Opinion
A18-0893
05-13-2019
State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Edward Martin, Appellant.
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Patrick R. Lofton, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent) Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Richard Schmitz, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn . Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018). Affirmed
Rodenberg, Judge Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-17-5099 Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Patrick R. Lofton, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent) Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Richard Schmitz, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant) Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Rodenberg, Judge; and Reilly, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
RODENBERG, Judge
In this direct appeal from his conviction for violating the predatory-offender-registration statute, appellant Edward Martin argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. We affirm.
FACTS
In 1992, appellant was convicted in California of one count of sexual battery under Cal. Penal Code § 243.4(a) (West 1991). In 2005, the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (BCA) informed appellant that he was required to register for life as a predatory offender in Minnesota because of the California conviction. Appellant complied with his registration requirements for the next several years. In 2011, appellant registered with the BCA as homeless. Until August 2016, appellant continued to either register as homeless—which obligated him to check-in with law enforcement—or listed a shelter as his primary address. On August 19, 2016, appellant was released from the Hennepin County Workhouse. Upon his release, appellant registered as homeless.
Appellant was originally charged, under California law, with forcible rape, forcible oral copulation, and two counts of rape by foreign object. He pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of sexual battery.
Persons who are homeless and required to register with the BCA "shall report in person on a weekly basis to the law enforcement authority with jurisdiction in the area where the person is staying." Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 3a(e) (2016).
On September 28, 2016, the BCA deemed appellant noncompliant with his registration requirement because he had failed to report to law enforcement on a weekly basis as required by law. Appellant had previously signed a document, from the Minnesota BCA, acknowledging his duty to register as a predatory offender. The state charged appellant with knowingly failing to register under Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 5(a) (2016).
We cite to the 2016 version of statutes because that is when appellant was charged.
Appellant moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the state lacked probable cause to support the charge because the certified documents did not establish that he was required to register in California. The district court denied appellant's motion. The case was assigned to another district court judge and submitted to the court for a trial on stipulated evidence. The district court reviewed evidence of appellant's California conviction, appellant's BCA registration file, and police reports. The district court found appellant guilty of knowingly failing to register as a predatory offender.
This appeal followed.
DECISION
Appellant argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. When reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, we review the record to determine whether the evidence is sufficient to allow a fact finder to reach its verdict. State v. Olhausen, 681 N.W.2d 21, 25 (Minn. 2004); see also State v. Palmer, 803 N.W.2d 727, 733 (Minn. 2011) ("[Appellate courts] use the same standard of review in bench trials and in jury trials in evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence."). Appellate courts review the evidence in the light most favorable to the conviction and assume that the fact-finder "believed the state's witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary." Olhausen, 681 N.W.2d at 25. The verdict will not be disturbed if the fact-finder "could reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty of the charged offense." Id. at 25-26.
Although appellant frames the issue as one of sufficiency of the evidence, what appellant appears to be arguing is that Minnesota law did not require him to register as a predatory offender based on his California conviction. Consequently, in addition to determining whether the state proved appellant's California conviction and failure to register, we must resolve the legal question of whether appellant is required to register in Minnesota based on his California conviction. See State v. Vasko, 889 N.W.2d 551, 556 (Minn. 2017) (stating that it is often necessary to interpret a criminal statute when evaluating an insufficiency-of-the-evidence claim).
Minn. Stat. § 243.166 (2016) requires persons convicted of certain crimes to register with the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension. A person is required to register as a predatory offender for an offense committed in another state if:
(1) the person was charged with . . . an offense in another state that would be a violation of a law described [under Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 1b(a)] . . . ;Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 1b(b). The offenses requiring lifetime registration are enumerated in section 243.166, and include criminal sexual conduct in the fourth degree, "or a statute from another state or the United States similar to the offenses described in this clause." Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 6(d)(3).
(2) the person enters [Minnesota] to reside, work, or attend school, or enters this state and remains for 14 days or longer; and
(3) ten years have not elapsed since the person was released from confinement or, if the person was not confined, since the person was convicted of or adjudicated delinquent for the offense that triggers registration, unless the person is subject to a longer registration period under the laws of another state in which the person has been convicted or adjudicated, or is subject to lifetime registration.
Not every fourth-degree criminal-sexual-conduct offense or conviction requires lifetime registration, but relevant here, lifetime registration is required under Minn. Stat. § 609.345, subd. 1(c) (2016), where "the actor uses force or coercion to accomplish the sexual contact."
Appellant was convicted in California of sexual battery under Cal. Penal Code § 243.4(a) in 1992. Under the 1991 version of the statute, a person is guilty of sexual battery if he "touches an intimate part of another person while that person is unlawfully restrained by the accused or an accomplice, and if the touching is against the will of the person touched and is for the purposes of sexual arousal, sexual gratification, or sexual abuse." Cal. Penal Code § 243.4(a). The unlawful restraint required for violation of section 243.4 is something more than the mere exertion of physical effort required to commit the prohibited sexual act. People v. Pahl, 277 Cal. Rptr. 656, 662 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991). "'Intimate part' means the sexual organ, anus, groin, or buttocks of any person, and the breast of a female." Cal. Penal Code, § 243.4(f)(1) (West 1991).
