Likewise, one who deposits contraband (or grows marijuana) in his backyard even adjacent to his home in such a position that a passerby who can see through or over a fence and thus readily can view the contraband likewise has no reasonable expectation of privacy. See State v. Lyons, 167 Ga. App. 747 ( 307 S.E.2d 285). Today the protection afforded to the "curtilage" is no more or no less than that reasonable expectation of privacy to which the home resident reasonably expects to be afforded his secluded activities within the home. Oliver, supra at p. 182, fn. 12. However reasonable a landowner's expectation of privacy may be, those expectations cannot convert grounds (open to casual view) into a "house" or an "effect."
Thus, the entry upon the property was a "valid intrusion" by the police. State v. Lyons, 167 Ga. App. 747, 748 ( 307 S.E.2d 285). The van was not parked in an area in which defendant had an expectation of privacy. See Lang v. State, 165 Ga. App. 576 ( 302 S.E.2d 683). And it cannot be said that Officer Bartlett violated defendant's Fourth Amendment rights when he established his vantage point.
See Galbreath v. State, 213 Ga. App. 80, 82 (2) ( 443 SE2d 664) (1994). See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 464-473 (91 SC 2022, 29 LE2d 564) (1971); State v. Lyons, 167 Ga. App. 747, 748 ( 307 SE2d 285) (1983). Here, the only question is whether Bishop's presence in the back yard was an unlawful invasion of Watson's privacy expectation such that the evidence seized was the fruit of an illegal search.
State v. Zackery, 193 Ga. App. 319, 320 ( 387 SE2d 606) (1989).State v. Lyons, 167 Ga. App. 747, 748 ( 307 SE2d 285) (1983).United States v. Anderson, 552 F2d 1296, 1299-1300 (I) (8th Cir. 1977).
Pretermitting whether the officers' protective sweeps of the barn and the house were authorized, however, the trial court found that the officers were within their rights when they saw marijuana from the adjoining property, when they smelled marijuana from the driveway, and when they went to both the front and the back doors of the house "in an attempt to make contact with someone." See State v. Zackery, 193 Ga. App. 319, 320 ( 387 SE2d 606) (1989) (officer who is unable to approach the front door of a residence and tries to knock upon a side door makes a "valid intrusion" upon the property, having taken the same route as a guest would), quoting State v. Lyons, 167 Ga. App. 747, 748 ( 307 SE2d 285) (1983). Because this finding is not clearly erroneous, we hold that the grounds given in the affidavit supporting the warrant application were "wholly unconnected" with Padgett's arrest and the two protective sweeps, amounting instead to an "independent source" for the seizure of the evidence at issue.
See King v. State, 217 Ga. App. 889, 891 ( 459 SE2d 605) (1995) (that defendant was agitated and backed up into his residence did not justify deputy's advance into home as a response to any perceived safety threat). The State argues that the officers were justified in entering Kirsche's backyard because it is not unusual for an officer to go to the back door to contact the resident if he is unable to contact them at the front door. See, e.g., State v. Lyons, 167 Ga. App. 747, 748 ( 307 SE2d 285) (1983). Under these circumstances, the plain view doctrine is in effect regardless of whether the officer expected or suspected that he would discover the object seized.
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) State v. Lyons, 167 Ga. App. 747, 748 ( 307 S.E.2d 285) (1983). This is true even when the officer entered the back yard of the property.
Nor did Agent Evans become a trespasser merely by walking around to the back of the house to determine whether anyone was home, after receiving no response at the front door. State v. Lyons, 167 Ga. App. 747, 748 ( 307 S.E.2d 285). [S]uch an officer is merely taking the same route as would any guest or other caller.
Likewise the seizure of the contraband found in plain view as a result was authorized. State v. Lyons, 167 Ga. App. 747, 749 ( 307 S.E.2d 285) (1983); Horton, supra. Cf. State v. Scott, 176 Ga. App. 887, 890 ( 339 S.E.2d 276) (1985).
See also Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963)." Cf. State v. Lyons, 167 Ga. App. 747 ( 307 S.E.2d 285) (1983); Phillips v. State, 167 Ga. App. 260, 261 ( 305 S.E.2d 918) (1983). When the officer saw the cocaine, he was not "entitled to be in such a vantage point," Lyons, supra at 749; his vantage point was unlawful because it was unconstitutionally achieved by holding defendant in a place he did not choose to be. Since what the officers took from defendant's person by searching it was tainted by the unlawful custody, it follows ineluctably that what they took from his immediate custodial presence was also tainted by the unlawfulness of that custody.