For example, there was no testimony describing a gun-shaped bulge in the clothing, an awkward gait or arm movement typical of those carrying concealed guns, an informant's tip that the subject was armed, or the fact that persons similarly situated to the defendant frequently carry unlicensed guns. See, e.g., United States v. Parker, 277 Fed.Appx. 48, 51 (2d Cir.2008) ; State v. Mann, 271 Conn. 300, 322–26, 857 A.2d 329 (2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 949, 125 S.Ct. 1711, 161 L.Ed.2d 527 (2005) ; 4 W. LaFave, supra, at § 9.6(a), pp. 855–62. In fact, the officers never even testified that they actually believed the defendant was carrying a weapon.
By contrast, the police may conduct a protective sweep even in the absence of probable cause to search the premises or arrest a suspect, as long as the officer is lawfully present on the premises at the time that the officer conducts the protective sweep, which of course must be justified by the officer's reasonable belief. The facts underlying State v. Mann, 271 Conn. 300, 857 A.2d 329 (2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 949, 125 S.Ct. 1711, 161 L.Ed.2d 527 (2005), aptly illustrate this principle. In that case, the police knocked on the defendant's door after receiving a tip concerning drug activity in that apartment.
Reasonable and articulable suspicion is a lower standard than probable cause. State v. Mann, 271 Conn. 300, 306 n. 8, 857 A.2d 329 (2004) (“[r]easonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable to show probable cause” [internal quotation marks omitted] ), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 949, 125 S.Ct. 1711, 161 L.Ed.2d 527 (2005). “Proof of probable cause requires less than proof by a preponderance of the evidence,” or in other words, less than proof that something is more likely than not. (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Consequently, the fourth amendment permits “swift action by police officers who, while conducting lawful investigations, find themselves in a position of imminent peril.” State v. Mann, 271 Conn. 300, 315, 857 A.2d 329 (2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 949, 125 S.Ct. 1711, 161 L.Ed.2d 527 (2005). Such action is permissible when, as the state contends occurred in the present case, an officer reasonably believes that, in order to avoid or defuse a potentially dangerous situation, he must take control of that situation by temporarily maintaining the status quo.
" An anonymous tip generally does not satisfy the requirement of reasonable suspicion unless the tip is suitably corroborated or otherwise exhibits sufficient indicia of reliability." State v. Mann, 271 Conn. 300, 326 n.21, 857 A.2d 329 (2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 949, 125 S.Ct. 1711, 161 L.Ed.2d 527 (2005); see also Florida v. J.L., supra, 529 U.S. 270, 120 S.Ct. 1375, 146 L.Ed.2d 254 (" there are situations in which an anonymous tip, suitably corroborated, exhibits 'sufficient indicia of reliability to provide reasonable suspicion to make the investigatory stop"); Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990) (anonymous tip seldom demonstrates veracity or basis of knowledge and, therefore, rarely justifies Terry stop standing alone). " [I]nformants do not all fall into neat categories of known or anonymous . Instead, it is useful to think of known reliability and corroboration as a sliding scale.
Professor LaFave's treatise on search and seizure has summarized these cases, indicating they recognize a "limited exception," which it explains by stating: "If the officer has commenced a nonseizure confrontation without a pre-existing reasonable suspicion supporting a frisk, but such suspicion suddenly appears (most likely because of the suspect's conduct), then the officer is entitled to frisk for his own protection." 4 LaFave, § 9.6(a) and n.14 (citing United States v. Ellis , 501 F.3d 958 [8th Cir. 2007] [occupant of house consented to police entry, but another occupant "act[ed] nervously and reach[ed] toward his pocket" providing suspicion justifying search]; State v. Mann , 271 Conn. 300, 857 A.2d 329 [2004] [allowing pat-down during consensual encounter after officers developed reasonable suspicion individual was armed and posed an immediate danger]; People v. Colyar , 374 Ill.Dec. 880, 996 N.E.2d 575 [2013] [citing LaFave's statement of exception and concluding "(t)hat is precisely what happened here," as "(o)nly after the nonseizure interrogation had commenced did they develop a reasonable suspicion that the vehicle's occupants were armed and dangerous"]; Commonwealth v. Stephens , 451 Mass. 370, 374, 383, 885 N.E.2d 785 [2008] [nonseizure encounter with persons within parked cars, when officer saw one "holding a black object in the area of his chest, which he quickly lowered to the area of his lap," officer "was justified in ‘opening the door, securing the defendant's hands and ordering the defendant from the car for a pat frisk limited to finding weapons’ "] ). We need not determine whether we agree with those decisions or the exception they recognize because, even if we did,
"An anonymous tip generally does not satisfy the requirement of reasonable suspicion ...." State v. Mann , 271 Conn. 300, 326 n.21, 857 A.2d 329 (2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 949, 125 S.Ct. 1711, 161 L.Ed.2d 527 (2005). This is because, "[u]nlike a tip from a known informant whose reputation can be assessed and who can be held responsible if her allegations turn out to be fabricated, see Adams v. Williams , 407 U.S. 143, [146–47, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612] (1972), an anonymous tip alone seldom demonstrates the informant's basis of knowledge or veracity, Alabama v. White , [496 U.S. 325, 329, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990) ].
See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081, 86 Ohio Law Abs. 513 (1961)." State v. Mann, 271 Conn. 300, 302 n.1, 857 A.2d 329 (2004), cert. denied ___U.S. ___, 125 S. Ct. 1711, 161 L. Ed. 2d 527 (2005). The state also claims that the defendant's second statement in which he confessed to the police "was sufficiently attenuated to purge any taint flowing from the illegal seizure . . . [because] the defendant received Miranda warnings and waived his constitutional rights in writing before he agreed to speak to the detectives about the murder."
State v. Spencer , 268 Conn. 575, 585–86, 848 A.2d 1183, cert. denied, 543 U.S. 957, 125 S. Ct. 409, 160 L. Ed. 2d 320 (2004) ; see State v. Jackson , 304 Conn. 383, 394–95, 40 A.3d 290 (2012) ; State v. Curet , 200 Conn. App. 13, 25, ––– A.3d ––––, cert. granted on other grounds, 335 Conn. 969, 240 A.3d 287 (2020) ; see generally State v. Mann , 271 Conn. 300, 319–20, 857 A.2d 329 (2004) (it is long-standing rule that police must, whenever practicable, obtain in advance judicial approval of searches and seizures via warrant procedure), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 949, 125 S. Ct. 1711, 161 L. Ed. 2d 527 (2005). "The fourth amendment to the United States constitution, made applicable to the states through the [due process clause of the] fourteenth amendment, prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures by government agents."
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Mann, 271 Conn. 300, 306 n.8, 857 A.2d 329 (2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 949, 125 S.Ct. 1711, 161 L.Ed.2d 527 (2005). " In evaluating the validity of [a traffic] stop, courts must consider whether, in light of the totality of the circumstances, the police officer had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity."