Opinion
No. 2-670 / 01-1805
Filed September 11, 2002
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Plymouth County, Robert J. Dull, District Associate Judge.
The State appeals from the district court's dismissal of the trial information charging defendant with possession of methamphetamine in violation of Iowa Code section 124.401(5) (2001). REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR REINSTATEMENT OF THE TRIAL INFORMATION.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Mary Tabor, Assistant Attorney General, Darin J. Raymond, County Attorney, and Amy Oetken, Assistant County Attorney, for appellant-State.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Nan Jennisch, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellee.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Vogel and Mahan, JJ.
The State appeals from the district court's dismissal of the trial information charging Kevin Majeres with possession of methamphetamine in violation of Iowa Code section 124.401(5) (2001). The State contends the district court erred when it applied a sufficiency of the evidence standard to a rule 2.11(6)( a) motion to dismiss. We reverse and remand for reinstatement of the trial information.
Background Facts and Proceedings. On August 1, 2001, the State filed a trial information charging Majeres with possession of methamphetamine in violation of Iowa Code section 124.401(5) (2001). Attached to the trial information were minutes of evidence, including a complete arrest report prepared by the LeMars Police Department. The minutes of evidence state Officer Dan Plueger of the LeMars Police Department stopped a vehicle owned by Marvin Kunkel and operated by Majeres for a routine speeding violation. During an initial search of the vehicle, Officer Plueger found several beer cans, a propane tank, butane bottles, lighter fluid, and a roll of tin foil. During a more extensive search of the vehicle, Officer Bendlin found a small piece of tin foil containing a white powdery substance that was later identified as methamphetamine.
The State filed a notice of additional minutes of evidence on August 28, 2001, summarizing the expected testimony of two employees of the Department of Public Safety who performed tests that determined the substance was methamphetamine. On September 12, 2001, Majeres moved to dismiss the trial information under Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure Rule 2.11(6) contending the State failed to show (1) where the tin foil was located in the vehicle; and (2) Majeres had dominion and control over the illegal substance, knowledge of its presence, or knowledge of its nature. The State resisted the dismissal and, in addition, filed a second notice of additional minutes of evidence, supplementing the expected testimony of Officers Plueger and Bendlin. The additional minutes of evidence state Majeres's impairment appeared to be in excess of his level of intoxication. Further, the minutes state the piece of tin foil containing a white powdery substance was found on the floor in front of the passenger seat. We note specifically that although Majeres denied knowledge of the drugs, his codefendant "gave Officer Bendlin a different story."
The district court dismissed the trial information for failure of the minutes of evidence to state sufficient facts to support the filing of the charge of possession of methamphetamine. The district court based its decision solely on State v. Atkinson, 620 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 2000) (holding mere proximity to contraband is insufficient to show dominion and control over the contraband). After reviewing the facts set forth in the trial information and minutes of evidence, the district court said the minutes show neither proof of the defendant's knowledge nor any evidence of his dominion and control over the contraband. The State appeals.
Motion to Dismiss Trial Information. We review a motion to dismiss a charge alleged in a trial information for the correction of errors at law. State v. Wells, 629 N.W.2d 346, 351 (Iowa 2001). A motion to dismiss a trial information is governed by Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.11(6)( a). This rule provides:
If it appears from the indictment or information and the minutes of evidence that the particulars stated do not constitute the offense charged in the indictment or information, or that the defendant did not commit that offense or that a prosecution for that offense is barred by the statute of limitations, the court may and on motion of the defendant shall dismiss the indictment or information unless the prosecuting attorney shall furnish a bill of particulars which so states the particulars as to cure the defect.
In considering a rule 2.11(6)( a) motion to dismiss, a court is to "accept as true the facts set out in the bill of particulars and indictment." State v. Marti, 290 N.W.2d 570, 578 (Iowa 1980). The reference to the "minutes of evidence" in the recent amendment to rule 2.11(6)( a) suggests this court should also accept as true the facts set forth in the minutes of evidence. "If those facts charge a crime as a matter of law, the indictment is upheld." Id.
The State contends the district court improperly applied a sufficiency of the evidence standard to a rule 2.11(6)( a) motion to dismiss. We agree. The district court's reliance on Atkinson, 620 N.W.2d at 5, was contrary to the supreme court's holdings in State v. Graham, 291 N.W.2d 345 (Iowa 1980), and State v. Doss, 355 N.W.2d 874 (Iowa 1984). The court held "a motion that merely challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting an indictment is not a ground for setting aside an indictment." Doss, 355 N.W.2d at 880 (citing Graham, 291 N.W.2d at 349-50). Thus, the district court erred when it dismissed the trial information based on lack of sufficient evidence to prove Majeres constructively possessed methamphetamine.
In dismissing the trial information, the district court misconstrued the function of the trial information, which is to "apprise the defendant of the crime charged so that the defendant may have the opportunity to prepare a defense." State v. Grice, 515 N.W.2d 20, 22 (Iowa 1994). The issue before the district court should have been whether the facts set forth in the trial information and minutes of evidence could constitute the crime of possession of methamphetamine and not whether the State would be able to prove its case at trial. The trial information and minutes of evidence state sufficient facts to support the filing of the charge of possession of methamphetamine. Whether the State can prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt is a separate issue altogether. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for reinstatement of the trial information.
REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR REINSTATEMENT OF THE TRIAL INFORMATION.
Vogel, J., concurs; Sackett, C.J., dissents.
I dissent. I would affirm the trial court.