Opinion
A22-0483
12-14-2022
State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Gerelle Shaquan Martin, Appellant.
Hennepin County District Court File No. 27-CR-20-8560
Considered and decided by Bryan, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Larkin, Judge.
ORDER OPINION
MICHELLE A. LARKIN JUDGE
BASED ON THE FILE, RECORD, AND PROCEEDINGS, AND BECAUSE:
1. Appellant Gerelle Shaquan Martin challenges his conviction for being an ineligible person in possession of a firearm, arguing that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress the firearm. Specifically, Martin argues that the police exceeded the limits of a permissible Terry search when they reached inside his pocket and retrieved the firearm without first patting down his outer clothing.
2. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I of the Minnesota Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures of "persons, houses, papers and effects." U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I., § 10. Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable, subject only to a few narrow exceptions. State v. Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d 840, 843 (Minn. 1992), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993). Police may stop and frisk a person if they have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the suspect might be engaged in criminal activity and they reasonably believe the suspect might be armed and dangerous. Id.; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). If both circumstances exist, police may conduct a limited search of a suspect's outer clothing to discover any weapons that might be used to assault officers. Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d at 843; Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. A protective pat search "must be strictly limited to that which is necessary for the discovery of weapons which might be used to harm the officer or others nearby." Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 373 (quotation and citations omitted). If the protective search goes beyond what is necessary to determine whether a suspect is armed, it is not a valid Terry frisk, and its fruits will be suppressed. Id.
3. The district court found that the record "presents a clear violation of [Martin]'s Fourth Amendment right to be free of unauthorized searches" because the officer "neglected to perform a [pat-down] before reaching into [Martin]'s pocket, as required by Fourth Amendment jurisprudence." Nonetheless, the district court denied Martin's motion to suppress. The district court determined the firearm was admissible, relying on the inevitable-discovery doctrine.
When [the officer] apprehended [Martin], in response to the 911 call referencing a man pointing a firearm at passersby, a protective [pat-down] search was justified under Terry. Officers are permitted to pat down individuals suspected of criminal activity for the safety of police personnel and public safety. However, [the officer] interrupted the proper procedure by invalidly reaching into [Martin]'s left front pocket. Despite the violation, the inevitable discovery doctrine requires the [district court] to put the parties in the position they would have been in had the misconduct not taken place. Even without [the officer's] misconduct, a routine protective [pat-down] or frisk
of [Martin]'s person would have revealed the presence of the firearm in [Martin]'s jacket. Therefore, the inevitable discovery doctrine cured the constitutional violation and the firearm is admissible.
4. Martin waived his right to a jury trial and stipulated to the prosecution's case under Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4, to obtain review of the district court's ruling. Respondent State of Minnesota acknowledged that the district court's pretrial ruling was dispositive and that a trial would be unnecessary if Martin were to prevail on appeal, as required under Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4(c). The district court found Martin guilty of being a prohibited person in possession of a firearm and sentenced him to serve 60 months in prison.
5. When reviewing a district court's pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence, we review the district court's legal determinations de novo. State v. Gauster, 752 N.W.2d 496, 502 (Minn. 2008). We review the undisputed facts and "determine, as a matter of law, whether the evidence need be suppressed." State v. Othoudt, 482 N.W.2d 218, 221 (Minn. 1992).
6. Martin contends that the district court erred by relying on the inevitable-discovery doctrine to justify the search in this case. Under that doctrine, "If the state can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the fruits of a challenged search 'ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means,' then the seized evidence is admissible even if the search violated the warrant requirement." State v. Licari, 659 N.W.2d 243, 254 (Minn. 2003) (quoting Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984)).
7. In State v. Harris, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that because a police officer had reasonable articulable suspicion that a defendant might be armed and dangerous,
the fact that [the] police officer searched [the] defendant's jacket from inside the sleeve pursuant to [the] defendant's apparent consent was not grounds for suppressing evidence- discovery of evidence was inevitable because, absent [the] defendant's apparent consent, [the] officer could have conducted a protective pat down search of [the] defendant's outer clothing and would have discovered marijuana in the course of [the] protective search.590 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 1999). The supreme court explained that the "only reason" that the officer searched Harris's jacket sleeve from the inside was because he believed he had obtained the defendant's voluntary consent to do so. Id. at 105; see State v. Brooks, 838 N.W.2d 563, 568 (Minn. 2013) ("[P]olice do not need a warrant if the subject of the search consents."). Thus, the supreme court concluded that "it was inevitable that [the officer] would have discovered and legally seized the marijuana during a protective pat-down search." Harris, 590 N.W.2d at 105.
8. This case is unlike Harris because the state does not rely on the Terry frisk exception to excuse an officer's impermissible reliance on another exception. Here, the officers appropriately relied on the Terry frisk exception, but they exceeded the permissible scope of a Terry frisk by searching inside Martin's pocket instead of patting down his outer clothing. Unlike Harris, the state does not proffer a warrant exception other than Terry to justify the search here.
9. "The State may not show inevitable discovery by claiming that if it had not searched illegally, it would have done so legally." State v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836, 849 (Minn. 2011). If police are "only required to show that lawful means could have been available even though not pursued, the narrow 'inevitable discovery' exception would 'swallow' the entire Fourth Amendment protection." State v. Hatton, 389 N.W.2d 229, 234 (Minn.App. 1986), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 13, 1986). Thus, evidence obtained in a warrantless search, "may not be admitted under the inevitable discovery doctrine simply because a warrant could have been obtained." State v. Martinez, 579 N.W.2d 144, 148 (Minn.App. 1998), rev. denied (Minn. July 16, 1998).
10. Use of the inevitable-discovery doctrine to justify admission of the firearm in this case would swallow the Fourth Amendment protection. The Terry exception authorizes only a limited pat down of a suspect's outer clothing. Application of the inevitable-discovery doctrine to justify a search that exceeded the permissible bounds of a Terry frisk on the theory that the police could have remained within the permissible bounds would allow the state to "show inevitable discovery by claiming that if it had not searched illegally, it would have done so legally." Diede, 795 N.W.2d at 849. The inevitable-discovery doctrine may not be used for that purpose. Id.
11. Because the inevitable-discovery doctrine does not justify admission of the firearm and because that issue is dispositive, we reverse Martin's conviction.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. The district court's order is reversed.
2. Pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c), this order opinion is nonprecedential, except as law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.