Id. (some capitalization omitted). In State v. Magliano, 7 Md. App. 286, 293, 255 A.2d 470, 474 (1969), the Court of Special Appeals referred to Kilty's as "[t]he only evidence on th[e] subject" of which English statutes have been found to be applicable in Maryland. Beckwitt points to a footnote in Magliano, 7 Md. App. at 293 n.5, 255 A.2d at 474 n.5, in which the Court of Special Appeals stated: "That Kilty did not regard a statute as ‘applicable’ did not preclude a court from having a different view."

In fact, an accessory could not even be arraigned until the attainder of the principal, which followed the final judgment. As stated in Blackstone, Commentaries on the Law of England, p. 232 (1st ed. 1769), quoted by Judge Orth for the court in State v. Magliano, 7 Md. App. 286, 296, 255 A.2d 470 (1969): Attainder or attaint at common law was the extinction of one's civil liberties and capacities that occurred by operation of law after the imposition of sentence upon conviction for a felony.

The General Assembly created a statutory crime of escape which was analogous to the common law offense. Baker v. State, 205 Md. 42, 45, 106 A.2d 692 (1954); State v. Magliano, 7 Md. App. 286, 288, 255 A.2d 470 (1969). The common law and statutory history of the crime was traced in Fabian v. State, 3 Md. App. 270, 274-279, 239 A.2d 100 (1968).

W. La Fave A. Scott, Handbook on Criminal Law § 63, pp. 498-499 (hereinafter referred to as La Fave Scott). The rules are frequently procedural embarrassments to the State, see State v. Magliano, 7 Md. App. 286, 255 A.2d 470 (1969), and the case at hand furnishes yet another example. It concerns the application of the common law doctrine of accessoryship to the crime of murder, and the procedural embarrassments to the State are compounded by the statutory classification in Maryland of murder into degrees, which was unknown at the English common law. I

Art. 5 of the Declaration of Rights states, in relevant part, that the inhabitants of Maryland are "entitled to the Common Law of England, and the trial by Jury, according to the course of that Law . . . except such as . . . may be inconsistent with the provisions of this Constitution. . . ." See State v. Magliano, 7 Md. App. 286, 293, 255 A.2d 470 (1969). Art. 23 states that "[t]he right of trial by Jury of all issues of fact in civil proceedings in the several Courts of Law in this State, where the amount in controversy exceeds the sum of five hundred dollars, shall be inviolably preserved."

We hold that the adoption of the escape statute was, in effect, the equivalent of the wooden stake in the heart of Dracula which made impossible the resurrection of the common law by the declaration of the trial judge that the escape statute was unconstitutional. This is evidenced by our holding in State v. Magliano, 7 Md. App. 286, 288, 255 A.2d 470 (1969), where we said: We concluded [in Fabian v. State, supra,] that it was the legislative intent under the statute in effect today, Maryland Code, Article 27, § 139, tocreate a new crime of escape, although analogous to the common law crime, and that the statutory crime encompasses both the common law "simple escape" and "breach of prison."

The argument raises the questions of whether that crime was one recognized under the Common Law of England when Maryland adopted that body of law, and if so, has the crime since been abandoned for obsolescence by its apparent non-use here. See State v. Magliano, 7 Md. App. 286, 293. There is no argument made that this crime which is in the nature of a criminal cover-up is "inconsistent with the spirit of the Constitution and the nature of our political institutions", see Gilbert v. Findlay College, supra, at 513, or that it is:

Our holding was expressly affirmed by the Court of Appeals on certiorari, 261 Md. 221, 223. Compare with the rule as to an accessory after the fact as set out in State v. Magliano, 7 Md. App. 286. IV

The rule that the common law is subject to change by the legislature was stated and applied in Heath v. State, 198 Md. 455, 464, and Robb v. State, 190 Md. 641, 650. We recognized the rule in State v. Magliano, 7 Md. App. 286. The Juvenile Causes Act has in effect changed the substantive law itself.

Fischer v. Ball, 212 Md. 517, 129 A.2d 822, 825. See Latz v. Latz, a/k/a Schafer, 10 Md. App. 720, 730, 272 A.2d 434; State v. Magliano, 7 Md. App. 286, 292, 255 A.2d 470. One of the rights to which the inhabitants of Maryland are entitled is, in an appropriate case, to request a court of chancery to issue a writ of ne exeat. The writ is described in Bouvier's Law Dictionary as follows: