Opinion
2012 KA 1157
03-25-2013
STATE OF LOUISIANA v. JAMES W. MARCHBANKS, III
Walter P. Reed District Attorney Covington, LA and Kathryn Landry Special Appeals Counsel Baton Rouge, LA Attorneys for State of Louisiana Cameron M. Mary Brown & Mary, LLC Mandeville, LA and Rene P. Frederick Alien & Frederick, LLC Covington, LA Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant James W. Marchbanks, III
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
On Appeal from the 22nd Judicial District Court
Parish of St. Tammany, Louisiana
Docket No. 515947, Division "F"
Honorable Martin E. Coady, Judge Presiding
Walter P. Reed
District Attorney
Covington, LA
and
Kathryn Landry
Special Appeals Counsel
Baton Rouge, LA
Attorneys for
State of Louisiana
Cameron M. Mary
Brown & Mary, LLC
Mandeville, LA
and
Rene P. Frederick
Alien & Frederick, LLC
Covington, LA
Attorneys for
Defendant-Appellant
James W. Marchbanks, III
BEFORE: PARRO, WELCH, AND KLINE, JJ.
Judge William F. Kline, Jr., retired, is serving as judge pro tempore by special appointment of the Louisiana Supreme Court.
PARRO , J.
The defendant, James W. Marchbanks, III, was charged by bill of information with possession of fluoromethamphetamine, a violation of LSA- R.S. 40:967(A)(1) (Count 1); possession with intent to distribute marijuana, a violation of LSA-R.S. 40:966(A)(1) (Count 2); possession of trenbolone acetate, a violation of LSA-R.S. 40:968(C) (Count 3); possession of testosterone enanthate, a violation of LSA-R.S. 40:968(C) (Count 4); possession of testosterone cypionate, a violation of LSA-R.S. 40:968(C) (Count 5); possession of testosterone propionate, a violation of LSA-R.S. 40:968(C) (Count 6); possession of alprazolam, a violation of LSA-R.S. 40:969(C) (Count 7); possession of diazepam, a violation of LSA-R.S. 40:969(C) (Count 8); possession of eszopiclone, a violation of LSA-R.S. 40:969(C) (Count 9); possession of methandienone, a violation of LSA-R.S. 40:968(C) (Count 10); possession of stanozolol, a violation of LSA-R.S. 40:968(C) (Count 11); possession of hydrocodone, a violation of LSA-R.S. 40:967(C) (Count 12); possession of dextropropoxyphene, a violation of LSA-R.S. 40:969(C) (Count 13); possession of cocaine, a violation of LSA-R.S. 40:967(C) (Count 14); possession of dimethyltryptamine, a violation of LSA-R.S. 40:966(C) (Count 15); and possession of nandrolone decanoate, a violation of LSA-R.S. 40:968(C) (Count 16).
The defendant pled not guilty to all counts. The defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence and, following a hearing on the matter, the motion was denied. Thereafter, the defendant withdrew his prior pleas of not guilty and, at a Boykin hearing, entered a Crosby plea of guilty to all sixteen counts, reserving his right to challenge the trial court's ruling on the motion to suppress. See State v. Crosby, 338 So.2d 584 (La. 1976). For the possession with intent to distribute marijuana conviction (Count 2), the defendant was sentenced to serve ten years of imprisonment at hard labor. For each of the fifteen convictions for possession (Count 1 and Counts 3-16), the defendant was sentenced to serve five years of imprisonment at hard labor. All of the sentences were ordered to run concurrently. All of the defendant's sentences were suspended, and he was ordered to serve five years of probation with conditions. The defendant now appeals, designating two assignments of error. We affirm the convictions and sentences.
