Opinion
A23-0010
03-04-2024
State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Christopher Lee Manska, Appellant.
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Lydia Villalva Lijó, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and Matti R. Adam, Itasca County Attorney, Grand Rapids, Minnesota (for respondent) Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Andrew J. Nelson, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
Itasca County District Court File Nos. 31-CR-20-2079, 31-CR-20-2265
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Lydia Villalva Lijó, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and Matti R. Adam, Itasca County Attorney, Grand Rapids, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Andrew J. Nelson, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Slieter, Judge; and Halbrooks, Judge. [*]
COCHRAN, Judge
In this direct appeal from a judgment of conviction for felony driving while intoxicated (DWI)-test refusal and other related offenses, appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his requests for discovery related to the state's dash-camera evidence and erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence discovered as a result of the traffic stop underlying the convictions. Appellant raises several additional arguments in a pro se supplemental brief. We conclude that the district court neither abused its discretion by denying appellant's discovery requests nor erred by denying his motion to suppress. We further conclude that appellant's pro se arguments do not merit relief. Therefore, we affirm.
FACTS
On September 4, 2020, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Christopher Lee Manska with felony DWI in violation of Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(1) (2020); felony DWI-test refusal in violation of Minn. Stat. § 169.20, subd. 2(2) (2020); driving after cancellation-inimical to public safety in violation of Minn. Stat. § 171.24, subd. 5 (2020); and misdemeanor possession of marijuana in a motor vehicle in violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.027, subd. 3 (2020).
According to the complaint, two police officers stopped a vehicle driven by Manska after one of the officers observed Manska's vehicle swerve twice over the fog line. While speaking with Manska, the primary officer discovered that Manska's driver's license had been canceled as inimical to public safety and observed several indicia of intoxication, including "bloodshot and glossy eyes, erratic movements, and profuse sweating." The primary officer applied for and secured a search warrant for a sample of Manska's blood or urine. When the primary officer asked Manska for a sample of his blood or urine, however, Manska refused. The primary officer arrested Manska and transported him to jail. During a search of Manska's vehicle, law enforcement found a bag containing 14.11 grams of marijuana.
The fog line is the line on the right side of a road, between the traffic lane and the shoulder of the road.
Shortly after the state filed the complaint, Manska sent a letter to police admitting that the vehicle he was driving belonged to a friend and that he took it without her consent. On September 30, the state filed a separate complaint charging Manska with felony unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.52, subd. 2(a)(17) (2020).
At his initial court appearance on the original complaint, Manska inquired as to whether the state had any dash-camera video that could corroborate the basis for the traffic stop. Shortly thereafter, Manska's attorney filed a demand for discovery that requested, in relevant part, "[a]ny and all video and audio . . . which relate to [Manska's] case." The state provided Manska with DVDs of the dash-camera video and the officers' body-camera videos.
Manska later discharged his attorney and began representing himself.
On October 13, Manska filed a motion seeking an order compelling the state to produce the "Dash Cam 'SD' card" or "hard drive." In the motion, Manska alleged that the primary officer had "misrepresented the facts" regarding the basis for the stop and that the officer had intentionally "edit[ed] out the initial encounter" with Manska from the dash-camera video. According to Manska, the S.D. card would show that the officer "pulled [Manska] over [for] no wrongdoing whatsoever." Manska requested the alleged dash camera "'SD' card" to prove that the officer had tampered with the dash-camera video that Manska received.
Soon thereafter, Manska filed a motion to dismiss counts one and two of the state's complaint-felony DWI and felony DWI-test refusal. Manska argued the dismissal was proper because "a search warrant wasn't executed upon the defendant at the stop of said incident."
On November 5, the district court held an omnibus motion hearing to address the pending motions. Due to a recording error, there is no transcript of this hearing. But the district court's subsequent order provides some insight into what transpired. At the hearing, the primary officer testified about how dash and body cameras work and how police departments handle their footage. The primary officer testified that officers control their dash and body cameras, and that dash cameras are installed by certified installers from a company named Axon. The primary officer also testified that dash and body cameras automatically begin recording when a patrol car's emergency lights and siren are activated but the cameras can be manually activated by a police officer as well. The primary officer testified that dash and body cameras do not have "SD" cards or hard drives for storing footage. Rather, footage from dash and body cameras is uploaded wirelessly to a cloud storage account maintained by Axon. When an officer needs to access dash or body camera footage, the officer must request the footage from Axon. Axon then sends a link to the video to the requesting officer, who downloads the video and burns it onto a DVD. The primary officer testified that he followed this procedure in this case.
