 Conn. 67, 73, 81 A. 1033. The plaintiff relies on Katz v. Richman, 114 Conn. 165, 170, 158 A. 219, where we said, quoting from State v. Martin, 77 Conn. 142, 144, 58 A. 745: "A voluntary conveyance made in good faith, by a grantor not indebted, or if so, by one who retains sufficient property to pay his debts, is valid as against creditors." Two of these factors are missing in the present case.

  7. Dombron v. Rogozinski

    180 A. 453 (Conn. 1935)   Cited 12 times

    General Statutes, § 5660; Practice Book, § 189; Corbett v. Matz, 72 Conn. 610, 613, 45 A. 494; Seymour v. Norwalk, 92 Conn. 293, 295, 102 A. 577. The burden to prove that the conveyances were fraudulent was upon the plaintiff and this involved proof of all facts essential to the establishment of that conclusion. Daly Brothers, Inc. v. Spallone, 114 Conn. 236, 241, 158 A. 237; Nowsky v. Siedlecki, 83 Conn. 109, 119, 75 A. 135; State v. Martin, 77 Conn. 142, 58 A. 745. Unless the plaintiff proved that the conveyances were made without any substantial consideration and, when made, rendered Felix Rogozinski unable to pay his then existing debts, or that they were made with a fraudulent intent in which Pauline Rogozinski participated, the plaintiff could not recover. Fishel v. Motta, 76 Conn. 197, 198, 56 A. 558; Porter v. Adams, 98 Conn. 349, 119 A. 358; Pepe v. Santoro, 101 Conn. 694, 697, 127 A. 277; Daly Brothers, Inc. v. Spallone, supra. The trial court has found that at the time the conveyances were made Felix Rogozinski had no debts except such as were secured by mortgages on real estate the value of which amounted to or exceeded the amount of the mortgages, and that he was not insolvent. These findings are attacked, but even if we should strike them out, there is no sufficient evidence upon which we could add to the finding a statement that Felix Rogozinski did have debts other than those adequately secured by the mortgages at the time he mad

  8. Katz v. Richman

    158 A. 219 (Conn. 1932)   Cited 28 times
    In Katz v. Richman, 114 Conn. 165, 171, 158 A. 219 (1932), our Supreme Court addressed the propriety of a request to “inspect the books” of a corporation associated with the defendants.

    Clarke v. Black, 78 Conn. 467, 473, 62 A. 757. Even if they were to be considered as voluntary, they could not be held to be fraudulent on this finding. In State v. Martin, 77 Conn. 142, 144, 58 A. 745, we said: "Whether [a] voluntary conveyance [is] constructively fraudulent as to existing creditors, depends upon the financial condition of the husband at the time [the conveyance] was made. A voluntary conveyance made in good faith, by a grantor not indebted, or if so, by one who retains sufficient property to pay his debts, is valid as against creditors.

  9. Goldberg v. Parker

    87 Conn. 99 (Conn. 1913)   Cited 33 times

    In the absence of proceedings under the insolvent law, neither the knowledge of the creditor of his debtor's insolvency, nor the fact that such acts are calculated to place the property of the debtor beyond the reach of his creditors and hinder them in the collection of their claims, will of themselves render such bona fide transactions void or fraudulent in law." See also State v. Martin, 77 Conn. 142, 144, 58 A. 745. It does not appear that Parker was indebted, when this conveyance was made, to any one other than the plaintiff.

  10. People v. Carbajal

    114 Cal.App.4th 978 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003)   Cited 41 times
    Holding that visual observation of the offense is not required to support an indecent exposure conviction

    At the turn of the last century, the Supreme Court of Iowa upheld a conviction for indecent exposure based on an indictment that failed to allege anyone saw the exposure of the defendant's person. ( State v. Martin (1904) 125 Iowa 715 [101 N.W. 637, 638].) "It will be observed that the crime as defined by the statute does not require that the exposure shall be made in the actual sight of any person, and . . . `if a case should be made by confession, corroborated by circumstances, a defendant might properly be convicted of this offense, although no person witnessed the indecent act.' . . . The words `indecent exposure' clearly imply that the act is either in the actual presence and sight of others, or is in such a place or under such circumstances that the exhibition is liable to be seen by others, and is presumably made for that purpose.