FACTS
At the motion to suppress hearing, Detective Katherine Domangue, with the Mandeville Police Department and assigned to the St. Tammany Parish Sheriff's Office Narcotics Drug Task Force, testified about the events leading to the application for and execution of a search warrant on the defendant's residence. A confidential informant (CI) approached Detective Domangue and told her that he could purchase MDMA (methylenedioxymethamphetamine, also known as "Ecstasy") from the defendant's residence, a duplex at 130 Pear Street in Covington. The CI had worked with the detective on previous arrests. The defendant lived with William Perry Kelly, co-defendant. The CI did not know the name of the defendant or Kelly, but the CI's friend (not identified and hereinafter also referred to as "the unwitting") lived in a duplex that contained the friend's residence and the defendant's residence and knew both the defendant and Kelly. The friend told the CI that only he (the friend) would be allowed in the defendant's residence to purchase the drugs. The CI relayed this information to Detective Domangue. On August 23, 2011, the CI was fitted with a "Kel" audio monitoring device (body wire) and given $100 to purchase drugs. The CI underwent an integrity check, whereby police officers searched his person and vehicle to verify there were no narcotics or drugs in either place. The CI went to his friend's residence and gave him the $100. Detective Domangue and other police officers maintained audio surveillance of the CI's conversations with his friend and visual surveillance on the friend's and the defendant's residences. The CI's friend went to the defendant's residence and returned shortly thereafter with two clear plastic bags containing about .6 grams of MDMA powder. The following day, August 24, 2011, a second drug buy was effected in the same manner. Again, the CI wore a Kel, and officers maintained audio and visual surveillance. This time, however, the CI gave his friend $200. The friend went to the defendant's residence with the money and returned shortly thereafter with four clear plastic bags, with each bag containing about .6 grams of MDMA powder. A few days later on August 27, Detective Domangue prepared a search warrant and the accompanying search warrant affidavit to search the defendant's residence for narcotics. Judge William Knight signed the search warrant and affidavit. Detective Domangue, with the assistance of other detectives, executed the search warrant on the defendant's residence. The return of the search warrant indicated that officers had seized from the defendant's residence, among other items, containers of marijuana, several small packages of MDMA, five different types of steroids, and psilocybin mushrooms. The defendant and Kelly were subsequently arrested.
Kelly was present and identified as a co-defendant at the motion to suppress hearing. Kelly has also appealed, raising the same issues as the defendant in his appeal. See State v. Kelly, 12-1158 (La. App. 1st Cir. 3/26/13) (unpublished).
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NOS. 1 and 2
In these related assignments of error, the defendant argues, respectively, that the facts in the search warrant affidavit were not sufficient to support a finding of probable cause by the magistrate judge and that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence seized from his residence. Specifically, the defendant contends that the CI's reliability was not established and that an unknown person, rather than the CI, allegedly purchased drugs from his residence.
When a search and seizure of evidence is conducted pursuant to a search warrant, the defendant has the burden to prove the grounds of his motion to suppress. LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 703(D); State v. Hunter, 632 So.2d 786, 788 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1993), writ denied, 94-0752 (La. 6/17/94), 638 So.2d 1092. When a trial court denies a motion to suppress, factual and credibility determinations should not be reversed in the absence of a clear abuse of the trial court's discretion, i.e., unless such ruling is not supported by the evidence. See State v. Green, 94-0887 (La. 5/22/95), 655 So.2d 272, 280-81. However, a trial court's legal findings are subject to a de novo standard of review. See State v. Hunt, 09-1589 (La. 12/1/09), 25 So.3d 746, 751.
Article 1, § 5 of the Louisiana Constitution requires that a search warrant may issue only upon an affidavit establishing probable cause to the satisfaction of a judge. See LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 162. Probable cause exists when the facts and circumstances within the affiant's knowledge, and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient to support a reasonable belief that an offense has been committed and that evidence or contraband may be found at the place to be searched. State v. Johnson, 408 So.2d 1280, 1283 (La. 1982). The facts establishing the existence of probable cause for the warrant must be contained within the four corners of the affidavit. State v. Duncan, 420 So.2d 1105, 1108 (La. 1982); see State v. Green, 02-1022 (La. 12/4/02), 831 So.2d 962, 969.
An affidavit supporting a search warrant is presumed to be valid. State v. Brannon, 414 So.2d 335, 337 (La. 1982). The defendant at a suppression hearing has the burden of proving the representations in the affidavit by the affiant are false. See Brannon, 414 So.2d at 337; see also Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978).
