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State v. Mailo

12 Citing cases

  1. State v. Kekona

    77 Haw. 403 (Haw. 1994)   Cited 36 times
    Holding that the failure to electronically record custodial interrogation was not a due process violation

    In the same vein, and although the right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation is not directly in issue in this case, I am concerned that the unwillingness of the majority to adopt the Stephan rule prospectively will come back to haunt us on that subject as well. Specifically, in the absence of the Stephan rule, enforcement of this court's holdings in State v. Mailo, 69 Haw. 51, 731 P.2d 1264 (1987), and Hoey, supra, may be virtually impossible. In Mailo, the defendant appealed the circuit court's order denying his motion to suppress statements made by him during a custodial interrogation, arguing that his rights to counsel and to remain silent under the fifth and sixth amendments to the United States Constitution and article I, sections 10 and 14 of the Hawaii Constitution had been violated.

  2. State v. Hoey

    77 Haw. 17 (Haw. 1994)   Cited 143 times
    Holding that "the question whether [the defendant]'s kidnapping offense merged into the robbery offense . . . is one of fact that should have been submitted to the jury."

    See also Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 646 [ 104 S.Ct. 1338, 1343, 79 L.Ed.2d 579] . . . (1984). State v. Mailo, 69 Haw. 51, 53, 731 P.2d 1264, 1266 (1987). In Mailo, the defendant appealed the circuit court's order denying his motion to suppress statements made by him during a custodial interrogation, arguing that his rights to counsel and to remain silent under the fifth and sixth amendments to the United States Constitution and article I, sections 10 and 14 of the Hawaii Constitution had been violated.

  3. State v. Carvalho

    101 Haw. 97 (Haw. Ct. App. 2002)   Cited 8 times
    Holding that HRS § 706-662 was not constitutionally infirm and reading Tafoya in harmony with Apprendi

    In this connection, Carvalho cites only one legal authority. Carvalho relies on State v. Mailo, 69 Haw. 51, 731 P.2d 1264 (1987), to support his assertion that he invoked hisMiranda right to counsel during custodial interrogation. In Mailo, the following colloquy occurred after the interviewing police officer informed Mailo of his Miranda rights:

  4. State v. Trinque

    140 Haw. 269 (Haw. 2017)   Cited 19 times
    Defining interrogation to include police practices "that the police should know [are] reasonably likely to invoke an incriminating response"

    We note that, if this were the case, Officer Silva would have violated the well-established rule that "once the right to counsel has been invoked all questioning must cease.” State v. Mailo, 69 Haw. 51 , 52, 731 P.2d 1264 , 1266 (1987).

  5. State v. Luton

    83 Haw. 443 (Haw. 1996)   Cited 25 times
    Applying the federal attachment standard to claim under the Hawaii Constitution

    An accused invokes the constitutional protection against self-incrimination when he either remains silent or expresses "his desire to deal with police interrogators only through his counsel." State v. Mailo, 69 Haw. 51, 731 P.2d 1264 (1987). Thereafter, "he cannot be further questioned until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused initiates further communication, exchanges or conversations with the police."

  6. State v. Tsujimura

    140 Haw. 299 (Haw. 2017)   Cited 41 times
    Holding the test in cases where the prosecution elicits information regarding a defendant's prearrest silence is whether the prosecutor intended for the information to imply the defendant's guilt or whether the character of the information suggests that the prearrest silence may be considered as inferential evidence of guilt

    Hawai'i case law is clear that the constitutional right against self-incrimination under the Ha-wai'i Constitution is invoked when a person "either remains silent or expresses 'his desire to deal with police interrogators only through his counsel.' ” State v. Luton, 83 Hawai'i. 443, 453, 927 P.2d 844 , 854 (1996) (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Mailo, 69 Haw. 51 , 731 P.2d 1264 (1987)). Thus, under the Hawai'i Constitution, the mere fact that a person remained silent in the face of police questioning is enough to invoke the right to remain silent, and "express invocation” is not necessary.

  7. State v. Wallace

    105 Haw. 131 (Haw. 2004)   Cited 12 times
    Stating that "we choose to afford our citizens broader protection under article I, section 10 of the Hawai'i Constitution than that recognized by the" Supreme Court in Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452

    See also Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 646 [ 104 S.Ct. 1338, 1343, 79 L.Ed.2d 579] . . . (1984).State v. Mailo, 69 Haw. 51, 53, 731 P.2d 1264, 1266 (1987).Id. at 34, 881 P.2d at 521 (brackets, ellipses points, and emphasis in original).

  8. State v. Ketchum

    97 Haw. 107 (Haw. 2001)   Cited 49 times
    Holding that a defendant who objects to the admissibility of his or her oral statement and seeks to suppress it must establish that his or her statement was a result of . . . "interrogation" that occurred while he or she was . . . "in custody"

    Once the right to counsel has been invoked, all questioning must cease. State v. Mailo, 69 Haw. 51, 731 P.2d 1264 (1987). Herein, once Ketchum was informed of his right to counsel, and thereafter refused to speak, Officer Itomura proceeded to request Ketchum's address.

  9. State v. Villeza

    72 Haw. 327 (Haw. 1991)   Cited 22 times
    In Villeza, this court extended its holding in Fajardo by further holding that "it was error for the trial court to instruct the jury that it must unanimously decide that it was unable to reach a verdict."

    More recently, however, we have applied the clearly erroneous standard to the findings on which the decision to admit the statement are based. See State v. Kaahanui, 69 Haw. 473, 481, 747 P.2d 1276, 1281 (1987); State v. Mailo, 69 Haw. 51, 53, 731 P.2d 1264, 1266 (1987); Lono v. State, 63 Haw. 470, 629 P.2d 630 (1981). In State v. Nelson, 69 Haw. 461, 469, 748 P.2d 365, 370 (1987) (citations omitted), we noted that

  10. Kortz v. State

    746 P.2d 435 (Wyo. 1987)   Cited 3 times

    This is not just plain error; it is abject malfeasance in prosecutorial conduct. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378, reh. denied 452 U.S. 973, 101 S.Ct. 3128, 69 L.Ed.2d 984 (1981); State v. Mailo, Hawaii, 731 P.2d 1264 (1987). See also Best v. State, Wyo., 736 P.2d 739, 742 (1987):