Opinion
No. H12M-MV05-0394794S
May 31, 2005
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS
This matter comes before the court on the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence seized as a result of the detention of his motor vehicle by the East Hartford Police. For the following reasons the defendant's motion to suppress is denied.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The following facts are derived from the testimony presented and the exhibits introduced at a hearing held on the defendant's motion to suppress. The sole witness at the hearing was Officer Kwanza Clayton — a five-year veteran of the traffic enforcement division of the East Hartford Police Department.
On February 3, 2005, Clayton was on patrol on Burnside Avenue in the town of East Hartford. At approximately 12:50 p.m. Clayton observed a 1995 Nissan Maxima operating near the 700 block of Burnside Avenue. Using the Mobile Data Terminal (MDT) installed in his car, Clayton performed a registration check of the marker plate on the Maxima. While the MDT reported that the registration was in order, Clayton learned that the operator's license of the registered owner of the Maxima — Mathenge Maina — was suspended for a violation of § 14-227a and/or § 14-227b. In an effort to determine whether Maina was the operator, Clayton stopped the Maxima. Immediately, thereafter, Clayton approached the Maxima and requested that the operator identify himself. The defendant, who was behind the wheel, gave Clayton a false name.
Operation while under the influence of liquor, drug or while having an elevated blood alcohol content.
Implied consent to test operator's blood, breath or urine.
While Clayton was running the false name through the MDT, the defendant approached Clayton and confessed that he was Mathenge Maina and that his license was suspended for operating under the influence. Thereafter the defendant was issued a misdemeanor summons for operating under suspension.
§ 14-215(c).
On March 28, 2005, the defendant filed a motion to suppress arguing that the detention of his motor vehicle was illegal and that the evidence seized as a result of that detention — his identity — must be suppressed. The Court has reviewed the testimony and exhibits presented at the hearing and now issues this decision.
II. DISCUSSION
Stopping a vehicle and detaining its occupants constitutes a seizure within the meaning of the fourth and fourteenth amendments even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting duration brief. State v. Sailor, 33 Conn.App. 409, 416, cert. denied 229 Conn. 911 (1994) citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979). To comply with the requirements of the fourth amendment, therefore, a motor vehicle stop by a police officer must be based upon a reasonable, articulable suspicion on the part of the officer that the operator has committed or is about to commit an offense. Delaware v. Prouse, supra at 663.
Such brief investigatory seizures and detentions are permitted under both the United States and the Connecticut constitutions, even in the absence of probable cause, provided the police have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the occupants of the vehicle have engaged, are engaged, or are about to engage in criminal activity. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049-52, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983); State v. Lamme, 216 Conn. 172, 184 (1990); State v. Carter, 189 Conn. 611, 617 (1983). The purpose of such a detention is to maintain the status quo while investigating the circumstances that give rise to the suspicion of criminal wrongdoing. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972); State v. Carter, supra, 618. The United States Supreme Court has held that in situations where police have a reasonable suspicion, that a motorist is unlicensed or that an automobile is not registered, stopping a motor vehicle and detaining the operator in order to check his driver's license and registration is not unreasonable under the fourth amendment. Delaware v. Prouse, supra, 663.
What constitutes a reasonable and articulable suspicion depends on the totality of the circumstances. State v. Aillon, 202 Conn. 385, 399 (1985); State v. Aversa, 197 Conn. 685, 690 (1985). The determination of whether a specific set of circumstances provides a police officer with a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity is a question of fact. State v. Anderson, 24 Conn.App. 438, 441 (1991).
As an initial matter the defendant must "prove that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place that he alleges to have been unconstitutionally searched." (Citations omitted.) State v. Brown, 198 Conn. 348, 356, 503 A.2d 566 (1986). To that end the United States Supreme Court has recognized that "it is unreasonable to have an expectation of privacy in an object required by law to be located in a place ordinarily in plain view from the exterior of [an] automobile . . . The exterior of a car, of course, is thrust into the public eye, and thus to examine it does not constitute a search." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 114, 106 S.Ct. 960, 89 L.Ed.2d 81 (1986) (holding that there is no expectation of privacy in a vehicle identification number). Although the Class court considered the expectation of privacy in a vehicle identification number, the same analysis logically applies to a registration plate displayed on the exterior of the car in plain view. See, e.g., State v. Donis, 157 N.J. 44, 54-55, 723 A.2d 35 (1998) (upholding random MDT checks against a New Jersey constitutional challenge).