Affidavits, by their nature, are brief, and some factual details must be omitted. Unless the omission is willful, and calculated to conceal information that would indicate that there is not probable cause, or would indicate that the source of other factual information in the affidavit is tainted, the omission will not change an otherwise good warrant into a bad one. In matters relating to the possibility that a warrant contains intentional misrepresentations, the question of the credibility of the witnesses is within the sound discretion of the trier of fact. His factual determinations are entitled to great weight and will not be disturbed unless clearly contrary to the evidence. The harsh result of quashing a search warrant, when the affidavit supports a finding of probable cause, should obtain only when the trial judge expressly finds an intentional misrepresentation to the issuing magistrate. State v. Fugler, 97-1936 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/25/98), 721 So.2d 1,19, rehearing granted and amended in part on other grounds, 97-1936 (La. App. 1st Cir. 5/14/99), 737 So.2d 894, writ denied, 99-1686 (La. 11/19/99), 749 So.2d 668.
If the basis for the existence of probable cause is the tip of an informant, the affiant must articulate the basis for his belief that the informant is trustworthy. This may be done by showing circumstances where the informant has given reliable information in the past. The affidavit must also indicate the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that the drugs were where he said they would be. This may be done by reciting that the informant personally observed the drugs under the circumstances recited. An allegation of past reliability is not necessarily a sine qua non to sufficiency of probable cause as long as a common-sense reading of the affidavit supports the conclusion that the informant is credible and his information is reliable. Duncan, 420 So.2d at 1108.
An issuing magistrate must make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit, there is a "fair probability" that evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2332, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983); State v. Byrd, 568 So.2d 554, 559 (La. 1990). The process of determining probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant does not involve certainties or proof beyond a reasonable doubt, or even a prima facie showing, but rather involves probabilities of human behavior, as understood by persons trained in law enforcement and as based on the totality of circumstances. The process simply requires that enough information be presented to the issuing magistrate to enable him to determine that the charges are not capricious and are sufficiently supported to justify bringing into play the further steps of the criminal justice system. See State v. Rodrigue, 437 So.2d 830, 832-33 (La. 1983); see also Green, 831 So.2d at 968.
The review of a magistrate's determination of probable cause prior to issuing a warrant is entitled to significant deference by reviewing courts. "[A]fter-the-fact scrutiny by courts of the sufficiency of an affidavit should not take the form of de novo review." Gates, 462 U.S. at 236, 103 S.Ct. at 2331. Further, because of "the preference to be accorded to warrants[,]" marginal cases should be resolved in favor of a finding that the issuing magistrate's judgment was reasonable. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109, 85 S.Ct. 741, 746, 13 LEd.2d 684 (1965); see Rodrigue, 437 So.2d at 833.
In the instant matter, the defendant alleges the search warrant affidavit did not set forth sufficient grounds to establish the reliability of the CI. The defendant further alleges that, even assuming the CI was reliable, the affidavit still lacked probable cause because an unknown person allegedly purchased drugs from the defendant's residence.
In its ruling denying the defendant's motion to suppress, the trial court stated in pertinent part:
Judge Knight is presented with a search warrant which relies upon an unwitting to make a buy then is provided to the CI which has been on at least two cases before [being] found to be reliable. The sale itself, there is a KEL, it is not within site of any surveillance of the officers other than seeing what transpired prior to the sale. Money is marked, brought from the CI to the unwitting, to the residence located at 130 Pear Street. This is presented to Judge Knight in a probable cause affidavit. I think some of the issues brought out by the defense certainly can be used in defense of the case. I'm not going to suppress the warrant.
There appears to be no reason to disturb the ruling of the trial court. Addressing first the reliability of the CI, this court finds the search warrant affidavit clearly established the reliability of the CI. Detective Domangue stated in the affidavit that she was contacted by the CI, who advised her, as follows:
he/she knew of a residence located at 130 Pear St. ... that was occupied by two white males selling a large quantity of MDMA .... The CI stated he did not know the name of the white male subjects, but could purchase the MDMA from the residence at anytime. It should be noted that the aforementioned CI has been proven reliable on several unrelated cases.
Detective Domangue set forth later in her affidavit that the CI stated he/she had been contacted by a "friend," who resides in the duplex next to the defendant's residence. The friend stated that he knew the occupants of the defendant's residence and could get the CI MDMA anytime the CI wanted it. According to the affidavit, the CI met with his friend, or the unwitting, on two separate occasions. On each occasion, the CI gave money to the unwitting, who went next door to the defendant's residence, purchased MDMA, then brought the drugs back to the CI. Thus, the information provided by the CI was based on personal knowledge and was consistent with other information received by Detective Domangue. The CI's information about his friend, the friend's relationship to the defendant, the defendant's residence, and the kind of drugs being sold from it were all corroborated by police surveillance of the residence and the actual drug purchases made over a two-day period. See State v. Beach, 610 So.2d 908, 912-13 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1992), writs denied, 614 So.2d 1252 (La. 1993), and 94-1942 (La. 11/11/94), 644 So.2d 389. Accordingly, the search warrant affidavit, based on the CI's past history and the personal observations of the police, set forth sufficient grounds to establish the reliability of the CI. See State v. Tilley, 525 So.2d 716, 718-20 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1988); see also State v. Banks, 11-961 (La. App. 5th Cir. 5/22/12), 95 So.3d 508, 515-16; State v. Cummings, 07-1304 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 4/30/08), 983 So.2d 246, 253-54, writ denied, 08-1187 (La. 2/20/09), 1 So.3d 489 (where the court found that, although attacked by the defendant, the reliability of the CI was not at issue because the police officers relied on their own observations rather than what the CI said when they observed the CI, whose person was searched before the drug buy, go into a home with money and return with the drugs).
The defendant asserts in his brief that the CI provided Detective Domangue information that later turned out to be false. This contradictory information, according to the defendant, shows the CI was "at best, unreliable, and at worst, deceptive." The defendant is referring to that part of the affidavit where the CI stated he did not know the white male subjects (at the defendant's residence), "but could purchase the MDMA from the residence at anytime." Later, the CI learned that he, personally, could not go to the defendant's residence to purchase drugs, but would have to use his "friend" (the defendant's next door neighbor) to purchase the drugs for him. Therefore, according to the defendant, the CI provided false information to Detective Domangue.
The CI told Detective Domangue what he knew at the time, that is, that he could buy drugs from the defendant. When the CI learned later that only his "friend" would be allowed to go to the defendant's residence, the CI informed the detective of this change, and this new information was put in the search warrant affidavit. The subsequent statements in the affidavit that reflect this new development are the following:
The friend stated he knew the residents of 130 Pear St. and could get the CI MDMA anytime he/she wanted it.
The CI further stated that his/her "friend" stated they could purchase the MDMA from the residence at anytime.
At the motion to suppress hearing, Detective Domangue explained on cross-examination how she initially indicated in the affidavit that the CI could get the narcotics, but then subsequently indicated that, based on new information from the CI, the "friend" could get the narcotics:
Q. All right. This is what he was presented with to determine. That statement was inaccurate. The CI couldn't purchase narcotics from the residence at 130, correct?
A. No. It was made further clear, correct, that he had to have a friend go next door and do it. Correct.
Q. Okay. So, the CI is giving you inaccurate information at the time?
A. The CI at the time thought that he could go next door and buy it once meeting up with the friend, but I guess after he spoke with the friend -
Q. I don't want you to guess.
A. I am not guessing, but that's what I was told by the CI, that he could go next door and purchase the narcotics. Later on that afternoon when we met up, he said that the friend can go next door because he was not allowed to go with him to purchase narcotics from the defendants, which is also stated in the affidavit.
Based on the foregoing, this court finds no contradictory information in the affidavit regarding the role the CI played in the drug purchases; and while the CI may have at the outset mistakenly thought that he, personally, could buy the drugs, this court does not find that he was deceptive in relaying such information to Detective Domangue. Moreover, if an unintentional misstatement is in an affidavit, the misstatement can be excised and the remainder used to determine if probable cause for the issuance of a warrant is set forth. See State v. Peterson, 03-1806 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/31/03), 868 So.2d 786, 793, writ denied, 04-0317 (La. 9/3/04), 882 So.2d 606. This court finds that, even with the single statement regarding the CI's ability to purchase MDMA from the defendant's residence excised, the affidavit still supports a finding of probable cause, since it still gives rise to a reasonable belief that illegal narcotics would be found at the defendant's residence.
