N.M.S.A. § 30-31-20(A)(3) (emphasis added). See State v. Reams, 1981-NMCA-158, ¶ 2, 98 N.M. 372, 648 P.2d 1185 (concluding that quaalude is not a narcotic drug under the Controlled Substances Act); State v. Mabrey, 1975-NMCA-098, ¶ 6, 88 N.M. 227, 539 P.2d 617 (concluding that marijuana similarly is not a narcotic drug). Psilocybin is a Schedule I drug included in the list of scheduled hallucinogenic substances.
The jurisdictional exception was later applied in a number of New Mexico cases. E.g., Trujillo v. State, 79 N.M. 618, 619, 447 P.2d 279, 280 (1968); State v. Paris, 76 N.M. 291, 298, 414 P.2d 512, 517 (1966); State v. Mabrey, 88 N.M. 227, 228-29, 539 P.2d 617, 618-19 (Ct.App. 1975). {10} Defendant argues that Goodson, as well as the jurisdictional portion of Diaz, is inconsistent with more recent Supreme Court authority.
"[W]here a defendant is not charged with a public offense, proceedings after a plea to that non-charge does [sic] not place a defendant in jeopardy." State v. Mabrey, 88 N.M. 227, 229, 539 P.2d 617, 619 (Ct.App. 1975) (citing State v. Ferguson, 56 N.M. 398, 244 P.2d 783 (1952); State v. Ardovino, 55 N.M. 161, 228 P.2d 947 (1951); State v. Valdez, 51 N.M. 393, 185 P.2d 977 (1947)). Similarly, agreeing to be sentenced as an adult for a crime specifically defined as a delinquent act should be of no effect.
1984); 30-42-4. See also State v. Mabrey, 88 N.M. 227, 539 P.2d 617 (Ct.App. 1975) (defendant may not be punished for a crime without a sufficient charge having been filed, even where defendant voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the court). The fact that Whitfield Bus Lines, Inc. was named in the charge as the affected enterprise did not constitute a charge of racketeering against the corporate defendant.
Because attempted felony murder was not a proper charge, the trial court lacked jurisdiction over Count I. State v. Mabrey, 88 N.M. 227, 539 P.2d 617 (Ct.App. 1975). Because the trial court lacked jurisdiction, there is no basis for a claim of double jeopardy.
Being a proper charge, jurisdiction was conferred on the court. Cf. State v. Mabrey, 88 N.M. 227, 539 P.2d 617 (Ct.App. 1975). When the jury was impaneled and sworn to try the case, jeopardy attached on the charge.
Bell Telephone Laboratories, Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue, 78 N.M. 78, 428 P.2d 617 (1966). On the merits see State v. Manzanares, 100 N.M. 621, 674 P.2d 511 (1983); State v. Tanton, 88 N.M. 333, 540 P.2d 813 (1975); Owens v. Abram, 58 N.M. 682, 274 P.2d 630 (1954); State v. Barela, 95 N.M. 349, 622 P.2d 254 (Ct.App. 1980); State v. Mabrey, 88 N.M. 227, 539 P.2d 617 (Ct.App. 1975). CLAIMED MERGER OF AGGRAVATED BURGLARY AND DANGEROUS USE OF EXPLOSIVES
Defendant asserts his motion to dismiss was a challenge to the jurisdiction of the court; from the cases cited in support of this argument, defendant uses "jurisdiction" in the sense of a sufficient charge for there to be a pending cause. See State v. Mabrey, 88 N.M. 227, 539 P.2d 617 (Ct.App. 1975). The indictment charged an offense in accordance with R.Crim.Proc. 5.
Because the Children's Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, defendant does not claim that the D.W.I., reckless driving, and vehicular homicide charges in the indictment were barred by Children's Court proceedings involving those charges. State v. Mabrey, 88 N.M. 227, 539 P.2d 617 (Ct.App. 1975); see State v. Peavler, 88 N.M. 125, 537 P.2d 1387 (1975). Defendant's contention is that the prosecution of the three charges in the indictment was barred, under double jeopardy concepts, because of the Children's Court proceedings involving the involuntary manslaughter allegation.