In its December 5, 2020 order, the district court referred to Axon as "Axos." In a subsequent order, the district court clarified that the company's name is Axon.
On December 5, the district court denied Manska's motion to compel production of the dash camera "SD" card, concluding that "no such 'SD' card exists." The district court further concluded that the state had "complied with its obligation to provide discovery to [Manska] in this case." The district court also denied Manska's motion to dismiss, concluding that "[a] search warrant was not required for the initial traffic stop in this matter" because the stop was supported by probable cause. Finally, the district court consolidated Manska's cases for trial.
While awaiting an order from the district court, Manska filed several more requests to compel discovery of the "original" dash-camera video. In these requests, Manska alleged that the primary officer had not only deleted the first portion of the dash camera footage that Manska received, but also had edited out evidence of a storm (which Manska alleged affected his driving prior to the stop); changed the time and date of the video; and altered the primary officer's conversation with Manska by changing the officer's reason for stopping Manska from "crossing the center line" to "crossing the fog line." Because these requests were submitted "after evidence was closed and the matter [was] taken under advisement," the district court did not consider them in its omnibus order.
Shortly after the December 5 order was signed, Manska filed a renewed motion to dismiss charges on the basis that the primary officer failed to present him with a search warrant for a blood or urine sample.
And in February 2021, Manska filed another motion to compel information relating to the dash-camera video. In this motion, Manska sought an order compelling the state to produce the dash-camera video "audit trail." In support of his motion, Manska attached an email from a senior investigation engineer at Axon, the company responsible for storing and disseminating dash- and body-camera video footage for the police department. In the email, the engineer explained that Axon does not own or have access to police dash- or body-camera video footage and that all requests for such footage must be processed by the police department. The engineer also noted that the company's dash and body cameras "are designed to be tamper-proof"; while a user may view and annotate dash- and body-camera footage, the "system does not allow an officer to modify or delete video footage in any way." The engineer clarified that a video could be deleted once it was uploaded to the server but noted that any deleted videos would have an "audit trail" explaining why the video was deleted. Lastly, the engineer explained that "a SHA-2 hash of the copy [of the dash-camera video] versus the SHA-2 hash on the evidence audit trail . . . would prove whether the copy is identical to the original." Based on this email, Manska sought the "SHA-2 hash on the evidence audit trail" to allow Manska to determine whether his copy of the dash-camera video provided by the state was identical to the "original" footage.
Manska filed another motion to compel discovery of the dash-camera-video audit trail on March 9, 2021. Manska attached several documents to his motion, including text messages between Manska and the senior investigation engineer, and several pages from Axon's website, both of which provided information about accessing a device's audit trail. Manska also filed multiple addenda to his original discovery motion. Manska attached to these addenda more text messages between Manska and the senior investigation engineer.
The district court held a second omnibus motion hearing on March 15, 2021. In an order dated April 14, 2021, the district court denied Manska's motion to dismiss as well as his motion to compel discovery of the dash-camera-video audit trail. With regard to the dash-camera-video audit trail, the district court noted that it had already found in its December 5 order that the state had "fulfilled its [disclosure] obligation under [r]ule 9.01 when it provided [Manska] with the DVDs of the dash cam and radio traffic." And the district court explained that it was denying the current motion for the audit trail because "once again, [Manska] has provided no evidence" to support his assertion that the DVDs produced in discovery were not authentic. The district court also emphasized that Manska's correspondence with the senior investigation engineer "undercut[]" his claims regarding the authenticity of the dash-camera video because it was consistent with the primary officer's testimony that dash cameras record only when activated, and it established that dash-camera video "cannot be changed, modified, or edited," contrary to Manska's assertion.
Due to another reporting error, there is no transcript of this hearing.