The reliability vel non of the CI notwithstanding, the defendant also alleges the affidavit lacked probable cause because an unknown person purchased drugs from the defendant's residence. According to the defendant, it is of critical importance that the CI purchased drugs not from one of the defendants, but from an unnamed neighbor, whose reliability was not established, at a location other than the target location. The defendant concludes that, had the CI actually personally witnessed the sale of the drugs in the defendant's residence, or had actually purchased the drugs himself while in the defendant's residence, then the search would have been valid. This contention is baseless.
Initially, it is noted that, despite the defendant's assertion, the drugs were purchased from the target location of 130 Pear Street. The basis for the assertion is not clear, and the defendant provides no support. Regarding the unwitting, it was not necessary for Detective Domangue to have known the identity of the CI's friend. Other numerous facts established the existence of probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant. Moreover, the facts were corroborated by police surveillance, both visual and audio. According to the search warrant affidavit, the CI knew the unwitting, who lived next door to the defendant. The unwitting told the CI he could get the CI drugs from next door (the defendant's residence) any time he wanted. In setting up the drug purchase, the CI underwent an integrity check and was determined to have no drugs on him when he met with the unwitting. Also, the CI wore a Kel and was provided Sheriff's Office funds to give to the unwitting to purchase the drugs. When the CI met with the unwitting, Detectives monitoring the situation heard the unwitting take the money from the CI and tell the CI to stay in his residence while he went to the defendant's residence to purchase the drugs. Detectives observed the unwitting leave his own residence and enter the defendant's residence. Shortly thereafter, the unwitting emerged from the defendant's residence and went back to his residence. The unwitting made contact with the CI and handed the CI two plastic bags containing MDMA powder. The following day, according to the affidavit, the unwitting made another drug purchase from the defendant's residence that was very similar to the transaction the day before. Once more, the CI wore a Kel and detectives monitored, visually and by audio, the activities of the CI and the unwitting; and again, the unwitting, while the CI remained at the unwitting's residence, went next door and purchased with Sheriffs Office funds powdered MDMA, returned to his own residence, and gave the drugs to the CI. At the conclusion of both transactions, the CI brought the MDMA to Detective Domangue. When the search warrant was executed on the defendant's residence, detectives found, as was clearly suggested by the two drug transactions described in the affidavit, several small packages containing MDMA. The packaging was also the same as that received by the CI, and the Sheriff's Office funds were found at the defendant's residence.
As noted, the defendant suggests in his brief that the affidavit did not establish probable cause, because the CI did not personally observe any conduct or criminal activity by either of the defendants. The Fourth Amendment, however, contains no such requirement. If sufficient facts are confirmed by appropriate corroborative efforts of the police involved in the case, and such information is provided in the search warrant affidavit, then probable cause is established. See Cummings, 983 So.2d at 253-54.
In State v. Robinson, 03-1350 (La. App. 5th Cir. 3/30/04), 871 So.2d 575, a case factually very similar to the instant matter, the CI indicated he could not directly purchase anything from the residence, but knew another person who could. This person was referred to as the unwitting informant. At the case agent's direction, the CI contacted the unwitting informant, who agreed to make the purchase. The agent listened to a phone conversation between the CI and the unwitting informant in which the unwitting informant agreed to meet with the CI, proceed to the target location, and purchase cocaine from the occupants at that address using the CI's money. The CI was given pre-recorded money to make the drug buy. The affidavit stated that surveillance was established at the target location and on the CI. During the surveillance, the CI met with the unwitting informant, who entered the residence (target location) and exited about two minutes later with a quantity of cocaine. The unwitting informant gave the CI the drugs, and also told the CI the person selling drugs was nicknamed "Scooby." The CI met with investigators and turned over the purchased cocaine. Robinson, 871 So.2d at 579-80.
