Opinion
ID No. 9712013899.
Submitted: May 17, 2000.
Decided: May 23, 2000.
Defendants Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea — Denied .
John R. Garey, Esquire Deputy Attorney General 45 The Green Dover, Delaware 19901.
Sandra W. Dean, Esquire Office of the Public Defender 530 South State Street, Suite 108 Dover, Delaware 19901.
Counsel:
This is the Court's decision on Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea. As the parties are aware, a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. An important factor in the exercise of that discretion is the timing of the motion to withdraw a guilty plea. Superior Court Criminal Rule 32(d) provides that if a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty "is made before imposition . . . of sentence . . . the court may permit withdrawal of the plea upon a showing by the defendant of any fair and just reason. At any later time, a plea may be set aside only by motion under Rule 61."
After sentencing, a motion to withdraw a guilty plea constitutes a collateral attack against the conviction and is subject to the requirements of Rule 61, including its bar of procedural default. In order to succeed, the Defendant must demonstrate actual prejudice. The Defendant must have been informed of the full and possible range of sentences specified by the statutes, and her plea must have been voluntary, knowing and intelligent when made. The Court may allow the Defendant to withdraw her guilty plea if the Court finds that doing so would be in the "interest of justice."
In Blackwell v. State, Del. Supr., 736 A.2d 971 (1999), a Defendant entered into a plea colloquy on the record. He was advised that there was a fifteen-year minimum mandatory sentence of incarceration at Level V for his charges. However, the Court did not advise him that his license would also be revocated for two years. The Supreme Court found this harmless error and did not let the Defendant withdraw his guilty plea because the license revocation was incidental to the plea and could not have been negotiated out of the agreement.
This situation is similar to the one at bar. The Defendant pleaded guilty to the felony under Superior Court Criminal Rule 11(e)(1)(c) to assault, although a factual question may have existed regarding whether a weapon was involved in the incident. The Court then followed the recommendation of the State and sentenced the Defendant accordingly. Subsequently, after sentencing, the Defendant was unable to procure a job as a certified nursing assistant because she was an admitted felon.
Although this is an unfortunate occurrence, the Court does not find that it is in the "interest of justice" to allow the Defendant to withdraw her plea. The Defendant admitted at the hearing on this motion that she pleaded guilty to this felony knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily; however, her counsel stated that she was unaware of the consequences of her plea. I find that this does not amount to the level of prejudice that the Defendant must prove in order to withdraw her guilty plea after sentencing, a standard which Defendant, through counsel, admitted at argument must meet more stringent requirements after sentencing. Pleading guilty to a felony charge has both civil and criminal consequences. An impediment to obtaining a job as a result of such a plea is well known and is similar to the incidental consequences of a guilty plea that was previously mentioned in Blackwell. Therefore, the Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea is denied .
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours,
William L. Witham, Jr. Judge.