Manska filed several other discovery requests related to the dash-camera video between the omnibus hearing on March 15, 2021, and the district court's issuance of an order on April 14, 2021. In its order, the district court noted that these motions were not properly before it but stated that it would consider them anyways "for the sake of judicial economy."
Several months later, Manska filed a motion to suppress the evidence discovered as a result of the traffic stop. Manska argued that the officers did not have reasonable, articulable suspicion to support the stop.
The district court held a hearing on the suppression motion. Both the primary and secondary officers testified. The primary officer first testified about dash and body cameras and then testified about the circumstances giving rise to the traffic stop. The primary officer testified that dash and body cameras activate automatically when an officer turns on their emergency lights but can be activated manually by a police officer. The primary officer testified that, when dash and body cameras activate automatically, they capture video (but not audio) footage of what was occurring during the 30 seconds prior to activation. Regarding the traffic stop, the primary officer testified that he saw Manska swerve twice over the fog line and that each swerve was the width of the tire. But the primary officer testified that his dash camera did not capture this behavior because he did not activate his emergency lights until one or two minutes after he saw Manska swerve. The primary officer testified that a driver who swerves over the fog line may be under the influence. The primary officer also testified that Manska was driving "very cautiously," which indicated that Manska knew the police were behind him. The secondary officer testified that he did not see Manska swerve over the fog line because he was looking elsewhere at the time.
The district court denied Manska's motion to suppress. The district court explained that swerving over the fog line is a traffic violation which provides an officer with reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity to stop a vehicle. The district court then credited the primary officer's testimony that Manska swerved twice over the fog line and concluded, based on these violations, that the primary officer had reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity to support the stop. The matter proceeded to a jury trial.
Following a two-day trial, the jury found Manska guilty of all five charges. The district court entered convictions of DWI-test refusal, driving after cancellation, misdemeanor possession of marijuana, and unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. The district court then sentenced Manska to 66 months in prison for DWI-test refusal and to 19 months in prison for unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, with credit for time served.
Manska appeals.
DECISION
Manska argues that the district court (1) abused its discretion by denying his motion to compel discovery of the dash-camera-video audit trail and (2) erred by denying his motion to suppress. In a supplemental pro se brief, Manska also contends that the primary officer submitted perjured testimony, that the state violated his right to due process by committing a Brady violation, and that the district court erred by denying his motion to dismiss based on the primary officer's alleged failure to present Manska with a search warrant for his blood or urine. We consider each argument in turn.
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Manska's motion to compel discovery of the dash-camera-video audit trail.
Manska first argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion to compel discovery of the dash-camera-video audit trail. "A district court judge has wide discretion to issue discovery orders, and normally an order will not be overturned without clear abuse of that discretion." State v. Underdahl, 767 N.W.2d 677, 684 (Minn. 2009) (quotation omitted). A district court abuses its discretion when it misapplies the law or makes findings that are unsupported by the evidence. Id.
Manska is challenging the district court's discovery ruling under Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 9.01, subdivision 2(3). This rule provides:
On the defendant's motion, the [district] court at any time before trial may, in its discretion, require the prosecutor to disclose to defense counsel and to permit the inspection, reproduction, or testing of any relevant material and information not subject to disclosure without order of court under Rule 9.01, subd. 1, provided, however, a showing is made that the information may relate to the guilt or innocence of the defendant or negate guilt or reduce the culpability of the defendant as to the offense charged. If the motion is denied, the court upon application of the defendant must inspect and preserve any relevant material and information.Minn. R. Crim. P. 9.01, subd. 2(3). To show that requested evidence may relate to a defendant's guilt or innocence, the defendant must make "some plausible showing that the information sought would be both material and favorable to [the] defense." Underdahl, 767 N.W.2d at 684 (quoting State v. Hummel, 483 N.W.2d 68, 72 (Minn. 1992)).
In Underdahl, the supreme court considered "what showing is required to support a district court's conclusion that information may relate to a defendant's guilt or innocence in a DWI case." 767 N.W.2d at 684-86. In addressing this issue, the supreme court analyzed discovery requests by two DWI defendants, Brunner and Underdahl, who sought the computer-source code for a certain breath-alcohol testing device to determine whether it was functioning properly at the time of their preliminary breath tests. Id. at 680-81, 684-86. The district court granted both motions and compelled discovery of the computer-source code. Id. at 680-81. On appeal, the supreme court affirmed the district court's order as to Brunner but reversed as to Underdahl, concluding that Brunner had made the requisite showing under rule 9.01, subdivision 2(3), but Underdahl had not. Id. at 685-86.
The supreme court held that Brunner had met his burden of showing that the evidence sought related to his guilt or innocence because he had submitted with his motion a memorandum and nine exhibits supporting his request for the source code. Id. One of these exhibits was written testimony from a computer-science professor explaining how a computer's source code could be used to identify defects in a machine that operates according to that code. Id. at 685. Another exhibit detailed Brunner's efforts to obtain the source code from the state and the manufacturer of the testing device. Id. And the final exhibit was a copy of a report regarding the reliability of a different testing device. Id. Based on these submissions, the supreme court concluded that Brunner had "show[n] that an analysis of the source code may reveal deficiencies that could challenge the reliability of the [breathalyzer] and, in turn, would relate to Brunner's guilt or innocence." Id. at 686.
By contrast, the supreme court held that Underdahl had not met his burden of showing that the source code may relate to his guilt or innocence because his motion to compel "contained no other information or supporting exhibits related to the source code." Id. at 685. Although Underdahl had asserted that "challenging the validity of the [breathalyzer] was the only way for him to dispute the charges against him," he "made no threshold evidentiary showing whatsoever" as to "how the source code would help him do so." Id. Accordingly, the supreme court held that, "even under a lenient showing requirement, Underdahl failed to make a showing that the source code may relate to his guilt or innocence" and thus was not entitled to the discovery he sought. Id. at 685-86.
Manska challenges the district court's denial of his motion to compel discovery of the dash-camera-video audit trail on two grounds. First, Manska contends that the district court misapplied the law by requiring Manska to produce evidence showing that the dash-camera video was not authentic. Second, Manska asserts that the district court's decision "is contrary to the facts in the record." We address each argument in turn and conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Manska's request for the audit-trail evidence.
A. The district court did not misapply the law.
Manska argues that the language the district court used when denying his motion to compel the dash-camera-video audit trail demonstrates that the district court "believed that [he] had to show that the dash cam video was not authentic in order to receive access to the . . . audit trail," which imposed a "significantly higher" burden of proof on him than rule 9.01, subdivision 2(3), ordinarily imposes on a criminal defendant.
The district court denied Manska's motion to compel because Manska provided "no evidence" to support his motion other than "his assertion that the DVDs [containing the dash-camera video] produced in discovery are not authentic." The district court determined that Manska's assertion that the videos had been altered was not credible and noted that Manska's correspondence with the Axon engineer "undercut[]" this claim.
The district court did not hold Manska to a higher standard than rule 9.01, subdivision 2(3), ordinarily requires. In denying Manska's motion, the district court outlined the requirements of rule 9.01, subdivision 2(3), and explained that Manska sought the audit-trail evidence because he hoped to prove that the dash-camera-video evidence was inauthentic. The district court found that Manska's assertions regarding the dash-camera video were not credible because Manska "provided no evidence in support of [these] claims." The district court further found that the evidence Manska did provide- namely, his correspondence with the Axon engineer-undermined his assertions, because this evidence showed that the dash-camera video could not "be changed, modified, or edited." Taken as a whole, the district court's decision shows that it denied Manska's motion to compel the audit-trail evidence because Manska did not provide a factual basis for concluding that the dash-camera video may have been altered and therefore did not show how the audit-trail evidence "may relate to his guilt or innocence," as required by rule 9.01, subdivision 2(3), and Underdahl. See Underdahl, 767 N.W.2d at 685-86. We therefore conclude that the district court applied the correct legal standard when it denied Manska's motion to compel.
B. The district court's decision is not contrary to the facts on record.
In the alternative, Manska argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion to compel because he provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the audit-trail evidence may undermine "the reliability [of] the dash cam video" and thereby "relate to his guilt or innocence." We disagree.
Like the unsuccessful defendant in Underdahl, Manska provided almost no evidence to explain how the evidence he sought-the dash-camera-video audit trail-may be related to his guilt or innocence. See id. Manska attached only three documents to his motion to compel: (1) an email from the Axon engineer, (2) text messages with the same engineer, and (3) information from Axon's website about how to access an audit trail. None of these documents explain how the audit-trail evidence would be "material and favorable" to Manska's defense. See id. at 684 (providing that a defendant must make "some plausible showing that the information sought would be both material and favorable to his defense" to establish that the information may relate to his guilt or innocence (quotation omitted)). Although the email from the Axon engineer explains that the audit trail "would prove whether the copy [of the dash-cam video evidence] is identical to the original," neither this email nor any of the other documents Manska submitted show that there is a reasonable basis for concluding that the dash-camera video was capable of being altered. To the contrary, Manska's communications with the Axon engineer show that the dash-camera video-recording system "does not allow an officer to modify or delete video footage in any way." And the other information Manska submitted merely describes how to find an audit trail-not how dash-camera-video evidence may be modified such that an audit trail is required to prove a particular recording's authenticity.
Because the evidence Manska presented does not show how the audit-trail evidence would be material and favorable to his defense, Manska has not met his burden of showing that the audit-trail evidence may relate to his guilt or innocence, as required by rule 9.01, subdivision 2(3). Id. at 684; see Shetka v. Kueppers, Kueppers, Von Feldt & Salmen, 454 N.W.2d 916, 919 (Minn. 1990) ("[I]nformation subject to discovery must, at least, be likely to lead to relevant admissible evidence."). Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Manska's motion to compel the audit-trail evidence. See Underdahl, 767 N.W.2d at 684-86.
To persuade us otherwise, Manska argues that the district court's decision is contrary to the facts in the record because, according to Manska, the testimony of the primary officer and the first 30 seconds of the dash-camera video show that the video was altered by the officer. To support his argument, Manska relies on the testimony by the primary officer at the January 2022 suppression hearing, which postdates the district court's April 2021 order denying Manska's motion to compel. Because Manska's argument relies on testimony from a later hearing, we reject this argument. See State v. Balandin, 944 N.W.2d 204, 220 (Minn. 2020) (concluding that the defendant forfeited an argument on appeal by failing to raise it at the relevant omnibus hearing); see also State v. Lieberg, 553 N.W.2d 51, 56 (Minn.App. 1996) (same).
With regard to the evidence that Manska did rely on in his motion to compel and at the hearing on that motion, none of that evidence undermines the authenticity of the dash-camera video. Manska based his motion to compel on his correspondence with an Axon engineer. In this correspondence, the Axon engineer stated that the police department's dash cameras "are designed to be tamper-proof" and emphasized that Axon's "system does not allow an officer to modify or delete video footage in any way." These statements directly contradict Manska's assertions that the primary officer altered the dash-camera video before it was disclosed to Manska. We therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by finding that Manska failed to provide evidence to support his claim that the dash-camera video had been altered.
II. The district court did not err by denying Manska's motion to suppress the evidence discovered as a result of his traffic stop because the officers had reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity to support the stop.
Manska next argues that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress the evidence discovered as a result of the traffic stop. When reviewing a pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence, we review the district court's legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error. State v. Ortega, 770 N.W.2d 145, 149 (Minn. 2009). Factual findings are not clearly erroneous if they are "reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole." State v. Barshaw, 879 N.W.2d 356, 366 (Minn. 2016). We defer to a district court's credibility determinations. State v. Klamar, 823 N.W.2d 687, 691 (Minn.App. 2012).
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. Accordingly, evidence obtained during an unlawful seizure must be suppressed. State v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836, 842 (Minn. 2011). A police officer's temporary detention of an individual during a traffic stop constitutes a "seizure." State v. Fort, 660 N.W.2d 415, 418 (Minn. 2003) (citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10 (1996)). Warrantless seizures are generally unreasonable. State v. Taylor, 965 N.W.2d 747, 752 (Minn. 2021). But an officer may conduct a limited, investigatory stop without a warrant if the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity. Id.
The reasonable-suspicion showing is "not high." State v. Bourke, 718 N.W.2d 922, 927 (Minn. 2006) (quotation omitted). But reasonable suspicion must be based on more than a mere "hunch." State v. Timberlake, 744 N.W.2d 390, 393 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted). "Reasonable suspicion must be 'particularized' and based on 'specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.'" Taylor, 965 N.W.2d at 752 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)). The state bears the burden of proving that a stop was supported by reasonable suspicion. State v. Flowers, 734 N.W.2d 239, 256 (Minn. 2007).
An officer's observation of any traffic violation, "however insignificant," provides the officer with an objective basis for initiating a stop. State v. George, 557 N.W.2d 575, 578 (Minn. 1997). This includes an officer's observation of a vehicle crossing the fog line. Soucie v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety, 957 N.W.2d 461, 465 (Minn.App. 2021), rev. denied (Minn. June 29, 2021). An actual violation need not have occurred. State v. Pike, 551 N.W.2d 919, 921 (Minn. 1996). Rather, an officer need "only show that the stop was not the product of mere whim, caprice or idle curiosity, but was based upon specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion." Id. at 921-22 (quotation omitted).
The parties agree that Manska was seized when the primary officer initiated the traffic stop. But Manska contends that the officers did not have reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity to support the stop. Manska asserts that the stop was not supported by reasonable, articulable suspicion because (1) the secondary officer did not see Manska cross the fog line, (2) the dash-camera video provided by the state does not show Manska's vehicle crossing the fog line, and (3) the primary officer stated that Manska was driving in a "very cautious" manner and this statement "contradict[ed]" the primary officer's allegation that Manska had committed a traffic violation. We are not persuaded.
With regard to the first two arguments, we note that Minnesota law does not require corroboration of an officer's observation of a traffic violation. Rather, the law provides that an officer's observation of a traffic violation, no matter how minor, provides the officer with an objective basis for initiating a stop. George, 557 N.W.2d at 578. The primary officer testified at the suppression hearing that he observed Manska cross the fog line on two occasions prior to the stop. Thus, Manska's first two arguments are unavailing.
To the extent that Manska is challenging the district court's decision to credit the primary officer's testimony, we defer to the district court's credibility determination as this determination is supported by the record, which reflects that the primary officer's testimony was consistent with the video evidence. See Klamar, 823 N.W.2d at 691; Barshaw, 879 N.W.2d at 366.
As for Manska's third argument, the officer's statement that Manska was driving in a "very cautious" manner does not necessarily contradict the primary officer's testimony that Manska crossed the fog line. Trained police officers may draw inferences from the surrounding circumstances and make deductions that elude an untrained person. State v. Johnson, 444 N.W.2d 824, 826 (Minn. 1989). Even seemingly "innocent factors," like driving cautiously, may provide an officer with reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. State v. Martinson, 581 N.W.2d 846, 852 (Minn. 1998) (quotation omitted). Consequently, evidence of cautious driving does not necessarily conflict with evidence of a traffic violation and therefore does not undermine our conclusion that the officer had reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity.
In sum, we conclude that the primary officer had reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity to stop Manska when he saw Manska's vehicle cross the fog line. See George, 557 N.W.2d at 578. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not err by denying Manska's motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the stop. See Soucie, 957 N.W.2d at 465.
III. Manska's pro se arguments do not merit relief.
In a supplemental pro se brief, Manska argues that (1) the primary officer submitted perjured testimony, (2) the state violated his right to due process by committing a Brady violation, and (3) the district court erred by denying his motion to dismiss based on the primary officer's alleged failure to present Manska with a search warrant for his blood or urine. We consider each argument and conclude that none merit relief.
A. Whether the primary officer committed perjury is not properly before this court.
Manska first contends that the primary officer submitted perjured testimony at the omnibus hearing on November 5, 2020, by stating that he followed the proper procedures when he produced the dash-camera video. He seeks a new trial on this basis.
This argument is not persuasive. Perjury is a crime. See Minn. Stat. §§ 609.01 (providing that chapter 609 "may be cited as the Criminal Code of 1963"), .48, subd. 1 (describing the acts constituting perjury); see generally Minn. Stat. §§ 609.01-.912 (the "Criminal Code") (2022). Accordingly, perjury must be prosecuted in a criminal proceeding, which affords defendants special due-process protections. See Minn. Const. art. I, §§ 6-7 (enumerating the rights of criminal defendants); Johnson v. State, 641 N.W.2d 912, 917 (Minn. 2002) (providing that "the power to decide whom to prosecute and what charge to file resides with the executive branch"); State v. Carriere, 290 N.W.2d 618, 620 n.3 (Minn. 1980) (explaining that a prosecutor is an executive official). Manska presents no evidence that the state has charged the primary officer with perjury in this case or in a related criminal proceeding, nor does he explain why the district court may find the primary officer guilty of perjury without prosecution or due process. For these reasons, we decline to consider Manska's pro se perjury argument.
B. Manska has not shown that the state violated his right to due process.
Manska next asserts that the state's failure to disclose "the original (unabridged) version of the dash cam video recording, body cam video recording and inside squad camera recording" constituted a violation under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
Like Manska's first pro se argument, this argument is not properly before us. We generally consider only those issues that were presented to the district court. Roby v. State, 547 N.W.2d 354, 357 (Minn. 1996). Manska did not present his Brady argument to the district court, nor did the district court consider it. Accordingly, this argument is waived. See id.
Even so, Manska has not met his burden of proving error under Brady. In Brady, the United States Supreme Court held "that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." 373 U.S. at 87. For a Brady violation to exist, three elements must be present: "(1) the evidence must be favorable to the defendant because it would have been either exculpatory or impeaching; (2) the evidence must have been suppressed by the prosecution, intentionally or otherwise; and (3) the evidence must be material-in other words, the absence of the evidence must have caused prejudice to the defendant." Walen v. State, 777 N.W.2d 213, 216 (Minn. 2010).
Manska cannot satisfy any of the elements of a Brady violation because, based on the record before us, he cannot show that the allegedly undisclosed videos exist. Accordingly, Manska cannot show that these videos would be favorable to him, that the state suppressed them, or that their absence prejudiced him, as required by Brady. See Walen, 777 N.W.2d at 216. Because Manska has not met his burden of proving that the state violated his right to due process under Brady, Manska's second pro se argument is unavailing. See 373 U.S. at 87; Schoepke v. Alexander Smith & Sons Carpet Co., 187 N.W.2d 133, 135 (Minn. 1971) ("An assignment of error based on mere assertion and not supported by any argument or authorities in appellant's brief is waived and will not be considered on appeal unless prejudicial error is obvious on mere inspection."); State v. Andersen, 871 N.W.2d 910, 915 (Minn. 2015) (applying this aspect of Schoepke in a criminal appeal).
C. Manska has not shown that the district court erred by denying his motion to dismiss.
Finally, Manska contends that the district court erred by denying his motion to dismiss charges against him based on his allegation that the primary officer failed to present him with a search warrant for a sample of his blood or urine. We are not persuaded.
Even if we assume that the officer was required to show Manska the warrant when the officer requested Manska provide a sample of his blood or urine, Manska has not shown that he is entitled to reversal of his convictions due to the officer's alleged failure to fulfill this requirement. It is undisputed that the primary officer obtained a valid search warrant for a sample of Manska's blood or urine, that the primary officer notified Manska that refusing to provide a blood or urine sample pursuant to a valid search warrant is a crime, and that Manska refused to provide a sample of his blood or urine. Manska does not contend that he would have provided a blood or urine sample if the officer had shown him the search warrant. Therefore, Manska has not established that he was prejudiced by the primary officer's alleged failure to provide him with a copy of the search warrant. Accordingly, any error by the primary officer in this regard was harmless, and Manska is not entitled to relief on this basis. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 31.01 (requiring that harmless error be ignored); State v. Mollberg, 246 N.W.2d 463, 470 (Minn. 1976) (concluding that the defendant was not entitled to relief for "technical and nonprejudicial irregularities in the execution of [a] search warrant" because he "[did] not allege that the irregularities resulted in any prejudice to him").
Affirmed.
[*]Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.