The defendant in Robinson argued the affidavit failed to establish probable cause, because the reliability and credibility of the unwitting informant were not proven. According to the defendant, the mere fact that critical information passed through a reliable and credible CI did not make the original source of the information sufficiently reliable for purposes of establishing probable cause. The fifth circuit disagreed with the defendant, stating the issue was not the independent reliability of the unwitting informant, but rather under the totality of the circumstances, there was a sufficient basis upon which the trial court could have found probable cause to issue the search warrant. While noting that the veracity, reliability, or basis of knowledge of a CI is relevant, but not the determining factor in evaluating probable cause, the Robinson court found that the CI's information, corroborated by police surveillance, satisfied the probable cause requirement. Robinson, 871 So.2d at 580-81.
The initial information in Robinson that the residence at issue was involved in drug activity came from what the case agent described as a reliable and credible CI. In the affidavit, the agent stated the CI had proven to be both reliable and credible, having provided information that led to the arrests and the seizure of illegal drugs. The reliability of the CI was not traversed. Robinson, 871 So.2d at 580. In the instant matter, when Detective Domangue was questioned on cross-examination about the reliability of her CI, she stated that the CI had done about eight cases prior to the instant one and that they resulted in arrests.
The fifth circuit in Robinson concluded that, based on the totality of the circumstances, the information from the CI, and corroboration of the information by police surveillance and investigation, the trial court had a substantial basis upon which to find probable cause to issue a search warrant. The fact that information from an unknown third party was utilized during the investigation, the court observed, does not render the information unreliable. Robinson, 871 So.2d at 581.
This court finds, as did the fifth circuit in Robinson, that based on the totality of the circumstances, the information from the CI, and the corroboration of that information by police surveillance, the trial court had a substantial basis upon which to find probable cause to issue the search warrant. See Hunter, 632 So.2d at 787-89; Beach, 610 So.2d at 912-13. The CI's information regarding the unwitting (the CI's friend), where the unwitting lived, and the unwitting's knowledge of the defendant's drug activity was all corroborated by police surveillance and two separate drug transactions between the unwitting and an occupant of the defendant's residence.
This court finds also that, even had the search warrant been based on less than probable cause, under the Leon good-faith exception, the suppression of the evidence seized pursuant to that search warrant would not be required. It is well-settled that even when a search warrant is found to be deficient, the seized evidence may nevertheless be admissible under the good-faith exception of United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919-20, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 3418-19, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984). In Leon, the United States Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule should not be applied so as to bar the use, in the prosecution's case-in-chief, of evidence obtained by officers acting in an objectively reasonable, good-faith reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate, but ultimately found to be invalid.
Under Leon, 468 U.S. at 923, 104 S.Ct. at 3421, four instances in which suppression remains an appropriate remedy are: (1) where the issuing magistrate of the warrant was misled by information that the affiant knew was false or would have known was false except for a reckless disregard of the truth; (2) where the issuing magistrate wholly abandoned his detached and neutral judicial role; (3) where the warrant was based on an affidavit so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable; and (4) where the warrant is so facially deficient—i.e., in failing to particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized—that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid.
The instances in which suppression remains an appropriate remedy, as enunciated in Leon, clearly reflect that suppression of evidence seized pursuant to an invalid warrant is not a remedy to be lightly considered. Furthermore, the jurisprudence presumes good faith on the part of the executing officer, and the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating the necessity for suppression of evidence by establishing a lack of good faith. State v. Maxwell, 09-1359 (La. App. 1st Cir. 5/10/10), 38 So.3d 1086, 1092, writ denied, 10-1284 (La. 9/17/10), 45 So.3d 1056.
Applying these factors to this case, this court concludes that, even if the search warrant was to be considered deficient, the good-faith exception would apply. The defendant did not establish any bad faith on the part of the executing officer. There were no misleading statements contained in the affidavit. There was no evidence that Judge Knight abandoned his neutral role in his issuance of the search warrant, nor was there anything on the face of the warrant that would make it so deficient that it could not be presumed to be valid. Detective Domangue provided the judge with information gathered by her CI, whom she had used on several prior cases and who had proven to be credible and reliable. Detective Domangue was not unreasonable in believing she provided the judge with sufficient information to issue a search warrant. Accordingly, suppression of the evidence would not be appropriate under the Leon good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. See Maxwell, 38 So.3d at 1092.
The trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's motion to suppress. Accordingly, these assignments of error are without merit.
CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES AFFIRMED.