Respondent's brief cites this as subdivision (g), which is the current version of the statute, but the definition was provided in subdivision (f) at the time appellant committed the crime.
In Minnesota, a person who engages in sexual contact with another person is guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the fourth degree if "the actor uses force or coercion to accomplish the sexual contact." Minn. Stat. § 609.345, subd. 1(c). Sexual contact includes "the intentional touching by the actor of the complainant's intimate parts." Minn. Stat. § 609.341, subd. 11(a)(i) (2016). Intimate parts "includes the primary genital area, groin, inner thigh, buttocks, or breast of a human being." Id., subd. 5 (2016). "Force" is defined as "the infliction, attempted infliction, or threatened infliction by the actor of bodily harm or commission or threat of any other crime by the actor against the complainant or another." Id., subd. 3 (2016). Coercion means "the use by the actor of words or circumstances that cause the complainant reasonably to fear that the actor will inflict bodily harm upon the complainant or another, or the use by the actor of confinement, or superior size or strength, against the complainant that causes the complainant to submit to sexual . . . contact." Id., subd. 14 (2016).
The sexual-battery statute under which appellant was convicted in California is sufficiently similar to Minnesota's fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct statute to trigger lifetime registration under Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 6(d)(3). The elements are nearly identical.
Appellant argues that the district court erred in its third conclusion of law which states:
With regard to element one, there is evidence to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that [appellant] is a person required to register as a predatory offender. See Minn. Stat. § 243.166. [Appellant] was convicted of felony Sexual Battery on March 26, 1992 in San Diego County, California. Ex. 1. In the State of Minnesota, individuals convicted of criminal sexual conduct and individuals who are convicted of a similar offense in other states must register as a predatory offender. Minn. Stat. § 243.166[,] subd. 1b(a)(iii). [Appellant's] conviction of Sexual Battery on March 26, 1992 in California qualifies as criminal sexual conduct in Minnesota and
[appellant] is required to register as a predatory offender in Minnesota. This requires lifetime registration. Minn. Stat. § 243.166 subd. 6(d)(1).
First, appellant argues that the district court erred because not all criminal sexual conduct convictions in Minnesota require registration. Appellant is correct. First-time convictions for fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct do not require registration. But, as noted, appellant's California conviction is the equivalent of fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct in Minnesota. The district court's erroneous statement of law makes no difference here.
Second, appellant argues that the district court erred by citing to Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 6(d)(1), for the proposition that appellant is subject to lifetime registration. Section 243.166, subdivision 6(d)(1), provides registration requirements for persons who have a prior conviction requiring registration, and does not apply to appellant. Here again, the district court's erroneous statement of law does not affect the conclusion that appellant was required to register as a predatory offender based upon a California conviction that is the equivalent of fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct in Minnesota.
Third, appellant maintains that the district court erred by stating that appellant is required to register in Minnesota because he is required to register in California. There is no evidence in the record that appellant was required to register in California and appellant's plea agreement for the 1992 California offense reflects this conclusion. Consequently, the district court could not have determined on this record that appellant was required to register in Minnesota for life because he is required to register in California. But whether or not appellant is required to register as a predatory offender in California would only be relevant if the basis for appellant's registration was Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 6(e), which provides that persons required to register in other states shall continue to register in Minnesota for at least the time required in the other state(s). The state does not claim that section 243.166, subdivision 6(e), is the basis on which appellant is required to register in Minnesota, the complaint does not allege that as being the reason appellant is required to register here, and the district court's erroneous statement of law is immaterial.
Appellant's guilty plea listed numerous possible consequences of his plea. Several consequences were circled, but the possible registration as a sex offender was not.
The district court's reasoning in this case was not as robust as it might have been, and closely followed the reasoning of the earlier order of another district court judge denying appellant's motion to dismiss for want of probable cause. The district court should have analyzed whether the California statute is sufficiently similar to a Minnesota statute so as to require appellant to register here. But this is a question of law, and we do not afford any deference to the district court's reasoning underlying its legal conclusion. See State v. Dorn, 887 N.W.2d 826, 830 (Minn. 2016) (stating that appellate courts review questions of law de novo). While the district court may have made some descriptive errors in its order, the district court's conclusion that, "[a]s a result of the [California] conviction, [appellant] is a person required to register as a predatory offender under Minnesota state law" is correct.
Appellant also argues that the first district court judge, hearing the motion to dismiss, erred by stating that his "California sentence is largely irrelevant." The district court judge was responding to appellant's argument that the state had to prove that he was required to register in California. The district court was correct that the California sentence is largely irrelevant; it is the conviction that is relevant under Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 6(d)(3). --------
Finally, appellant argues that the exhibit proving appellant's California conviction does not contain the elements of California's crime of sexual battery. The state need not offer evidence of the applicable law. The state proved the California conviction. Finding and construing the applicable law is, and always has been, the court's duty.
The California statute defining sexual battery is nearly identical to Minnesota's fourth-degree criminal-sexual-conduct statute that requires lifetime registration. The district court did not err in concluding that appellant was required to register, and the record supports appellant's conviction for knowingly failing to register.
Affirmed.