In response to Ruiz–Velez, our supreme court amended Wis. Stat. § 885.42 and SCR 71.01(2), which no longer requires that video statements played during trial be recorded. See State v. Marinez, 2010 WI App 34, ¶ 19 n. 4, 324 Wis.2d 282, 781 N.W.2d 511., 324 Wis.2d 282, 781 N.W.2d 511. Accordingly, the trial court did not err when it did not require that the audiovisual recordings of Marcus and Caleb be transcribed. Supreme Court Rule 71.01(2)(e) now provides that:

As with any procedural due process inquiry, the touchstone of our analysis is whether the procedures used by the committee were fundamentally fair. See D.M.D. v. State, 54 Wis. 2d 313, 318, 195 N.W.2d 594 (1972); State v. Marinez, 2010 WI App 34, ¶ 21, 324 Wis. 2d 282, 781 N.W.2d 511. ¶ 52.

It is true that consideration of counsel's performance and prejudice to the defendant take into account "the circumstances of the case." State v. Marinez, 2010 WI App 34, ¶32 n.7, 324 Wis. 2d 282, 781 N.W.2d 511. Yet, at the same time, the Strickland standard is highly deferential towards counsel, even beginning with "a strong presumption that ... under the circumstances, the challenged action 'might be considered sound trial strategy.'"

The scope of § 885.42(4) was narrowed by the deletion of the phrase "and other testimony," thereby limiting mandatory transcription to only videotaped depositions. See WIS. STAT. § 885.42(4); see also State v. Marinez, 2010 WI App 34, ¶19 n.4, 324 Wis. 2d 282, 781 N.W.2d 511. The transcription of other types of audiovisual recordings—such as recordings admitted pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 908.08—is now discretionary.

; State v. Marinez, 324 Wis.2d *79 282 , 781 N.W.2d 511 , 519 (2010) (determination whether to allow video statements during closing argument is a matter within the court’s discretion).