In the present case the defendant makes no claim that the registration plate of the Maxima was not in plain view. Thus the actions of Clayton in running the registration plate through the MDT have no constitutional implications and did not violate the defendant's fourth amendment rights.
The defendant further argues that prior to the stop Clayton lacked reasonable suspicion in that Clayton did not observe any moving violations and he had no information as to whether the operator of the Maxima was in fact the owner or some other male.
Although this issue appears to be one of first impression in Connecticut, other courts which have considered this issue have invariably found that a police officer's knowledge that the operator's license of the owner of a vehicle was suspended provides sufficient reasonable suspicion to warrant a stop and further investigation. See, e.g., People v. Ceballos, 175 App. Div.2d 315, 572 N.Y.S.2d 84, 85 (1991) (officer's knowledge of suspension of driving privileges of vehicle's owner was a "permissible basis for the stop of defendant's vehicle"); Commonwealth v. Deramo, 436 Mass. 40, 43-44, 762 N.E.2d 815 (2002) ("police may, in the absence of any contrary evidence, reasonably conclude that a vehicle is likely being driven by its registered owner . . . the likelihood that the operator is the owner is strong enough to satisfy the reasonable suspicion standard"); State v. Ritter, 801 N.E.2d 689, 693, Ind.Ct.App.), cert. denied, 812 N.E.2d 798 (Ind. 2004) (when an officer knows that the registered owner has a suspended license, he has reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle in order to determine whether it is the owner driving it); Village of Lake in the Hills v. Lloyd, 227 Ill. App.3d 351, 352-54, 591 N.E.2d 524, cert. denied, 146 Ill.2d 630, 602 N.E.2d 455 (1992) ("knowledge that an owner of a vehicle has a revoked driver's license provides a reasonable suspicion to stop the owner's vehicle for the purpose of ascertaining the status of the license of the driver"); State v. Pike, 551 N.W.2d 919, 922 (Minn. 1996) ("knowledge that the owner of a vehicle has a revoked license is enough to form the basis of reasonable suspicion of criminal activity when an officer observes the vehicle being driven").
"While it is certainly possible that someone other than a vehicle's registered owner may be operating the vehicle on any given occasion, the likelihood that the operator is the owner is strong enough to satisfy the reasonable suspicion standard. Lake in the Hills v. Lloyd, supra at 353, citing People v. Barnes, 152 Ill.App.3d 1004, 1006 (1987)." Commonwealth v. Deramo, supra, 436 Mass. 43-44. "The standard of `reasonable suspicion' does not require that an officer exclude all possible innocent explanations of the facts and circumstances." Id.
It is beyond dispute that the state has a compelling interest in ensuring that only qualified drivers operate vehicles on public roads. Delaware v. Prouse, supra, 658. See also Daly v. DelPonte, 225 Conn. 499, 515 (1993) (state's interest in highway safety is a compelling state interest). To that end "[e]very operator of a motor vehicle must expect that the state, in enforcing its regulations, will intrude to some extent upon that operator's privacy." New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 113, 106 S.Ct. 960, 965, 89 L.Ed.2d 81, 90 (1986). In the present case, the only immediate way to determine the identity of the driver and whether he possessed a valid license was to stop the defendant's car. Thereafter the degree of intrusion by Clayton was minimal. As soon as the defendant's car was stopped, Clayton approached the car, asked the operator his name, returned to his patrol car and immediately began a license check of the false name. There is no evidence that the defendant was searched, taken into custody or even asked to exit his vehicle. The officer having a reasonable suspicion that the operator may have been suspended acted within the scope of his authority under General Statutes § 14-217 to verity the operator's identity and license status. State v. Anderson, 24 Conn.App. 438, 446 (1991). Therefore, in balancing the state's compelling interest against the minimal intrusion to the defendant, the court concludes that no fourth amendment violation occurred.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant's motion to suppress is denied.
BY THE COURT
PATRICIA A. SWORDS JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT