Opinion
No. 1 CA-CR 18-0687
12-12-2019
STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee, v. MIGUEL MANSANARES, Appellant.
COUNSEL Arizona Attorney General's Office, Phoenix By Joseph T. Maziarz Counsel for Appellee Maricopa County Public Defender's Office, Phoenix By Jennifer Roach Counsel for Appellant
NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CR2016-141495-001
The Honorable Geoffrey Fish, Judge
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL
Arizona Attorney General's Office, Phoenix
By Joseph T. Maziarz
Counsel for Appellee
Maricopa County Public Defender's Office, Phoenix
By Jennifer Roach
Counsel for Appellant
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge Jennifer M. Perkins delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Judge Paul J. McMurdie joined.
PERKINS, Judge:
¶1 Miguel Mansanares appeals his conviction and sentence for possession of a dangerous drug, arguing the superior court erred by failing to order competency proceedings sua sponte. Mansanares also challenges the trial judge's impartiality, and he claims the State improperly diminished its burden of proof. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶2 We view the facts in the light most favorable to upholding the jury's verdict. State v. Payne, 233 Ariz. 484, 509, ¶ 93 (2013). While on patrol, officer Baynes observed Mansanares trespassing at a trailer park. Baynes approached and questioned Mansanares. When Baynes asked whether he had any contraband, Mansanares began to pull a prescription pill bottle from his pants pocket and suddenly fled. Baynes tackled Mansanares about ten feet away and retrieved the pill bottle. Inside the bottle, Baynes discovered more than one gram of methamphetamine.
¶3 The State charged Mansanares with one count of possession or use of a dangerous drug. Soon thereafter, appointed counsel withdrew due to a breakdown in communication with Mansanares. Newly appointed counsel then requested a determination of Mansanares' competency to stand trial under Rule 11 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. Based on three mental health experts' reports, the superior court found Mansanares incompetent but restorable. Mansanares was admitted into a county facility to obtain involuntary mental health treatment. Almost two months later, the court determined his competency was restored.
¶4 Mansanares then waived counsel, and he proceeded as a self-represented party with newly appointed advisory counsel. About four months later, the court withdrew both Mansanares' self-represented status and advisory counsel based on Mansanares' disruptive behavior during hearings and his inability to effectively represent himself. The court appointed new defense counsel, and three months later, granted
Mansanares' motion to appoint yet another attorney to represent him. Citing Mansanares' threats and refusal to cooperate, his fifth appointed counsel then moved to withdraw. The trial court denied the motion. Almost two years after the indictment, the jury deliberated after one day of trial testimony and returned a guilty verdict. After the court sentenced him to the minimum term of eight years, Mansanares timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. The Trial Court Did Not Err by Declining to Order an Additional Rule 11 Proceeding.
¶5 Mansanares first argues the trial court should have initiated a second competency evaluation when it withdrew Mansanares' self-representation status. "The trial court has broad discretion in determining whether reasonable grounds exist to order a competency hearing and its decision will not be reversed absent a manifest abuse of discretion." State v. Amaya-Ruiz, 166 Ariz. 152, 162 (1990); see also Ariz. R. Crim. P. 11 (procedures for determining a defendant's competency to stand trial).
¶6 Although a trial court is "under a continuing duty to inquire into a defendant's competency, and to order a [Rule] 11 examination sua sponte if reasonable grounds exist," Amaya-Ruiz, 166 Ariz. at 162, courts generally assume that "a criminal defendant has sufficient mental competence to stand trial." Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 174 (2008). "Reasonable grounds exist if there is sufficient evidence to indicate that the defendant is not able to understand the nature of the proceedings against him and to assist in his defense." State v. Salazar, 128 Ariz. 461, 462 (1981). To determine whether a Rule 11 examination is appropriate, a court may rely on its own observations of the defendant's behavior in court. State v. Glassel, 211 Ariz. 33, 44, ¶ 28 (2005). Trial courts are presumed to know of their duty to order a Rule 11 examination if reasonable grounds exist. State v. Trostle, 191 Ariz. 4, 22 (1997).
¶7 Here, the record reflects that when Mansanares was in treatment after first being found incompetent, he did not exhibit psychotic, depressive, or paranoid behaviors. Indeed, the record shows that, after his treatment, Mansanares understood the criminal proceedings and chose not to work with his attorneys in a productive manner. Instead, Mansanares pursued an obstructionist strategy punctuated by threats to his counsel, the prosecutor, and the court. Also, Mansanares did not cooperate with the mental health examiners during the initial Rule 11 proceeding, and
Mansanares stated he received "abusive treatment" during the "Rule 11 process."
¶8 To be sure, the trial court cited its concerns about Mansanares' competency when it withdrew his self-representation status. But it did so noting the United States Supreme Court recognizes that states may require representation of defendants who are competent to stand trial, but who suffer from mental illnesses that prevent them from competently conducting trial proceedings by themselves. See Indiana, 554 U.S. at 178. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by not initiating another Rule 11 proceeding.
II. The Trial Judge Did Not Err by Not Recusing Himself.
¶9 After the verdict, but before sentencing, the trial judge informed the parties that, after trial ended, he learned that his former law partner represented Mansanares in three previous criminal cases. The judge explained the representation occurred at the time they were partners, but he did not recall ever working on the cases or even Mansanares' name. The judge added that the representation occurred "towards the end of those three case[s]" before each was dismissed. After reviewing the minute entries, the judge confirmed he had never appeared in the cases on behalf of Mansanares. The judge then invited the defense to file "any motions" with a different division regarding "whether I should still proceed with sentencing[.]" Mansanares filed no such timely motions. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 10.1(b)(1) ("A party seeking a change of judge for cause must file a motion no later than 10 days after discovering that grounds exist[.]").
¶10 Noting he was entitled to be tried by a judge "free from the appearance of bias," Mansanares contends the trial judge's failure to recuse himself constitutes structural error. Mansanares claims he is entitled to a new trial. We conclude otherwise.
¶11 "A trial judge is presumed to be free of bias and prejudice." State v. Hurley, 197 Ariz. 400, 404, ¶ 24 (App. 2000). To overcome this presumption, a party requesting recusal must "set forth a specific basis for the claim of partiality and prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the judge is biased or prejudiced." State v. Medina, 193 Ariz. 504, 510, ¶ 11 (1999). Specifically, the moving party must establish "a hostile feeling or spirit of ill-will, or undue friendship or favoritism, towards one of the litigants." In re Guardianship of Styer, 24 Ariz. App. 148, 151 (1975).
¶12 Mansanares' "appearance of bias" claim is not the kind of bias that results in structural error. "[O]nly bias reflecting a direct, personal,
substantial pecuniary interest, . . . constitutes a structural defect affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds." State v. Granados, 235 Ariz. 321, 325, ¶ 8 (App. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Therefore, we review for fundamental error. Id. at 326, ¶ 13.
¶13 Mansanares points to nothing in the record indicating any bias by the trial judge either at trial or sentencing, and he thus fails to overcome the presumption that the judge acted impartially. Indeed, our review of the record makes clear that the judge did not need to recuse himself and did precisely what he should have done under these circumstances. "Bare allegations of bias and prejudice, unsupported by factual evidence, are insufficient to overcome the presumption of impartiality and do not require recusal." State v. Carver, 160 Ariz. 167, 173 (1989). No conflict, technical or otherwise, presented itself here and thus no error of any kind occurred. Mansanares is therefore not entitled to a new trial.
III. The Prosecutor Did Not Improperly Diminish the State's Burden of Proof.
¶14 During closing arguments, the prosecutor stated the following:
Beyond a reasonable doubt, it's on page five of your jury instructions. It's on page five of your jury instructions, and it is the burden that the State has to prove to you. We must prove to you beyond a reasonable doubt. Well, a lot of people go like, well, what does that mean? It's difficult to define. And if I could give you a percentage — if I could say, well, it has to be 75 percent sure or 90 percent sure or whatever number percentage you want to talk about percent sure, we'd probably do that. But we can't. Okay? There's no percentage, there's no graph, there's no bar, there's no pie chart. There's nothing that we can show you. It's not, you have to be this convinced or this convinced. There's no depiction that we can show you because it is simply that you must be firmly convinced, firmly convinced.
. . .
Is there a possibility it's going to rain? Yes. In Phoenix is there a real possibility that a ten percent [sic] it's going to rain? Probabl[y] not, if you've lived in Phoenix long enough. It has
to be a real possibility. Okay? And if there's a real possibility that he's not guilty, then you must find him not guilty.
¶15 Mansanares argues the prosecutor's "analogy and argument diluted the burden of proof." Specifically, he contends the prosecutor's reference to the reasonable doubt standard as "difficult to define" results in the jurors' undue sympathy for the prosecutor, and that it "disempowers" the jurors, intimidating them from attempting to figure out the facts. Mansanares also claims the prosecutor improperly argued a ten percent chance of rain in Phoenix is "not a real possibility" and thus ten percent doubt as to guilt requires a guilty verdict. Notwithstanding Mansanares' contention to the contrary, we review for fundamental, not structural, error. See Amaya-Ruiz, 166 Ariz. at 171-72 (reviewing closing arguments for fundamental error because defendant did not object at trial).
¶16 The trial court properly instructed the jury regarding the State's burden. Further, prosecutors have wide latitude in presenting closing arguments. State v. Jones, 197 Ariz. 290, 305, ¶ 37 (2000). The trial court committed no error by allowing the argument. Moreover, based on the overwhelming and uncontested evidence at trial, Mansanares fails to establish any resulting prejudice.
CONCLUSION
¶17 We affirm Mansanares' conviction and sentence.